dc.contributor.author | Brekke, Kurt Richard | |
dc.contributor.author | Sørgard, Lars | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-03T07:28:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-03T07:28:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-08 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162762 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the interplay between public and private
health care in a National Health Service. We consider a two-stage
game, where at stage one a Health Authority sets the public sector
wage and a subsidy to (or tax on) private provision. At stage
two the physicians decide how much to work in the public and the
private sector. We characterise different equilibria depending on
whether physicians coordinate labour supply or not, the physicians’
job preferences, and the cost efficiency of private relative to
public provision. We find that private provision tends to crowd
out the NHS if physicians are sufficiently indifferent about where
to work or the private sector is sufficiently cost efficient. Competition
between physicians triggers a shift from public provision
towards private provision, and an increase in the total amount of
health care provided. The endogenous nature of labour supply
may have counter-intuitive effects. For example, a cost reduction
in the private sector is followed by a higher wage in the public sector. | en |
dc.format.extent | 190381 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2003:14 | en |
dc.subject | health care | en |
dc.subject | mixed oligopoly | en |
dc.subject | physicians | en |
dc.title | Public versus private health care in a national health service | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |