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dc.contributor.authorHagen, Rune Jansen
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-03T08:10:07Z
dc.date.available2006-08-03T08:10:07Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162826
dc.descriptionUpdated October 2004en
dc.description.abstractShould a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post. They therefore delegate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.en
dc.format.extent269337 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:22en
dc.subjectforeign aiden
dc.subjectincentivesen
dc.subjectstrategic delegationen
dc.titleSamaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policyen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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