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dc.contributor.authorCappelen, Alexander W.
dc.contributor.authorTungodden, Bertil
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-03T07:14:06Z
dc.date.available2006-08-03T07:14:06Z
dc.date.issued2004-06
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162890
dc.description.abstractA liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is not possible to fulfil this ambition. Inequalities can only be justified on the basis of incentive considerations within a liberal egalitarian framework. Moreover, we demonstrate that there is a surprisingly thin line between strict egalitarianism and libertarianism, which implies that liberals easily may end up as libertarians if they weaken their egalitarian ambitions.en
dc.format.extent168395 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:8en
dc.titleThe liberal egalitarian paradoxen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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