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dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-21T12:51:20Z
dc.date.available2008-10-21T12:51:20Z
dc.date.issued2008-10
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163947
dc.description.abstractWe model how multinationals structure their borrowing and lending transactions and find that affiliates in high-tax countries have higher internal and overall debt ratios and lower rental rates of physical capital than comparable domestic firms. We also show that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:19en
dc.subjectmultinational enterprisesen
dc.subjecttax-efficient financing structuresen
dc.subjectminority ownershipen
dc.titleMultinationals, minority ownership and tax-efficient financing structuresen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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