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dc.contributor.authorAase, Knut K.
dc.contributor.authorBjuland, Terje
dc.contributor.authorØksendal, Bernt
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-08T09:28:48Z
dc.date.available2013-03-08T09:28:48Z
dc.date.issued2011-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/164185
dc.description.abstractThe single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially informed, or alternatively they can be manipulated. Unlike Kyle's assumption that the quantity traded by the noise traders is independent of the asset value, we assume that the noise traders are able to correlate their trade with the true price. This has several implications for the equilibrium, one being that the insider's expected profits decrease as the noise traders' ability to correlate positively improve. In the limit, the noise traders do not lose on average, and the insider makes zero expected profits. When the correlation is negative, we interpret this as manipulation. In this case the insider makes the highest expected profits, and the informativeness of prices is at its minimum.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Finance and Management Scienceno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;2011:21
dc.subjectinsider tradingno_NO
dc.subjectasymmetric informationno_NO
dc.subjectstrategic tradeno_NO
dc.subjectcorrelated tradeno_NO
dc.subjectpartially informed noise tradersno_NO
dc.titleInsider trading with partially informed tradersno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Business: 213no_NO


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