Managerial delegation and merger incentives
Working paper
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Date
2003-12Metadata
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- Working papers (SNF) [809]
Abstract
We analyse how the internal organisation of firms affects the correspondence between private and social incentives for horizontal merger. Applying a model of endogenous merger formation in a three-firm asymmetric Cournot industry, we contrast the cases of entrepreneurial and managerial firms. The use of strategic delegation increases both the probability that a merger takes place and the likelihood that the 'wrong' type of merger is undertaken, from a viewpoint of social welfare. This suggests that managerial delegation increases the scope for antitrust policy.
Publisher
SNFSeries
Working paper2003:1