| dc.description.abstract | The takeover literature appears to lack comprehensive studies on the
shareholder wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in emerging
markets (EMs). In this thesis, using a sample consisting of 542 initial
takeover bids originating from 21 emerging economies, we provide a
unified analysis of the value creation in M&A and the distribution of value
between target- and bidder firms. Further, we examine the differences in
value creation and value distribution between EMs and the United States
(US) by including a control sample consisting of 2 379 US initial takeover
bids. To measure value creation, we calculate both the capitalizationweighted
combined cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the bid
announcement, and the combined dollar returns per dollar spent on
takeovers. To measure the value distribution, we calculate the difference in
dollar returns received by the target and bidder, normalized by their
combined pre-merger market capitalization, as well as the fraction of
combined dollar returns received by the target. When analyzing the
differences between EMs and the US, we control for commonly accepted
deal-, firm-, and country characteristics. We find that while premiums
received by targets are significantly lower in EMs than in the US, there is
no significant difference in value creation. Further, EM targets receive a
significantly smaller share of the value creation than their US counterparts.
Hence, our results suggest that bargaining power is lower for EM targets.
In addition, we present evidence indicating a positive relationship between
the degree of corruption and target pre-announcement stock price runup. | nb_NO |
