| dc.description.abstract | This thesis consists of four chapters on the industrial organisation of digital platforms and
vertical markets. The first chapter addresses how competition between digital platforms is
affected by targeting technologies, stricter privacy regulation, and consumer multi-homing.
Since the quality of targeting technologies improves with consumer data, targeting in creases the importance of attracting consumers. Whereas previous literature has shown
that this could result in fierce competition when consumers subscribe to only one plat form (i.e., single-home), we find that targeting softens the competition over consumers
when we allow consumers to have multiple subscriptions (i.e., multi-home). This might
imply that equilibrium profits are higher with targeting than without. The second chap ter studies the competitive effects of cross-licensing contracts between digital platforms.
In one-sided markets, cross-licensing has potential anti-competitive effects. I find in a
two-sided model that positive network effects might alleviate the anti-competitive effects
of cross-licensing, and even flip the outcome. The third chapter studies the incentives of
dominant suppliers to commit to uniform pricing in wholesale markets when inside options
induce size-based wholesale price discrimination in favour of the large retailer. Seminal lit erature has provided clear-cut results. In a model with endogenous inside options, we show
that the outcome is ambiguous when we allow retailers to be differentiated. The fourth
and final chapter presents two classroom experiments on technology licensing, which has
been applied to teach central concepts of economics to business students. The classroom
experiments stimulate discussions of, among others, technology licensing and intellectual
property rights. | en_US |
