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Beliefs About Racial Discrimination and Support for Pro-Black Policies

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Beliefs About Racial Discrimination and Support for Pro-Black Policies*

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Abstract

We examine whether beliefs about racial discrimination causally affect support for pro-black policies. Using representative samples of Americans, we elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about the extent of labor market discrimination against blacks. 55 percent overestimate the extent of discrimination against blacks, and Republicans are 19 percentage points less likely than Democrats to overestimate discrimination. An information treatment substantially narrows Republican–Democrat differences in beliefs, but fails to narrow differences in political behavior. Overall, the results demonstrate that correcting biases in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political polarization in support for pro-black policies. (*JEL* C91, D83, J71, J15)

Keywords: Racial discrimination, Beliefs, Pro-black Policies, Policy Preferences

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1 Introduction

Racial discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon that affects many spheres of society (Arrow, 1998; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; List, 2004). In the United States, several studies have documented high levels of racial discrimination in various domains, such as the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), the housing market (Bartoš et al., 2016; Edelman et al., 2017), sports (Price and Wolfers, 2010), and the judicial system (Abrams et al., 2012; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014).

To deal with this large degree of racial discrimination, the US government has introduced policies aiming to actively counteract the effects of racial discrimination. However, Americans are deeply divided in their support for such policies. For instance, while 73 percent of Democrats support affirmative action programs for racial minorities, only 38 percent of Republicans support this.[1] There is a strong perception in the public debate that this political disagreement is rooted in differences in perceptions of the extent of racial discrimination in society (Newkirk, 2017). Furthermore, in a seminal article on the drivers of opposition to pro-black policies, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) argue that it is necessary to correct people's biases in beliefs to gain support for pro-black policies.

In this paper, we provide the first causal evidence of the relationship between people's beliefs about racial discrimination against blacks and their support for pro-black policies. Specifically, we address the following two questions using incentivized data on people's beliefs and support for pro-black policies: First, do Republicans and Democrats hold different beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society? Second, would a convergence in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society reduce the differences in support for pro-black policies between Republicans and Democrats?

We introduce a new approach to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about

[1] https://news.gallup.com/poll/184772/higher-support-gender-affirmative-action-race.aspx (accessed November 30, 2018).

racial discrimination. With respondents from a high-quality, probability-based sample of the US household population, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the results of a correspondence study testing for racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).[2] Respondents were told that researchers sent out resumes that were identical in all respects except for the perceived race of the sender to help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. After informing the respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on average, we asked them how many times they thought that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average. In contrast to traditional survey questions, which typically ask about "how much discrimination is there" on a scale from "a lot" to "none at all," this approach allows us to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about racial discrimination in a precisely defined environment.

To examine whether beliefs about racial discrimination causally affect people's support for policies aiming to counteract the effects of racial discrimination, we introduced exogenous variation in people's beliefs by informing a random subset of the respondents about the actual results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), namely that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. To measure whether people update their beliefs about racial discrimination in response to this evidence, we elicited their beliefs about a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017). Furthermore, to measure whether the information provision affects people's political behavior, respondents decided whether to receive money versus making a real donation to a pro-black civil rights organization. Finally, respondents answered a series of questions on self-reported views on pro-black policies. We document several novel findings on beliefs about racial discrimination and support for pro-black

[2]While the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) was conducted in 2001 and 2002, a recent meta-analysis of field experiment on racial labor discrimination in the US shows no change in racial discrimination over time (Quillian et al., 2017).

policies in America. Our first finding is that 55 percent of Americans overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks. Beliefs vary systematically by people's self-identified party affiliation: Republicans are about 19 percentage points less likely than Democrats to overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. Republicans are thus more accurate in their beliefs about racial discrimination than Democrats are. While Republicans on average overestimate the extent of racial discrimination by 16 percent (i.e., how many resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average), Democrats overestimate the extent of discrimination by 71 percent. Second, eliciting incentivized beliefs about the results from a second correspondence study in the housing market, we document that people's beliefs about racial discrimination respond strongly to the research evidence. Treated Republicans and Democrats hold virtually identical beliefs about racial discrimination. Third, we find that the provision of information about racial discrimination causally affects people's political behavior: Treated respondents who underestimate the extent of racial discrimination increase their donations by 17 percent of a standard deviation. This effect size corresponds to almost one-third of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. However, since the increase in donations among those who underestimate discrimination is entirely driven by non-Republicans, the treatment fails to narrow the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. Furthermore, examining treatment responses on self-reported attitudes towards pro-black policies, we find that these are generally unresponsive to new information. Overall, these findings demonstrate that correcting people's biases in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political polarization in support for pro-black policies.

To address concerns about social desirability bias, we conducted an additional experiment where the main outcome questions on self-reported policy views were only asked one week later in an obfuscated follow-up study hiding the connection between the treatment provision and the main outcome questions. We find evidence of strong

and persistent belief updating about the extent of racial labor market discrimination in response to the information. The treatment completely eliminates the gap in beliefs between Democrats and Republicans. Furthermore, the results from the obfuscated follow-up study support our finding from the first experiment that self-reported attitudes towards pro-black policies are generally unresponsive to changes in beliefs about racial discrimination. The only exception compared to Experiment 1 is that we find some evidence of backfiring for Republicans; that is, treated Republicans who underestimate racial discrimination display even less support for pro-black policies.

We also ran two additional experiments to shed light on the role of two further potential determinants of support for pro-black policies. Our first additional experiment was motivated by strong correlational evidence suggesting an important role of beliefs about differences in work ethic between blacks and whites for explaining views on pro-black policies. In this experiment, we provided our respondents with information challenging the stereotype that blacks have a worse work ethic than whites (Gilens, 2009). Our experiment reveals that people who receive information about racial differences in work ethic do not adjust their views on pro-black policies. Finally, after establishing that information about racial discrimination or about racial stereotypes regarding work ethic does not affect self-reported policy views, our last experiment sheds light on a different prominently discussed causal determinant of policy views, namely political identity (Bursztyn et al., 2016). We show that making party views on pro-black policies more salient does not increase Democrat–Republican differences in self-reported policy views, suggesting that political identity is not the main driver of people's views on pro-black policies. Overall, these two additional experiments corroborate our previous finding that self-reported attitudes towards pro-black policies are generally hard to move, suggesting that these may have an important "cultural" component that is very stable over time (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).

Our main contributions are as follows: We collect the first incentivized measures of

support for pro-black policies along with quantitative and incentivized data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market and in the housing market.[3] We introduce a new approach for measuring incentivized beliefs about discrimination by leveraging correspondence studies, which provide a useful tool to elicit well-defined and incentivized beliefs. In contrast to traditional survey questions, our approach allows us to obtain a quantitative measure of people's beliefs about racial discrimination that is incentivized and easily comparable across respondents. Since incentives have been shown to reduce partisan bias in people's stated beliefs (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015), an incentivized belief elicitation is particularly important for highly contested issues such as racial discrimination. Our evidence on beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination as measured in correspondence studies complements a literature studying people's ability to predict experimental results (DellaVigna and Pope, 2018a,b).

Second, we provide the first causal evidence of the role of people's beliefs about racial discrimination on their demand for policies that try to counteract the effects of this discrimination.[4] We thereby inform the debate on the determinants of support for pro-black policies (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Harrison et al., 2006; Jacobson, 1985; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Tuch and Hughes, 2011). More generally, by exploring how beliefs about racial discrimination affect people's political behavior, our results contribute to the literate on the relevance of race for US politics (DellaVigna, 2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Moreover, our results complement previous work on the determinants of discrimination (Bohren et al., 2019; Burns et al., 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2017; Lowe, 2018; Rao, 2019). Our results are also related to recent work examining whether the awareness of discrimination reduces biased judgments (Alesina et al., 2018a; Pope et al., 2018).

[3] Our study is related to concurrent work by Kraus et al. (2017) who measure people's beliefs about racial income inequality in the US.

[4] More generally, we add to the broader literature on how information provision affects people's policy preferences (Alesina et al., 2018b; Cruces et al., 2013; Gilens, 2001; Grigorieff et al., 2016; Haaland and Roth, 2017; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Kuziemko et al., 2015).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and samples. Section 3 provides descriptive data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination. Section 4 presents treatment effects of the provision of research evidence about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks on beliefs and policy views. Section 5 presents results from two experiments that explore the roles of beliefs about differences in the work ethic between blacks and whites as well as political identity in driving political differences in views on pro-black policies. Section 6 concludes. The Online Appendix provides additional results and the full set of experimental instructions.

2 Experimental design and samples

We conducted two complementary online experiments with different samples. In Experiment 1, we collected data on a probability-based sample of the US population in collaboration with NORC at the University of Chicago. In Experiment 2, we collected data on a US sample representative in terms of several observables, collaborating with Research Now, a US market research company.

2.1 Experiment 1: Design

The structure of Experiment 1 is as follows (Figure 2 provides an overview). We first measured our respondents' beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination in the US. We then exposed half of our respondents to the information treatment. Subsequently, we measured people's support for policies to address racial discrimination in the labor market using both self-reports and a behavioral measure. We also elicited post-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.

[Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here]

2.1.1 Pre-treatment beliefs about racial labor market discrimination

We used a correspondence study to measure people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. Correspondence studies rely on fictitious resumes to study discrimination in the labor market (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017). Specifically, by manipulating whether a fictitious resume is assigned a minority name, researchers can study racial labor market discrimination by comparing the outcomes for resumes with and without the perceived minority name. A seminal correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found that white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to receive a callback than black-sounding names; a finding that has been closely replicated in several subsequent correspondence studies (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Quillian et al., 2017). We rely on this study in our experiment. To familiarize our respondents with the study, we presented them with the following text:

> Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.
>
> The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like "Carrie" and "Todd". The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like "Tanisha" and "Kareem". The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

We then informed respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average ten times to get one callback for an interview. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market, we then asked how many times they

believe resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out on average to get one callback for an interview. Furthermore, we promised respondents a $2 bonus if their answer was the same "as what the researchers found."

Our belief elicitation has several advantages compared to qualitative survey questions that have traditionally been used to study beliefs about racial discrimination. First, we measure beliefs on a quantitative scale that is easily comparable across respondents and has the same interpretation for everyone. By contrast, many previous studies have assessed beliefs about racial discrimination using a question from the General Social Survey about the amount of discrimination that blacks face in "getting good jobs," which is measured on a 4-point scale from "none at all" to "a lot."[5] One concern with using subjective response scales to measure beliefs is that different people may have different opinions about what, e.g., "some" or "only a little" discrimination means.[6] Furthermore, in our setting, racial discrimination is precisely defined and we can hold our respondents' beliefs about the circumstances of racial discrimination constant. For qualitative survey questions, people may hold different beliefs about what constitutes "discrimination." These beliefs may be correlated with demographics, which makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions on differences in beliefs about racial discrimination across demographic groups. Our measure avoids these confounds. Second, unincentivized survey questions are more prone to the misreporting of beliefs. Indeed, small incentives for correct answers have been shown to strongly increase the accuracy of survey responses and to reduce gaps in reported beliefs across party lines (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015). Since our question has a factual answer, we can incentivize correct responses.

[5]Details about this variable are available at the following link: `https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/1244/vshow` (accessed November 30, 2018).

[6]For a discussion of problems associated with subjective response scales, see Bond and Lang (2018).

2.1.2 Introducing exogenous variation in beliefs

Two central identification challenges when studying the impact of beliefs on policy preferences are omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We address these identification challenges by introducing exogenous variation in beliefs, namely by informing respondents in the treatment group about the extent of racial discrimination found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically, we showed the following text to treated respondents:

> The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.
>
> Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

By contrast, respondents in the control group did not receive any information and proceeded directly from the belief elicitation to the outcome questions.

2.1.3 Measuring support for pro-black policies: Behavioral measure

A common critique of self-reported survey questions is that they might not be reflective of real political behavior and that they are prone to experimenter demand effects. To address these concerns, we collected a behavioral outcome measure, namely real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. We told our respondents that they have the opportunity to financially support a civil rights organization that works to reduce discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We elicited the respondents' marginal rate of substitution between money for themselves and money for the civil rights organization through a multiple price list. The respondents chose between donating $5 to the civil

rights organization and money for themselves in $1-increments from $0 to $5. One of the six choices was randomly implemented.[7]

2.1.4 Measuring support for pro-black policies: self-reported policy views

In addition to the behavioral measure, we also collected some data on people's self-reported policy views. Since our treatment was tailored to shift beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market, we focused on labor market policies. We asked questions about three commonly-discussed policies attempting to counteract the effects of labor market discrimination. First, we asked respondents whether they "support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job." Second, we asked respondents whether they "support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job." Third, we asked respondents whether they "support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs." For all three questions, respondents reported their answer on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support).

2.1.5 Measuring beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market

To measure whether respondents updated their beliefs in response to the research evidence, we relied on a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017). We chose to focus on racial discrimination in a different domain out of a concern that demand effects, numerical anchoring, or a taste for consistency in survey responses could bias responses if we re-asked the question about discrimination in the labor market shortly after the information provision. The housing market is a good candidate for several reasons. First, racial discrimination in the

[7] The experiment involved no deception and we actually donated the relevant amount to the civil rights organization after the experiment.

housing market holds strong economic importance. Second, the study by Edelman et al. (2017), which serves as our benchmark for incentivizing beliefs, used the same names as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). This allows us to easily explain the methodology to respondents and makes the results across domains more comparable. Specifically, we used the following text to familiarize our respondents with the second study:

> Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations. The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants' name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black requesters.

We then told them that the researchers found that white-sounding names were accepted 49 percent of the time. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market, we then asked what percent of the time they believe that black-sounding names were accepted. We offered a $2 bonus for answers that fall within "2 percentage points of what the researchers found."

We purposefully designed the second belief elicitation to avoid potential bias stemming from numerical anchoring by (i) using a different response scale than the first belief elicitation, and (ii) using a scale in which higher values implied less racial discrimination. Since higher values implied more discrimination in the first belief elicitation, numerical anchoring would make finding evidence for belief updating in the expected direction less likely.

2.2 Experiment 2: Design

While an important question is whether treatment effects persist over time, a potential drawback of re-asking the main outcome questions in a follow-up study is that people's taste for consistency in their survey responses may bias treatment effects (Falk and Zimmermann, 2013). To avoid this confound, we conducted a separate experiment in which we only asked the main outcome questions in a follow-up study (Figure 3 provides a summary of the structure). Furthermore, to address concerns about social desirability bias, we obfuscated the purpose of the follow-up study.

2.2.1 Design of the first wave

We first elicited beliefs about racial discrimination in the same way as in Experiment 1. We also elicited confidence by asking respondents how sure they were on a scale of 1 (Very Unsure) to 5 (Very Sure) of their answer to the previous question.[8] Finally, we asked respondents whether they think that racial discrimination against blacks "is a serious problem."

2.2.2 Design of the second wave

Approximately one week after the first wave, respondents were invited to participate in the second wave. We chose to have one week between the two waves to strike a balance between testing for persistence of treatment effects and minimizing attrition.

One general concern with information experiments is that the information provision could alter participants' perceptions about how the experimenter expects them to behave. Even though recent evidence suggests that demand effects are not quantitatively important (de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2018), we took several steps to obfuscate

[8] We did not ask this question in Experiment 1 owing to budget constraints. The cost of adding questions to Experiment 1 was much higher than in Experiment 2 because it used a probability-based sample.

the purpose of the second wave. First, respondents received a generic invitation from the survey provider to participate in a five-minute survey which did not reveal that the two waves were connected (Figure A.7 provides a screenshot of the invitation from wave 1).[9] Second, we used different Qualtrics accounts for the two studies: in wave 1, the Qualtrics account was from the University of Oxford; in wave 2, the Qualtrics account was from the NHH Norwegian School of Economics. We also varied the layout of the survey between the waves. Third, we asked respondents several obfuscation questions about their views on investment and religion before asking our main outcome questions.

Following the obfuscation questions, we asked the same questions on self-reported policy views as in Experiment 1: support for (i) a preference for hiring qualified black candidates over equally qualified white candidates, (ii) assistance programs for blacks in getting a job; and (iii) name-blind recruitment. We also asked a series of questions to examine mechanisms. Possible mechanisms include the belief that affirmative action programs are ineffective in improving the lives or general opportunities of blacks, which could engender opposition to those initiatives. To examine whether the treatment affects beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action, we asked respondents whether they think that affirmative action programs over the last fifty years have "have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other." Some people may also oppose affirmative action because they think that differences in outcomes between blacks and whites are mainly due to differences in work ethics between blacks and whites. To explore whether the treatment affected beliefs about the source of inequality between blacks and whites, we asked the following two questions: (i) to what extent they think that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks," and (ii) to what extent they think that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "primarily the result of

[9]The actual number of days between wave 1 and wave 2 varied between one and 19 days for all respondents, with an average of eight days.

whites working harder than blacks."

Near the end of the survey, we elicited posterior beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination using the same correspondence study as in the first wave. As in the first wave, we incentivized correct answers with a $2 bonus. Since we use the same belief elicitation across the two waves, it is natural to assume that respondents realized that the two waves are connected at this point.

2.3 Sample characteristics

2.3.1 Experiment 1: NORC AmeriSpeak

For Experiment 1, we recruited 1538 respondents through NORC's AmeriSpeak panel.[10] AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel of the US population. The panel uses NORC's National Frame, which is designed to provide at least 97 percent sample coverage of the US population. The NORC National Frame is used for several landmark studies in the US, including the General Social Survey (GSS), which is one of the most frequently-analyzed data sets in the social sciences.[11]

Table A.2 provides summary statistics for this sample. 46 percent of respondents are male, 66 percent are Non-Hispanic white, and 11 percent are Non-Hispanic black. The median household income in our sample is $55,270. 80 percent of our sample have at least some college education. The sample is also representative in terms of regions: 16 percent of our respondents come from the North-East, 29 percent from the Midwest, 33 percent from the South, while the remaining respondents are from the West. In terms of

[10]NORC does not force their respondents to answer any questions on their surveys. For some questions we therefore have less than 1538 observations, e.g. only 1382 respondents gave an answer to the question on the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent. There are no significant differences between Republicans and Democrats or between blacks and whites in not responding to this question. Our main specification includes only respondents who completed the question on beliefs about racial discrimination.

[11]More information about the panel is available at the following web page: `https://amerispeak.norc.org/about-amerispeak/Pages/Panel-Design.aspx` (accessed November 30, 2018).

political affiliation, 24 percent of respondents self-identify as Republicans; 36 percent self-identify as Democrats; 26 percent self-identify as Independents; and the remaining 14 percent do not have any particular political affiliation. Observations in the treatment and control group are balanced in terms of observables (Table A.4).[12]

2.3.2 Experiment 2: Research Now

In Experiment 2, we, in collaboration with Research Now, one of the leading marketing research companies in the US, successfully recruited 2075 respondents for the first wave of the experiment. The first wave was the second component of a follow-up study from another experiment that we also conducted with Research Now.[13] Out of these 2075 respondents, 1720 also completed the second wave.

Table A.3 provides summary statistics for the Research Now sample. The sample is broadly representative of the US population in terms of several important observable characteristics: 50 percent of our respondents are male; 49 percent are non-Hispanic white; and 6 percent are Non-Hispanic black. The median household income in our sample is $56,000. 83 percent of our sample have at least some college education. 23 percent of our respondents come from the North-East, 19 percent from the Midwest, 35 percent from the South, and the remaining 23 percent of respondents are from the West. In terms of political affiliation, 26 percent of respondents self-identify as Republicans, 38 percent of our respondents self-identify as Democrats, and the remaining respondents self-identify as Independents. There is balance across treatment arms (Tables A.5 and A.6). Treatment status is not correlated with completing the follow-up (Table A.7).

[12] We did not ask any questions about demographics or political affiliation as part of the experiment. This data was appended by NORC.

[13] In the first wave, respondents also answered demographic questions, questions about their views on the role of the government, and questions about their views on immigration.

3 Beliefs about racial discrimination: Descriptives

This section uses data from Experiment 1 to provide representative evidence of people's beliefs about racial discrimination. We first explore heterogeneity in people's beliefs regarding the extent of racial discrimination in America and investigate whether these beliefs correlate with some key background characteristics. We then examine whether beliefs about racial discrimination correlate with people's policy preferences.

3.1 Heterogeneity in beliefs about racial discrimination

Figure 4 provides representative evidence of people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor and housing markets. Panel A shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about how many resumes with black-sounding names had to send out to get one callback on average (respondents were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was ten). This quantitative belief elicitation allows us to assess the fraction of respondents who overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination in society. Taking the results from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) as given, who found that resumes with black-sounding names needed to be sent out 15 times before receiving one callback on average, we find that 35 percent of our respondents underestimate racial discrimination in the labor market, 10.3 percent have correct beliefs, and the remaining 54.7 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the labor market.[14]

Panel B of Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about the rejection rate of reservation requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb (respondents were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 51 percent). Taking the results from Edelman et al. (2017) as given, who found that requests from black-sounding names were rejected 59 percent of the time, we find that 19 percent of our

[14] A recent meta-analysis of field experiments on racial labor discrimination in the US shows no change in racial discrimination over time (Quillian et al., 2017)

respondents underestimate racial discrimination in the housing market and the remaining 81 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the housing market.

The data also allows for the measurement of the share of respondents who think that there is discrimination against whites, discrimination against blacks, and the fraction who think that there is no racial discrimination at all. For the labor market, 23 percent of our respondents believe that there is discrimination against whites, nine percent believe that there is no discrimination, and the remaining 68 percent believe that there is discrimination against blacks. For the housing market, 12 percent think that there is discrimination against whites, two percent believe that there is no racial discrimination, and the remaining 86 percent think that there is discrimination against blacks. One reason for why a higher fraction of our respondents think that there is discrimination against blacks in the housing market might be that they think that affirmative action programs in hiring make discrimination in the labor market less prevalent.

[Insert Figure 4 here]

Figure 5 examines whether beliefs about racial discrimination vary systematically by people's background characteristics. Panel A shows correlations between background characteristics and beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. We find especially pronounced differences in beliefs based on people's political affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats believe that seven additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average ($p<0.01$). Taking the results from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) as given, Republicans on average overestimate the extent of racial labor market discrimination by 16 percent, whereas Democrats overestimate the extent of discrimination by 71 percent. Beliefs about racial discrimination also correlate significantly with college education and income. Relative to those with no college education, college-educated respondents believe that four additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get to get one callback on average

($p<0.01$). Relative to respondents with below median income, above-median income respondents believe that 1.7 additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average ($p<0.05$). Surprisingly, we find no significant differences between blacks and whites in their beliefs about discrimination in the labor market ($p=0.85$).[15]

[Insert Figure 5 here]

Concerning beliefs about the housing market (Panel B of Figure 5), we also find pronounced differences based on people's political affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 5.7 percentage points more likely to be rejected ($p<0.01$). Taking the results from Edelman et al. (2017) as given, Republicans on average overestimate housing market discrimination by 14 percent, whereas Democrats overestimate housing market discrimination by 27 percent. While we do not find evidence of differences in beliefs in the housing market across people with different education levels, we find significant racial differences: Relative to whites, blacks think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 6.5 percentage points more likely to be rejected ($p<0.05$).

Given all of the findings discussed above, our first main result is as follows:

Result 1. *The majority of Americans overestimate racial discrimination against blacks in both the labor market and in the housing market. Furthermore, in both domains, we document that Democrats are more likely to overestimate the extent of racial discrimination than Republicans.*

[15] We also elicited willingness to pay for the research evidence through a multiple price list at the end of Experiment 2 for control group respondents. In the Online Appendix, we show that whites, males and Republicans had a lower willingness to pay for the research evidence (Table A.10).

3.2 The association between beliefs and policy preferences

Table 1 provides evidence of whether our measure of beliefs about racial labor discrimination correlates with some of our key outcome measures using only control group respondents. Column 1 of Panel A shows a regression of people's actual donations to the pro-black civil rights organization on their beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. A one standard deviation increase in beliefs is associated with 0.22 of a standard deviation higher donations to the pro-black civil rights organization ($p<0.01$). This corresponds to 36 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations to the pro-black civil rights organization. Including controls in the regression reduces the estimated association to 0.17 of a standard deviation ($p<0.01$, Column 1 of Panel B).

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show significant associations between beliefs about racial discrimination and support for preference in hiring and job assistance for blacks, respectively. Column 4 shows that a one standard deviation change in beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market is associated with a 0.22 of a standard deviation change in beliefs about discrimination in the housing market. Furthermore, column 5 shows that our belief measure is also predictive of whether people think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a "serious problem." Our next main result is as follows.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Result 2. *Beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market are associated with higher donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. The magnitude of a one standard deviation change in beliefs corresponds to about 36 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. Beliefs about racial discrimination are also positively correlated with self-reported support for pro-black policies.*

Overall, these correlations suggest that our belief measure has high external validity.

Not only does it predict responses to qualitative survey questions, it also predicts real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. But naturally, these correlations need to be interpreted cautiously. The estimated effect of beliefs on donations and self-reported policy views could be confounded due to measurement error, reverse causality, and omitted variable bias. The next section addresses causality by studying the effects of the randomly assigned information treatment.

4 Treatment effects on beliefs and policy views

This section presents treatment effects from providing people with research evidence about the results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). We first outline our empirical strategy and then present three sets of results: First, we investigate whether people update their beliefs in response to the treatment. Second, we analyze how the treatment affects people's political behavior as measured by incentivized donations. Third, we analyze how the treatment affects people's self-reported policy preferences on pro-black policies.

4.1 Empirical strategy

We pre-specified the analysis of both experiments in two documents uploaded to the AEA RCT Registry prior to starting the data collection. The empirical strategy outlined in this section follows the pre-analysis plans, which may be accessed with the following link: `https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273`. The Online Appendix includes all pre-specified results that are not discussed in the main text.

Main specification Since we expect different treatment effects based on whether the respondents initially overestimate or underestimate racial discrimination, our main specification is the following difference-in-differences equation which we estimate

using OLS:

$$y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Treatment}_i + \alpha_2 \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{prior}_i + \alpha_3 \text{prior}_i + \alpha_4 \mathbf{x}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where y_i is the outcome of interest; Treatment_i is an indicator for whether respondent i received the research evidence; prior_i is an indicator for initially overestimating racial labor market discrimination (i.e., for having pre-treatment beliefs that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average)[16]; $\mathbf{x}_i$ is a vector of pre-specified controls[17]; and ε_i is an individual-specific error term. We use robust error terms for inference. Throughout the section, we refer to respondents who initially underestimate and overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market as "underestimators" and "overestimators," respectively.

Heterogeneity by political views There are several reasons to expect Republicans to respond differently to the information than non-Republicans. For instance, Republicans are much more likely than non-Republicans to oppose government action on ideological grounds.[18] In the second main specification of interest, we therefore allow for political heterogeneity in treatment responses by estimating the following triple-difference

[16]Since those with accurate pre-treatment beliefs (i.e., 15) should become more confident in their beliefs, which we expected should increase support for pro-black policies, we decided to group them in the same category as those who strictly underestimated racial discrimination.

[17]For Experiment 1, we include the following controls: gender (binary), age (in years), two ethnicity indicators (non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks); three regional indicators; household size (continuous); log household income (continuous); an indicator for having college degree; and indicator for being employed; and two party affiliation indicators (Republicans and Democrats). For Experiment 2, we also include confidence in prior beliefs as a control (integer from 1 to 5) and, to follow the pre-analysis plan, do not include an indicator for self-identifying as a Democrat.

[18]There are also several reasons to expect blacks to respond differently to the information than whites; e.g., different self-interested incentives. We choose to focus on heterogeneity by political views for two main reasons. First, there is a larger gap in racial attitudes between Republicans and Democrats than between blacks and whites (`http://pewrsr.ch/2wAjUGP`; accessed February 4, 2019). Second, as there are twice as many Republicans than blacks in our sample, we have less power to explore heterogeneity for blacks.

equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_i = \alpha_0 &+ \alpha_1 \text{Treatment}_i + \alpha_2 \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Prior}_i + \alpha_3 \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Republican}_i \\
&+ \alpha_4 \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Prior}_i \times \text{Republican}_i + \alpha_5 \text{Prior}_i \\
&+ \alpha_6 \text{Republican}_i + \alpha_7 \text{Prior}_i \times \text{Republican}_i + \alpha_8 \mathbf{x}_i + \varepsilon_i
\end{aligned} \tag{2}
$$

where Republican_i takes value one for respondents self-identifying as a Republican and value zero for non-Republicans (i.e., Democrats, Independents, and respondents with no stated political affiliation).

4.2 Do people update their beliefs about racial discrimination?

Experiment 1: Beliefs about the housing market We first examine whether people used the information about racial discrimination in the labor market to update their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.[19] Column 1 of Table 2 shows that treated underestimators increase their estimate of the rejection rate of black-sounding names by 4.2 percentage points ($p<0.01$). By contrast, treated overestimators decrease their estimate of the rejection rate for black-sounding names by 5.8 percentage points ($p<0.01$). These estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.01$). Column 2 shows that these results are virtually unaffected by including controls in the regressions. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B show that there is no significant treatment heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. One reason for this could be that we incentivized the belief elicitation, making it costly to engage in motivated partisan reasoning.[20]

[19] While respondents were asked about the acceptance rate of black-sounding names (i.e., how many percent of the time they thought reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted), we recoded the responses such that higher numbers imply more discrimination. The results show beliefs about implied rejection rates instead.

[20] At the end of the survey, we asked treated respondents whether they agreed that the correspondence study provided clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market. While only 10 percent of our respondents actively disagree with this interpretation, Republicans are 15 percentage points more

Experiment 2: Posterior beliefs about the labor market In Experiment 2, we elicited posterior beliefs about racial discrimination in the one-week follow-up. Column 3 of Table 2 shows that treated underestimators increase their estimate of how many times resumes with black-sounding names need to be sent out to get one callback on average by 2.3 resumes ($p<0.05$). Treated overestimators, by contrast, decrease their estimate by 11 resumes ($p<0.01$). These estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.01$). Column 4 shows that the estimates are virtually unaffected by including controls in the regressions. Furthermore, columns 3 and 4 of Panel B show that there is no significant treatment heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. In Experiment 2, we also elicited confidence in pre-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. Treatment effects on posterior beliefs are stronger for respondents with less confidence in their pre-treatment beliefs (as shown in Table A.15), consistent with genuine belief updating.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Given all of the estimates discussed above, our next main result can be summarized as follows:

Result 3. *People's beliefs about racial discrimination are responsive to new information. Treated respondents strongly update their beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in both the labor market and the housing market in response to research evidence from a correspondence study.*

The successful "first stage" on beliefs allows us to investigate whether correcting biases in beliefs about racial discrimination causally affects people's behavior and policy views on pro-black policies.

likely than non-Republicans to disagree with this interpretation.

4.3 Does the treatment affect donations?

Table 3 shows regression results from Experiment 1 on people's real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization.[21] In the regression, we z-score the number of donations using the mean and standard deviation of the control group.

Column 1 of Table 3 shows that treated underestimators increase their donations to the civil rights organization by 0.17 of a standard deviation ($p<0.05$).[22] This effect size corresponds to 29 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. It also corresponds to about one-half of the difference in donations between those who initially overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination. By contrast, treated respondents who overestimate racial discrimination do not reduce their donations; the treatment effect estimate is close to zero and not statistically significant, ($p=0.97$), even though respondents in this group changed their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market considerably. The interaction effect between pre-treatment beliefs and the treatment is not statistically significant (p-value=0.12), but goes in the expected direction. Column 2 shows that the estimates are virtually unaffected by including controls in the regressions. These findings suggest that information has most scope to change behavior for people who underestimate racial discrimination. One reason as to why overestimators do not change their behavior could be that the treatment made them more confident that racial discrimination against blacks is a problem, which could offset the fact that they realize that discrimination is less prevalent than their initial estimate.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 examine political heterogeneity in treatment effects on donations. We find no significant treatment heterogeneity based people's political

[21] We only collected data on donations for respondents in Experiment 1. Respondents could choose between varying amounts of money for themselves or donating $5 to *The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*, a pro-black civil rights organization.

[22] A subset of respondents only completed a subset of the choices in the multiple price list. Once we restrict the sample to respondents who made all six choices in the multiple price list, the estimated effect sizes are virtually unchanged.

affiliation, but generally the data are consistent with stronger treatment effects for non-Republicans and weaker treatment effects for Republicans. Among non-Republicans, treated underestimators increase their donations by 0.23 of a standard deviation ($p<0.05$), whereas treated overestimators are essentially unaffected by the treatment; these estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.05$). For Republican underestimators, the treatment effect estimate is positive but close to zero and not statistically significant (p=0.86). This estimate is also not significantly different from the effect on non-Republican underestimators (p=0.86). For Republican overestimators, the point estimate is positive but not statistically significant (p=0.36) and also not significantly different from the effect on non-Republican overestimators (p=0.51). The estimated treatment effects are essentially unchanged when we include controls (column 4).[23]

[Insert Table 3 here]

Although the treatment substantially narrows the Democrat–Republican gap in beliefs, the Democrat–Republican gap in donations of about 0.6 of a standard deviation is essentially unaffected by the treatment (p=0.93). Our fourth main result is the following:

Result 4. *The provision of information about racial discrimination causally affects donations to an NGO lobbying for blacks in the labor market. While the treatment strongly increases donations for underestimators, the treatment has no effect on overestimators. The effect for treated underestimators is entirely driven by non-Republicans, which means that the treatment fails to narrow Democrat–Republican differences in donations.*

4.4 Does the treatment affect policy views?

Table 4 shows regression results from both experiments on people's self-reported support for different policies to address racial discrimination in society. Columns 1–4 show

[23]Table A.11 shows that results are robust to using a continuous measure of people's pre-treatment beliefs instead of the indicator used in our main specification.

results from Experiment 1, while columns 5–8 show results from Experiment 2. In this section, we only report results from the main specification with controls; Table A.12 shows the corresponding results excluding controls. All outcomes are z-scored and coded such that higher values imply higher support for the policies.

4.4.1 Experiment 1: NORC

Support for pro-black policies Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A of Table 4 show support for two "preferential treatment" policies specifically designed to help blacks in the labor market, namely support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job (column 1) and support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job (column 2). There is essentially no impact of the treatment on policy views on pro-black policies for either overestimators or underestimators. Moreover, there was no significant heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans in treatment responses on these measures (as shown in Panel B). Our next main result is as follows:

Result 5. *Views on pro-black labor market policies, such as black preference in hiring and job assistance programs for blacks, do not change in response to information about the extent of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.*

One reason for the lack of treatment effects on support for pro-black policies could be that people have a strong ideological stance on "preferential treatment" policies, making their support for such policies very unresponsive to changes in beliefs.

Support for name-blind recruitment We next analyze treatment effects on support for mandatory name-blind recruitment, i.e., a "non-preferential" policy for hiring in public and private jobs as a way to reduce discrimination in the labor market. The outcome is closely related to our informational treatment, which advised people that

employers used names on resumes to discriminate against blacks. From the results shown in Column 4 of Panel A of Table 4, we see that the treatment has essentially no impact on underestimators. Overestimators, by contrast, increase their support for name-blind recruitment, but the estimate is not statistically significant (p=0.45).

Exploring political heterogeneity in treatment responses (Panel B of Table 4), we find significant differences between Republicans and non-Republicans. For non-Republicans, the treatment has a positive but non-significant impact on support for name-blind recruitment among underestimators and essentially no impact among overestimators. For Republicans, by contrast, the treatment decreases support for name-blind recruitment by 0.24 of a standard deviation for underestimators (p=0.11) and increases support by 0.36 of a standard deviation for overestimators ($p<0.05$); the increased polarization in attitudes between Republicans who underestimated and overestimated discrimination is highly significant ($p<0.01$). One explanation for this finding could be that Republicans have a stronger self-interested motive to oppose name-blind recruitment than non-Republicans.[24]

4.4.2 Experiment 2

Support for pro-black policies Columns 5–7 of Panel A in Table 4 show treatment effects on support for pro-black policies. While the treatment has essentially no impact on overestimators, it "backfires" for underestimators who significantly reduce their support for pro-black policies when they learn that discrimination was larger than they thought. This backfire effect is entirely driven by Republicans, as shown in Panel B. Treated Republicans who initially underestimate racial discrimination reduce their support for pro-black policies by 0.30 of a standard deviation ($p<0.01$), an estimate that significantly

[24]One reason for why Republicans are non-Republicans might differ in their support for name-blind recruitment could be that Republicans are more likely to be white. However, we find similar results and even stronger evidence of polarization in attitudes between Republicans if we restrict the sample to non-Hispanic whites. Results are available upon requests.

differs from the treatment effect on non-Republican underestimators ($p<0.05$). In Experiment 1, we did not observe backfire effects for Republicans. One reason for this difference could be that Republicans in Experiment 1 felt it was not socially acceptable to express very low support for pro-black policies after being informed by the experimenter that discrimination is more prevalent than their initial estimate. This concern does not apply to the same extent in Experiment 2 because of the obfuscation design.

Explaining the backfire effect on support for pro-black policies One potential explanation for why the treatment backfires for Republicans is that it simultaneously changes their beliefs about how effective affirmation action programs have been in helping blacks. Among Republicans, we find evidence of strong polarization in beliefs: Treated republican underestimators are 0.36 of a standard deviation more likely to think that affirmative action programs have hurt blacks ($p<0.01$), whereas Republican overestimators do not significantly change their beliefs in response to the treatment (results are displayed in Column 1 of Table A.9). For non-Republicans, we observe no treatment effect on beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action programs. While these results could reflect genuine updating about the effectiveness of affirmative action, an alternative explanation is that treated Republican underestimators report different beliefs to justify their lower support for pro-black policies.

Support for name-blind recruitment Column 8 of Panel A of Table 4 shows treatment effects on support for mandatory name-blind recruitment. The treatment decreases support for name-blind recruitment among underestimators by 0.12 of a standard deviation and increases support among overestimators by 0.13 of a standard deviation. While neither effect is significantly different from zero ($p=0.09$ and $p=0.12$, respectively), the estimates are significantly different from each other ($p<0.01$). In line with the evidence from the first experiment, the negative treatment effect on underestimators is mainly

driven by Republicans (Panel B of Table 4). While the treatment has essentially no impact on non-Republican underestimators, it decreases support for name-blind recruitment among Republican underestimators by 0.2 of a standard deviation (p=0.12).

[Insert Table 4 here]

5 Exploring drivers of partisan differences in policy views

Although the provision of the research evidence strongly reduces political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination, it does not reduce political polarization in views on pro-black policies and donations. This finding raises the question which other factors drive these differences. In this section, we explore the role that (i) beliefs about differences in work ethic between whites and blacks and (ii) political identity play in driving the partisan gap in attitudes towards pro-black policies.

5.1 Beliefs about differences in work ethic

A centuries-old negative stereotype of blacks is the belief that they are "lazy, shiftless, and unambitious" (Gilens, 2009). One reason for why Democrats and Republicans differ in their views on pro-black policies could be that they differ in the extent to which they hold this negative stereotype.[25]

In Experiment 2, we asked respondents several questions to shed light on mechanisms, including two questions on whether differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks were primarily the result of "racial discrimination against blacks" or primarily the result of "whites working harder than blacks." Using data from control group respondents, we show that believing that racial inequality is due to "whites working harder than blacks" is, by a large margin, the strongest predictor of attitudes towards

[25] For a formal model of stereotypes, see Bordalo et al. (2016).

pro-black policies (as displayed in Figure A.6). Agreeing to the statement that racial inequalities are due to "whites working harder than blacks" is associated with a 0.87 of a standard deviation lower support for black preference in hiring, conditional on controls for demographics and party affiliations ($p<0.01$). To shed light on whether negative stereotyping of blacks causally affects attitudes towards affirmative action policies, we ran an additional experiment in which we challenge this stereotype with an information intervention.

Experimental design and sample We recruited approximately 3000 American respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform commonly used in economic experiments (Cavallo et al., 2016; Horton et al., 2011; Kuziemko et al., 2015). We ran the experiment in October 2018 and submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data collection.[26]

In the experiment, we first elicited people's beliefs about which factors they think blacks and whites rate as least important for them in a job. We then randomized respondents in a treatment and control group. Respondents in the treatment group received information that blacks and whites both rate short working hours as the least important characteristic in a job. Respondents in the control group did not receive any information. Subsequently, we measured people's support for pro-black policies using the same self-reported questions as in the main study.

Results In line with negative stereotyping of blacks (Gilens, 2009), the respondents think that whites are 20 percent more likely than blacks to place least weight on short working hours in a job (Table A.17). Furthermore, only 25 percent have correct beliefs that blacks actually placed the lowest weight on short working hours. But while having incorrect beliefs predicts greater opposition to pro-black policies, the information treat-

[26]Instructions are provided in Section D.4 of the Online Appendix.

ment does not affect support for pro-black policies. The information treatment also does not shift beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks," suggesting that the treatment is ineffective in challenging the stereotype of "lazy blacks." Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive evidence that beliefs governing racial stereotypes are much less responsive to new information than beliefs about racial discrimination. Furthermore, this result emphasizes that views on pro-black policies are generally very unresponsive to new information.

5.2 The role of political identity

During the last four decades, political polarization in beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are "mainly due to discrimination" has strongly increased (Figure A.5; data from the General Social Survey). This shift in beliefs is part of a broader trend in which American politics has become more polarized along partisan lines than at any point in recent history.[27] Since political identity might be a factor that influences both beliefs and attitudes, we decided to run a further experiment to test whether political party identity further polarizes attitudes towards pro-black policies between Republicans and Democrats.

Experimental sample and design We recruited 4000 respondents in collaboration with Research Now, the same market research company as used in Experiment 2. The sample was constructed to be representative of the US population in terms of age, sex, and region. We ran the experiment in July 2018, and we submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data collection.[28]

[27] http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public, accessed November 30, 2018.

[28] Instructions are provided in Section D.5 of the Online Appendix.

We randomly assigned respondents into a control group and a treatment group. For respondents in the treatment group, we added the following introductory sentence to the question on whether they support affirmative action in hiring: "In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race." In the main specification, we focused on the 2,737 respondents who self-identify as either Democrats or Republicans. We hypothesized in the pre-analysis plan that this treatment would polarize attitudes by making Democrats more supportive of pro-black policies and Republicans less supportive.

Results The treatment has essentially no impact on attitudes for either Democrats or Republicans (Table A.16). Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive evidence that political identity is not a very important driver of pro-black policies.[29] This finding underscores the point that views on pro-black policies are hard to move.

6 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we provide novel evidence of the determinants of people's support for pro-black policies with a particular focus on the role of beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks. We first provide representative evidence of people's beliefs about racial discrimination. We document strong heterogeneity in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in society and find that people strongly update their beliefs in response to information about the results from a correspondence study (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). However, although the treatment strongly reduces differences in beliefs about racial discrimination between Democrats and Republicans, we do not observe a similar convergence in support for pro-black policies used to combat racial

[29] While the null result could also reflect that the manipulation was too weak to substantially increase the salience of people's political identity, we note that a similar manipulation employed by Cappelen et al. (2017) strongly increased political polarization in views on redistribution.

discrimination. Almost three decades ago, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) pointed out "the need to address the denial of contemporary racial discrimination [...] if policies addressing persistent racial inequalities are to be pursued." Our results suggest that correcting people's biases in beliefs about racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political differences in support for pro-black policies, and we think more work is needed to better understand the causal drivers of the polarization in support for pro-black policies.

Our paper introduces a new approach of measuring beliefs about discrimination by leveraging correspondence studies to measure beliefs. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for the elicitation of quantitative and incentivized beliefs that are easily comparable across respondents. Furthermore, this approach allows for the provision of research evidence based on clean causal evidence. Our study demonstrates the feasibility of this approach by showing that correspondence studies can easily be explained to and understood by a general population sample. The approach could be useful for researchers who wish to study beliefs about discrimination in other domains, such as discrimination against women. Finally, the approach could be used to measure beliefs about other resume characteristics, such as additional years of education, to measure and change beliefs about the returns to human capital investments with credible research evidence.

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Main figures

Figure 1: Political differences in beliefs and preferences



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). **Panel A** shows the mean of beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview, separately for Democrats and Republicans (the dashed line indicates the correct answer, as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Respondents were informed that resumes with white-sounding names on average had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on average. **Panel B** shows the mean of the number of times control group respondents preferred to give $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves in $1 increments from $0 to $5 for Democrats and Republicans separately. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Figure 2: Experiment 1 (NORC sample)



Figure 3: Experiment 2 (Research Now sample)



Figure 4: Beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor and housing market



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). **Panel A** shows data on beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten (as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). **Panel B**, using only control group respondents, shows data on beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent rate of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent, as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each estimate from 100. In both panels, the short-dashed lines indicate the true level for whites and the long-dashed lines indicate the true level for blacks.

Figure 5: Correlates of beliefs about racial discrimination



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in **Panel A** is people's beliefs about the number times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. The dependent variable in **Panel B** is people's beliefs about the percent of time reservation requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb were rejected. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Main tables

Table 1: The association between beliefs and preferences

	(1) Donations to NGO	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Disc. housing	(5) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Without controls					
Beliefs about discrimination	0.219	0.241	0.246	0.217	0.294
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.035)
Panel B: With controls					
Beliefs about discrimination	0.171	0.167	0.169	0.213	0.231
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.031)
N	653	676	677	673	679

Note: The table show OLS regressions from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC). In **Panel A**, we regress the outcome indicated in each column on standardized beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market (i.e., beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to receive one callback on average). In **Panel B**, we also include pre-specified controls in the regressions (gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). *Donations to the NGO* refers to the number of times the respondents preferred money to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the outcomes *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). *Disc. housing* refers to beliefs about the rejection rate of black-sounding names in the housing market (elicited on a scale from 0 to 100). *Disc. ser. problem* refers to the question of whether "racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem" which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All outcomes are z-scored.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2: Belief updating

	Housing market (NORC)		Labor market (RN)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Main specification				
Treatment (a)	4.15	4.16	2.25	2.08
	(1.56)	(1.54)	(1.02)	(1.02)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-9.94	-9.91	-13.27	-13.08
	(1.91)	(1.90)	(1.62)	(1.62)
Prior	7.66	7.61	14.64	14.00
	(1.54)	(1.53)	(1.33)	(1.34)
N	1366	1366	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable	71.1	71.1	19.3	19.3
Control group mean: Prior	0.55	0.55	0.45	0.45
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Panel B: Political heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	2.98	2.91	1.77	1.61
	(1.87)	(1.84)	(1.22)	(1.22)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-9.50	-9.38	-13.18	-12.94
	(2.23)	(2.20)	(1.89)	(1.89)
Republican × Treatment (c)	3.94	4.21	1.65	1.66
	(3.35)	(3.34)	(2.22)	(2.22)
Prior × Republican × Treatment (d)	0.15	-0.22	0.07	-0.15
	(4.54)	(4.55)	(3.71)	(3.65)
Prior	6.62	6.70	14.84	14.21
	(1.79)	(1.76)	(1.57)	(1.57)
Prior × Republican	2.43	2.77	-1.18	-1.04
	(3.63)	(3.65)	(2.97)	(2.95)
Republican	-5.18	-4.33	-0.86	-1.48
	(2.74)	(2.82)	(1.47)	(1.52)
N	1366	1366	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
P-value: a + c = 0	0.013	0.011	0.066	0.082
P-value: b + d = 0	0.018	0.017	0.000	0.000
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.388	0.383	0.000	0.000

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are post-treatment beliefs about how many percent of the time reservation requests from black-sounding names were rejected on Airnbnb (columns 1–2; Experiment 1 with NORC) and post-treatment beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback on average (columns 3–4; wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In even-numbered columns, we include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). "Prior" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). For post-treatment beliefs about the labor market (columns 3 and 4), we also include confidence in prior beliefs as a control.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Treatment effects on donations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment (a)	0.174	0.159	0.230	0.213
	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.096)	(0.093)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.171	-0.139	-0.259	-0.217
	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.129)	(0.126)
Republican		-0.229	-0.365	-0.181
		(0.067)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Prior	0.359	0.269	0.328	0.284
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.087)
Prior × Republican			-0.087	-0.057
			(0.174)	(0.168)
Republican × Treatment (c)			-0.207	-0.191
			(0.160)	(0.155)
Prior × Republican × Treatment (d)			0.398	0.325
			(0.250)	(0.243)
N	1327	1327	1327	1327
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.97	0.79	0.73	0.96
P-value: a + c = 0			0.86	0.86
P-value: b + d = 0			0.51	0.61
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0			0.35	0.44

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in increments of $1 from $0 to $5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group). In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), regions (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having for full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). "Prior" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: Treatment effects on policy preferences

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Panel A: Main specification								
Treatment (a)	0.011	-0.028	-0.015	-0.025	-0.124	-0.081	-0.136	-0.121
	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.059)
Prior × Treatment (b)	0.079	-0.037	0.059	0.010	0.255	0.071	0.137	0.116
	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Prior	0.086	0.194	0.234	0.237	-0.009	-0.077	0.089	0.002
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.063)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.18	0.30	0.49	0.81	0.06	0.88	0.98	0.94
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity								
Treatment (a)	0.114	-0.061	-0.072	-0.074	-0.088	-0.015	-0.056	-0.039
	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.068)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.079	-0.074	0.037	-0.024	0.209	-0.035	0.012	-0.014
	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.100)
Republican × Treatment (c)	-0.350	0.109	0.192	0.166	-0.114	-0.223	-0.268	-0.276
	(0.172)	(0.150)	(0.172)	(0.149)	(0.141)	(0.136)	(0.143)	(0.138)
Prior × Republican × Treatment (d)	0.666	0.275	0.251	0.298	0.162	0.404	0.471	0.493
	(0.244)	(0.214)	(0.253)	(0.221)	(0.219)	(0.204)	(0.229)	(0.211)
Prior	0.215	0.214	0.273	0.270	0.099	0.018	0.215	0.125
	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.072)
Prior × Republican	-0.542	-0.148	-0.250	-0.219	-0.414	-0.361	-0.482	-0.473
	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.190)	(0.165)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.160)	(0.146)
Republican	0.120	-0.320	-0.251	-0.323	-0.043	-0.237	-0.192	-0.244
	(0.125)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.107)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.64	0.06	0.60	0.15	0.12	0.50	0.56	0.46
P-value: a + c = 0	0.11	0.70	0.41	0.45	0.09	0.04	0.01	0.01
P-value: b + d = 0	0.01	0.27	0.20	0.15	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.26	0.33	0.33	0.25

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2 (wave 2). For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. *Prior* takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We include pre-specified controls in all regressions (the controls are listed in Table 2).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix:

Beliefs About Racial Discrimination and Support for Pro-Black Policies

Ingar Haaland and Christopher Roth

Summary of the Online Appendix

Section A provides all the appendix tables. Section A.1 provides an overview of all experiments, summary statistics for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, as well as evidence of covariate balance and results on attrition. Section A.2 provides treatment effects on some mechanisms questions. Section A.3 provides additional results on robustness and heterogeneity of treatment effects. Section A.4 shows treatment effects from the two additional experiments (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4). Section A.5 provides additional pre-specified tables. Section B provides all the appendix figures. Section C provides screenshots of the consent forms for Experiment 2 and the recruitment email from Research Now. Finally, Section D provides experimental instructions for all the experiments.

A Appendix tables

A.1 Overview, summary statistics, balance and attrition

Table A.1: Overview of experiments

Experiment	Sample	Treatments Arms	Main outcomes
Experiment 1 (June and July 2017)	NORC (N=1,542)	**Treatment**: Information about results from the correspondence study **Control**: No information	Donations to NGO; incentivized post-treatment beliefs; self-reported policy views
Experiment 2: Wave 1 (June 2017)	Research Now (N=2,073)	**Treatment**: Information about results from the correspondence study **Control**: No information	None (elicited in wave 2)
Experiment 2: Wave 2 (June and July 2017)	Research Now (N=1,720)	No treatments (administered in wave 1)	Incentivized post-treatment beliefs; self-reported policy views
Experiment 3 (October 2018)	MTurk (N=2,999)	**Treatment**: Information about racial stereotypes **Control**: No information	Self-reported policy views
Experiment 4 (July 2018)	Research Now (N=4,000)	**Treatment**: Political identity prime **Control**: No prime	Self-reported policy views

Notes: This table provides an overview of the different experiments conducted.

Table A.2: Summary statistics: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
Respondent age	48.52	16.79	49.00	18.00	92.00	1542
Male	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Non-Hispanic black	0.11	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Non-Hispanic white	0.66	0.47	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Northeast	0.16	0.36	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Midwest	0.29	0.45	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
South	0.33	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Household size	2.69	1.42	2.00	1.00	6.00	1542
Log household income	10.81	0.86	10.92	7.82	12.27	1542
At least some college	0.80	0.40	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Paid employee	0.51	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Self-employed	0.10	0.31	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Prior (dummy)	0.55	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	1382
Prior (continuous)	22.46	21.15	20.00	1.00	100.00	1382
Republican	0.24	0.43	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542
Democrat	0.36	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	1542

Notes: This table displays summary statistics for Experiment 1 (NORC). "Prior (dummy)" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. "Prior (continuous)" refers to the number of times the respondents thought resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average.

Table A.3: Summary statistics: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
Respondent age	47.43	15.53	49.50	21.00	69.50	2073
Male	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Non-Hispanic black	0.06	0.24	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Non-Hispanic white	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Household size	2.46	1.35	2.00	0.00	10.00	2073
Log household income	10.93	0.83	11.04	8.92	12.32	2073
At least 2-year college degree	0.83	0.38	1.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Prior (dummy)	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Prior (continuous)	18.74	19.91	15.00	1.00	100.00	2073
Confidence in prior	3.34	1.00	3.00	1.00	5.00	2073
Republican	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Democrat	0.38	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
West	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
South	0.35	0.48	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Northeast	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073
Midwest	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.00	1.00	2073

Notes: This table displays summary statistics for Experiment 2 (Research Now). "Prior (dummy)" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. "'Confidence in prior" (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure).

Table A.4: Balance: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	49.31	47.71	0.062	1542
Male	0.45	0.48	0.258	1542
Non-Hispanic black	0.11	0.11	0.767	1542
Non-Hispanic white	0.67	0.65	0.514	1542
Northeast	0.16	0.15	0.713	1542
Midwest	0.26	0.31	0.033	1542
South	0.34	0.32	0.586	1542
Household size	2.66	2.73	0.308	1542
Log household income	10.84	10.79	0.214	1542
At least some college	0.82	0.78	0.032	1542
Paid employee	0.52	0.50	0.316	1542
Self-employed	0.10	0.11	0.708	1542
Prior (dummy)	0.54	0.55	0.708	1382
Republican	0.23	0.24	0.825	1542
Democrat	0.36	0.35	0.734	1542

Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group for Experiment 1 (NORC). "Prior (dummy)" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.164.

Table A.5: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; baseline survey)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	47.19	47.66	0.493	2073
Male	0.50	0.49	0.844	2073
Non-Hispanic black	0.06	0.05	0.335	2073
Non-Hispanic white	0.49	0.48	0.812	2073
Household size	2.42	2.50	0.228	2073
Log household income	10.92	10.94	0.691	2073
At least 2-year college degree	0.83	0.82	0.609	2073
Prior (dummy)	0.47	0.45	0.350	2073
Confidence in prior	3.31	3.36	0.295	2073
Republican	0.25	0.26	0.643	2073
Democrat	0.38	0.37	0.799	2073
West	0.22	0.24	0.225	2073
South	0.35	0.35	0.947	2073
Northeast	0.24	0.22	0.281	2073
Midwest	0.19	0.19	0.940	2073

Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 1 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). "Prior (dummy)" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. "'Confidence in prior" (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.918.

Table A.6: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; obfuscated follow-up)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	47.48	48.05	0.449	1671
Male	0.51	0.51	0.990	1671
Non-Hispanic black	0.07	0.06	0.419	1671
Non-Hispanic white	0.49	0.48	0.863	1671
Household size	2.43	2.46	0.640	1671
Log household income	10.92	10.94	0.716	1671
At least 2-year college degree	0.82	0.82	0.987	1671
Prior (dummy)	0.47	0.45	0.357	1670
Confidence in prior	3.32	3.38	0.218	1670
Republican	0.25	0.27	0.449	1671
Democrat	0.39	0.38	0.642	1671
West	0.22	0.25	0.313	1671
South	0.34	0.35	0.717	1671
Northeast	0.25	0.22	0.286	1671
Midwest	0.19	0.18	0.707	1671

Notes: This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). "Prior (dummy)" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. "'Confidence in prior" (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.961.

Table A.7: Experiment 2: Correlates of attrition

	Completed Follow-up	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-0.025	-0.027
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Republican		0.049
		(0.023)
Independent		0.041
		(0.021)
Log(Income)		-0.001
		(0.012)
College		-0.051
		(0.024)
Black		0.036
		(0.036)
White		-0.007
		(0.019)
Prior (dummy)		0.016
thisstat24		(0.018)
Confidence in Prior		0.005
		(0.009)
Male		0.042
		(0.018)
Age		0.001
		(0.001)
Response rate	0.806	0.806
Observations	2073	2073

Notes: The outcome variables takes value one if our respondent completed the follow-up study (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). "Treatment" takes value one if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. "Prior (dummy)" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. "'Confidence in prior" (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.2 Mechanisms

Table A.8: Treatment effects: Views on whether discrimination is a "serious problem"

	Experiment 1 (NORC)		Experiment 2 (RN)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Main specification				
Treatment (a)	0.178	0.157	0.127	0.108
	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.056)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.046	-0.019	-0.017	-0.001
	(0.105)	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.078)
Prior	0.429	0.302	0.326	0.325
	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.055)
N	1379	1379	2073	2073
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.040	0.016	0.061	0.049
Panel B: Political heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	0.170	0.141	0.197	0.189
	(0.099)	(0.090)	(0.070)	(0.066)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.092	-0.042	-0.082	-0.083
	(0.119)	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.090)
Republican × Treatment (c)	0.010	0.051	-0.257	-0.280
	(0.156)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.127)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d)	0.283	0.166	0.207	0.283
	(0.221)	(0.212)	(0.189)	(0.178)
N	1379	1379	2073	2073
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.242	0.113	0.070	0.090
P-value: a + c = 0	0.137	0.098	0.602	0.403
P-value: b + d = 0	0.303	0.496	0.444	0.191
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.009	0.024	0.575	0.310

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is agreement to the statement that "racial disagreement against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem." Columns 1 and 2 show responses from Experiment 1 (NORC), whereas columns 3 and 4 show responses from the first wave of Experiment 2 (Research Now). In both experiments, answers were given from a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all to) to 5 (A very serious problem). The outcome has been z-scored by the mean and standard deviation of the control group. "Prior" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. Even-numbered columns include pre-specified controls (as listed in Table 2).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.9: Experiment 2: Treatment effects – mechanism questions

	(1) Affirmative action hurts	(2) Inequality due to effort	(3) Inequality due to disc.	(4) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Main specification				
Treatment (a)	0.054	0.015	0.048	-0.022
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.083	-0.121	-0.081	0.189
	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Prior	0.022	-0.080	0.465	0.105
	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.063)
N	1720	1719	1715	1715
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.669	0.087	0.607	0.008
Panel B: Political heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	-0.076	-0.046	0.089	0.017
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Prior × Treatment (b)	0.080	0.003	-0.099	0.081
	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Republican × Treatment (c)	0.441	0.205	-0.137	-0.131
	(0.155)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.134)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d)	-0.592	-0.488	0.032	0.440
	(0.240)	(0.204)	(0.211)	(0.194)
N	1720	1719	1715	1715
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.953	0.543	0.891	0.182
P-value: a + c = 0	0.007	0.184	0.664	0.302
P-value: b + d = 0	0.018	0.006	0.716	0.001
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.383	0.013	0.442	0.001

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are indicated in each column. Responses were elicited in the second wave of Experiment 2 (the obfuscated follow-up study). *Affirmative action hurts* refers to the question of whether "affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks blacks" which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly helped) to 7 (Strongly hurt). *Inequality due to effort* refers to the question of whether "differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks" which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). *Inequality due to disc.* refers to the question of whether "differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks" which was elicited on scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). *Disc. ser. problem* refers to the question of whether "racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem" which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All responses are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation of the control group. Controls include gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, political views, and confidence in prior beliefs. *Prior* takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.10: Correlates of willingness to pay for research evidence

	Willingness to pay	
	Raw	z-score
Republican	-0.481	-0.172
	(0.220)	(0.079)
Age	0.012	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.002)
Log(Income)	0.018	0.006
	(0.126)	(0.045)
Black	-0.407	-0.145
	(0.414)	(0.148)
White	-0.487	-0.174
	(0.209)	(0.075)
College	0.321	0.115
	(0.255)	(0.091)
Male	-0.469	-0.167
	(0.192)	(0.069)
Prior	0.008	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Confidence in prior	0.026	0.009
	(0.100)	(0.036)
Mean	3.318	-0.001
Observations	861	861

Notes: The table show OLS regressions using control group respondents from Experiment 2 (Research Now). We offered control group respondents the option to buy information about the results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Willingness to pay to receive the information was elicited using a multiple price list where respondents could choose between receiving the information or varying amounts for themselves (between 10 cents and $1). "Willingness to pay" is the number of times individuals prefer to receive information over receiving money (on a scale from 0 to 7). Column 1 shows the raw score, whereas column 2 shows the z-score (standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the responses). "Prior" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. * $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.3 Robustness and additional heterogeneity

Table A.11: Treatment effects on donations: Robustness with continuous prior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.256	0.246	0.325	0.300
	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.107)
Prior × Treatment	-0.009	-0.009	-0.012	-0.010
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Prior	0.015	0.012	0.015	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Republican		-0.232	-0.293	-0.115
		(0.067)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Prior × Republican			-0.006	-0.005
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Republican × Treatment			-0.263	-0.224
			(0.193)	(0.190)
Prior × Republican × Treatment			0.013	0.010
			(0.010)	(0.010)
N	1327	1327	1327	1327
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in $1 increments from $0 to $5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), regions (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having for full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). "Prior" refers beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (the question was elicited on a scale from 1 to 100, and in line with the pre-analysis plan we have top-coded responses at 50).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.12: Treatment effects on policy preferences: Results without controls

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)			
	(1) Name-blind recruitment	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind recruitment	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Panel A: Main specification								
Treatment (a)	0.028	-0.015	0.010	-0.004	-0.101	-0.047	-0.102	-0.083
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Prior × Treatment (b)	0.058	-0.072	0.029	-0.026	0.224	0.018	0.088	0.057
	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Prior	0.170	0.304	0.354	0.367	-0.008	-0.095	0.107	0.000
	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.22	0.21	0.57	0.66	0.091	0.67	0.84	0.72
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity								
Treatment (a)	0.145	-0.038	-0.037	-0.042	-0.071	0.009	-0.034	-0.013
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.130	-0.129	-0.014	-0.085	0.193	-0.062	-0.017	-0.046
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.105)
Republican × Treatment (c)	-0.406	0.065	0.154	0.121	-0.118	-0.231	-0.267	-0.280
	(0.174)	(0.154)	(0.175)	(0.154)	(0.144)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.149)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d)	0.803	0.374	0.339	0.406	0.133	0.346	0.440	0.441
	(0.248)	(0.223)	(0.258)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.219)	(0.234)	(0.224)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.844	0.027	0.460	0.078	0.130	0.481	0.502	0.429
P-value: a + c = 0	0.077	0.824	0.427	0.520	0.115	0.082	0.019	0.024
P-value: b + d = 0	0.002	0.193	0.155	0.103	0.100	0.140	0.043	0.046
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.010	0.056	0.012	0.010	0.387	0.667	0.458	0.496

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. *Prior* takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.13: Treatment effects on policy preferences: Results with continuous prior

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)			
	(1) Name-blind recruitment	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind recruitment	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Panel A: Main specification								
Treatment	0.044	0.090	0.055	0.081	-0.136	-0.109	-0.153	-0.147
	(0.088)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Prior × Treatment	0.000	-0.007	-0.002	-0.006	0.008	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Prior	0.007	0.012	0.012	0.014	0.001	-0.002	0.004	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel B: Political hetereogeneity								
Treatment	0.130	0.032	-0.039	-0.003	-0.113	-0.033	-0.069	-0.057
	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.080)
Prior × Treatment	-0.003	-0.007	-0.001	-0.005	0.007	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Republican × Treatment	-0.356	0.175	0.290	0.258	-0.064	-0.280	-0.320	-0.338
	(0.207)	(0.177)	(0.210)	(0.179)	(0.169)	(0.160)	(0.171)	(0.165)
Prior × Republican × Treatment	0.018	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.015	0.016	0.017
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. *Prior*' refers beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (the question was elicited on a scale from 1 to 100, and in line with the pre-analysis plan we have top-coded responses at 50).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.14: Treatment effects with probability weights (Experiment 1; NORC)

	(1) Disc.: housing	(2) Donations to NGO	(3) Name-blind screening	(4) Black preference	(5) Black assistance	(6) Disc. ser. problem
Panel A: Man specification						
Treatment (a)	2.413	0.158	0.065	0.020	-0.009	0.231
	(2.087)	(0.180)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.114)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-7.313	-0.001	-0.021	-0.064	0.099	-0.081
	(2.523)	(0.252)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.148)
Prior	5.157	0.290	0.070	0.124	0.096	0.260
	(1.925)	(0.177)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.103)
N	1366	1327	1378	1377	1374	1379
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean	71.69	1.93	3.47	2.70	3.41	3.18
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.371	0.627	0.598	0.280	0.100
Panel B: Political heterogeneity						
Treatment (a)	1.515	0.212	0.234	-0.009	-0.134	0.243
	(2.418)	(0.222)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.141)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-7.022	-0.145	-0.295	-0.079	0.115	-0.158
	(2.811)	(0.296)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.176)
Republican × Treatment (c)	3.035	-0.184	-0.579	0.097	0.422	-0.048
	(4.769)	(0.368)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.232)	(0.237)
Republican × Prior × Treatment (d)	-0.017	0.655	1.145	0.129	0.148	0.376
	(6.354)	(0.579)	(0.331)	(0.302)	(0.332)	(0.327)
N	1366	1327	1378	1377	1374	1379
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.000	0.732	0.536	0.367	0.830	0.393
P-value: a + c = 0	0.269	0.925	0.086	0.658	0.146	0.304
P-value: b + d = 0	0.219	0.306	0.004	0.849	0.370	0.431
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.521	0.180	0.020	0.401	0.010	0.034

Note: The table shows OLS regressions with probability weights where the dependent variable is indicated in each column (applying probability weights was not pre-specified). *Disc. housing* refers to beliefs about the rejection rate of black-sounding names in the housing market (elicited on a scale from 0 to 100). *Donations to the NGO* refers to the number of times the respondents preferred money to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support." *Disc. ser. problem* refers to the question of whether "racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem" which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). The outcomes in columns 2–6 are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Controls are listed in Table 3. *Prior* takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.15: Belief updating: Heterogeneity by confidence in prior beliefs

	Labor market	
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Main specification		
Treatment	2.25	2.10
	(1.02)	(1.02)
Prior × Treatment	-13.27	-13.09
	(1.62)	(1.62)
Prior	14.64	14.09
	(1.33)	(1.34)
N	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes
Panel B: Heterogeneity by confidence		
Treatment	11.20	11.94
	(4.17)	(4.12)
Prior × Treatment	-22.85	-23.35
	(6.23)	(6.13)
Confidence × Treatment	-2.63	-2.89
	(1.22)	(1.20)
Prior × Confidence × Treatment	2.81	3.01
	(1.86)	(1.82)
Prior	19.61	19.02
	(5.03)	(5.01)
Prior × Confidence	-1.47	-1.45
	(1.50)	(1.49)
Confidence	1.22	1.35
	(0.94)	(0.94)
Confidence		
N	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is post-treatment beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback on average (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In column 2, we include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). "Prior" takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). "Confidence" refers to confidence in pre-treatment beliefs (measured instantly after the belief elicitation) and was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very sure).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.4 Results from follow-up experiments

Table A.16: Experiment 3: Treatment effects of a political party prime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.04	0.03	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Republicans	-0.61	-0.61	-0.20	-0.17
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Treatment × Republicans	-0.06	-0.03	0.02	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Democrats			0.41	0.44
			(0.05)	(0.05)
Treatment × Democrats			0.08	0.06
			(0.07)	(0.07)
N	2737	2737	4000	4000
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regressions from Experiment 3 (Research Now). The dependent variable is support for "government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job." Answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). We have z-scored the responses by the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The treatment was a political party prime, where we reminded respondents about party views on affirmative action as follows: "In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race." In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified controls: gender, age, and education. In line with the pre-analysis, we exclude Independents from the regression in columns 1–2 as the treatment was tailored to affect attitudes for Republicans and Democrats. In columns 3–4, add interaction terms between the treatment and Democrats and add Independents to the regressions. The sample was recruited from Research Now and is representative of the US population on the following observable characteristics: age, sex, and region.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.17: Experiment 4: Treatment effects of information about racial stereotypes

	(1) Black preference	(2) Black assistance	(3) Problack (Index)	(4) Inequality: effort
Panel A: Main specification				
Treatment	-0.001	0.012	0.006	0.040
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Panel B: Heterogeneity				
Treatment (a)	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.09	-0.06	-0.07	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Prior	0.18	0.11	0.15	-0.13
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
N	2999	2999	2999	2999
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.29	0.61	0.37	0.43

Note: The table shows OLS regression results from Experiment 4 (MTurk). The dependent variables are indicated in each column. For the outcomes *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support." These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. For the outcome "Inequality: effort" (agreement to the statement that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are due to whites working harder than blacks), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) and then z-scored. *Prior* is indicator taking the value one for respondents who thought that blacks were most likely to rank "Working hours are short, lots of free time" as the least important characteristic in a job. Controls were pre-specified and include the prior, two racial indicators (black and white), a gender indicator, a college indicator, age, log income, and two indicators for political status (Democrats and Republicans).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.5 Additional pre-specified tables

Table A.18: Pre-specified regressions: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Racial discrimination is a serious problem	Preference for blacks	Assistance for blacks	Pro-black policy index	Name-blind screening	Racial discrimination: housing market	Donation NGO
Panel A: Main Effect							
Treatment	0.147	-0.049	0.019	-0.015	0.054	-0.065	0.082
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.053)
		[1.000]	[1.000]				
Observations	1379	1377	1374	1371	1378	1366	1327
Panel B: Prior							
Treatment × (A)	-0.019	-0.037	0.057	0.009	0.080	-0.501	-0.137
Prior > 15	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.084)	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.107)
Treatment (B)	0.157	-0.029	-0.012	-0.020	0.010	0.210	0.157
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.016	0.299	0.474	0.842	0.178	0.000	0.790
Observations	1379	1377	1374	1371	1378	1366	1327
Panel C: Republican							
Treatment ×	0.126	0.238	0.289	0.265	-0.051	0.285	-0.016
Republican (A)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.097)	(0.123)	(0.115)	(0.118)
Treatment (B)	0.118	-0.104	-0.048	-0.077	0.066	-0.131	0.086
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.062)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.006	0.143	0.031	0.026	0.894	0.133	0.489
Observations	1379	1377	1374	1371	1378	1366	1327

Notes: For the outcome **Racial discrimination serious problem**, answers were given from a scale from 1: "Not a problem" at all to 5: "A very serious problem". For the outcomes **Support preference for blacks**, **Support assistance for blacks**, and **Support name-blind recruitment**, answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support". Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people's (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. For **Racial discrimination — housing market**, answers were given on a scale from 0 to 100 (higher values imply more discrimination). For **Donation NGO**, we count the number of times the respondent preferred money for the NGO over money for self we count the number of times the respondent preferred money for the NGO over money for self (scale 0–6). The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. "Treatment" takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. "Prior $>$ 15" takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. "Republican" takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. * p$<$0.1, ** p$<$0.05, *** p$<$0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.19: Pre-specified regressions: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Racial discr: serious problem		Preference	Assistance	Pro-black	Name-blind	Posterior:	Racial Inequality due to		Affirmative
	main	follow-up	for blacks	for blacks	policy index	screening	Belief	Effort	Discrimination	action hurts
Panel A: Main Effect										
Treatment	0.110	0.068	-0.050	-0.073	-0.061	-0.004	-3.982	-0.036	0.007	0.025
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.815)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.048)
			[0.284]	[0.284]						
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721
Panel B: Prior										
Treatment × (A)	-0.004	0.200	0.082	0.142	0.112	0.257	-13.030	-0.126	-0.097	-0.093
Prior > 15	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.077)	(0.094)	(1.630)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.096)
Treatment (B)	0.111	-0.024	-0.087	-0.139	-0.113	-0.122	2.044	0.022	0.051	0.068
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(1.018)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.045	0.005	0.931	0.961	0.985	0.052	0.000	0.093	0.487	0.713
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721
Panel C: Republican										
Treatment ×	-0.153	0.038	-0.064	-0.087	-0.075	-0.071	2.642	0.014	-0.119	0.191
Republican (A)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(1.798)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.119)
Treatment (B)	0.149	0.059	-0.033	-0.051	-0.042	0.014	-4.672	-0.039	0.037	-0.025
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.951)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.959	0.247	0.278	0.164	0.152	0.546	0.188	0.773	0.362	0.120
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721

Notes: For the outcome **Racial discrimination serious problem**, answers were given from a scale from 1: "Not a problem" at all to 5: "A very serious problem". For the outcomes **Support preference for blacks**, **Support assistance for blacks**, and **Support name-blind recruitment**, answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support". Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people's (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. "Racial inequality due to effort" is people's agreement to the following statement: "Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks." "Posterior belief" is people's estimate of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. "Racial inequality due to discrimination" is people's agreement to the following statement: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks." Responses to these questions are on a 7-point scale where (1) means "strongly disagree" and (7) means "strongly agree". "Affirmative action hurts" is people's response to the question: "Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other?" People answer this question on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) strongly helped to (7) strongly hurt. The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. "Treatment" takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. "Prior $>$ 15" takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. "Republican" takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. * p$<$0.1, ** p$<$0.05, *** p$<$0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.20: Pre-specified regressions II: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Racial discr: serious problem		Preference	Assistance	Pro-black	Name-blind	Posterior:
	main	follow-up	for blacks	for blacks	policy index	screening	Belief
Panel A:							
Treatment × (A)	0.000	0.006	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.007	-0.573
Prior (continuous)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.068)
Treatment (B)	0.110	-0.027	-0.103	-0.148	-0.125	-0.128	6.085
	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.074)	(1.268)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.069	0.754	0.134	0.038	0.041	0.089	0.000
Observations	2073	1715	1720	1720	1720	1720	1701
Panel B:							
Treatment × (A)	-0.167	-0.020	0.092	0.035	0.064	-0.183	-1.145
Male	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.077)	(0.094)	(1.625)
Treatment (B)	0.192	0.079	-0.096	-0.091	-0.094	0.088	-3.404
	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(1.134)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.652	0.334	0.948	0.404	0.593	0.164	0.000
Observations	2073	1715	1720	1720	1720	1720	1701
Panel C:							
Treatment × (A)	-0.099	-0.020	0.046	0.008	0.027	-0.075	-1.021
Confidence in prior	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.931)
Treatment (B)	0.439	0.135	-0.203	-0.101	-0.152	0.245	-0.568
	(0.143)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.174)	(0.147)	(0.180)	(3.149)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.001	0.320	0.182	0.464	0.240	0.188	0.483
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702

Notes: For the outcome **Racial discrimination serious problem**, answers were given from a scale from 1: "Not a problem" at all to 5: "A very serious problem". For the outcomes **Support preference for blacks**, **Support assistance for blacks**, and **Support name-blind recruitment**, answers were given on a scale from 1: "Strongly oppose" to 5: "Strongly support". "Racial inequality due to effort" is people's agreement to the following statement: "Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks." "Posterior belief" is people's estimate of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. "Treatment" takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. "Prior $>$ 15" takes value one if our respondents overestimate the extent of racial discrimination. "Republican" takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

B Appendix figures

Figure A.1: Belief updating in response to the research evidence



Notes: In **Panel A**, which uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC), answers are given on a scale from 0 to 100 and indicate beliefs about the acceptance rate of black candidates (higher values imply less discrimination). In **Panel B**, which uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now), answers are given on a scale from 1 to 100 and indicate people's beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding resumes had to be sent to get one callback (higher values imply more discrimination). The errors bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Figure A.2: Republican–Democrat differences in beliefs about racial discrimination



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). **Panel A** shows, separately for Republicans and Democrats, data on beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten (as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). **Panel B** shows, separately for Republicans and Democrats, using only control group respondents, beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent rate of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent, as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each estimate from 100. In both panels, the dashed vertical lines indicate the correct answer.

Figure A.3: Republican–Democrat differences in donations behavior



Notes: The figure, which uses data from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC), shows distributions of the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization for self-identified Democrats and Republicans separately (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and $5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in increments of $1 from $0 to $5). The figure only includes respondents who completed all choices in the multiple price list.

Figure A.4: Prior and posterior beliefs about the number of resumes sent to get one interview



Notes: The figure uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now). Respondents were asked how many times they thought resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten. **Panel A** shows pre-treatment beliefs asked in wave 1 separately for the treatment and control group, whereas **Panel B** shows posterior beliefs asked in wave 2 approximately one week later. The vertical dashed line indicates the correct answer from the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).

Figure A.5: Political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination



Notes: The figure shows data from the General Social Survey, `http://gss.norc.org/get-the-data`. Respondents were asked whether differences the fact that blacks have "worse jobs, income, and housing than white people" is "mainly due to discrimination"; the figure shows the fraction of Democrats and Republicans who agree to this statement.

Figure A.6: Correlates of attitudes towards pro-black policies



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now). The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in **Panel A** is support for giving black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. The dependent variable in **Panel B** is support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job. Both outcomes are z-scored. "Inequality: discrimination" and "Inequality: effort" are agreements to the statements that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are primarily the result of, respectively, "discrimination against blacks" and "whites working harder than blacks." Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

C Screenshots

Figure A.7: Invitation emails sent out for the experiments with Research Now



Figure A.8: Consent form in wave 1 of Experiment 2 (Research Now)



Figure A.9: Consent form in wave 2 of Experiment 2 (Research Now)

This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics. Please pay close attention to all questions.

By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that you are at least 18 years of age.

>>

D Instructions

D.1 Experiment 1 (NORC)

D.1.1 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like "Carrie" and "Todd". The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like "Tanisha" and "Kareem". The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

> I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out ☐ times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus of $2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of 2,000 AmeriPoints.

D.1.2 Treatment screen

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

D.1.3 Self-reported outcomes

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem?

A very serious problem

A serious problem

A problem

A small problem

Not a problem at all

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.1.4 Behavioral measure: Donation

In Washington, D.C., several civil rights organizations work to protect individuals from discrimination in society. One of these organizations, the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*, tries to help African Americans. One of the organization's key initiatives aims to reduce racial discrimination in the workplace by lobbying for political reforms.

Below, you are given the opportunity to financially support the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*.

Your decision

For each of the 6 choices below, you decide whether the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights* should get money or whether *you* should get money ($1 equals 1000 AmeriPoints).

We will randomly implement your decision for *one* of these choices, which involve real money, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of being implemented.

$5 for the organization	◯	◯	$0 for me
$5 for the organization	◯	◯	$1 for me
$5 for the organization	◯	◯	$2 for me
$5 for the organization	◯	◯	$3 for me
$5 for the organization	◯	◯	$4 for me
$5 for the organization	◯	◯	$5 for me

Note: NORC is a non-partisan research organization and has no association with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights. NORC and the AmeriSpeak Panel do not endorse political or charitable causes.

D.1.5 Belief extrapolation: Discrimination in the housing market

Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations.

The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants' name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black requesters.

The researchers found that reservation requests from white-sounding names were accepted 49 percent of the time.

What do you think?

How many percent of the time do you think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted?

> I think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted ☐ percent of the time.

If your answer is within 2 percentage points of what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus of $2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of 2,000 AmeriPoints.

D.1.6 Beliefs about strength of the evidence: Treatment group only

The researchers behind the study on labor market discrimination described earlier in this survey interpreted their findings as clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with this interpretation of their findings?

Strongly agree

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

D.2 Instructions: Experiment 2 – first wave (Research Now)

D.2.1 Consent Form

This study has received ethics clearance by the Oxford University Institutional Review Board.

If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge a complaint or concern, they may contact us at the following email: christopher.roth@economics.ox.ac.uk.

{page break}

Consent form

I have read the information provided on the previous page.

I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time.

I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.

I understand that I can only participate in this experiment once.

I understand that close attention to the survey is required for my responses to count.

If you are 18 years of age or older, agree with the statements above, and freely consent to participate in the study, please click on the "I agree" button to begin the experiment.

I agree

I disagree

D.2.2 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like "Carrie" and "Todd". The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like "Tanisha" and "Kareem".

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with **white-sounding** names had to be sent out on average **10 times** to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with **black-sounding** names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

> I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out ☐ times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a **bonus of $2** in panel currency.

D.2.3 Confidence in priors

How sure are you about your answer to the previous question?

> Very sure

Sure

Somewhat sure

Unsure

Very unsure

D.2.4 Treatment screen

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out **15 times** to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were **50 percent** more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names than applicants with black-sounding names.

D.2.5 Manipulation check

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem?

A very serious problem

A serious problem

A problem

A small problem

Not a problem at all

D.3 Instructions: Experiment 2 – second wave (Research Now)

D.3.1 Introduction

This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics. Please pay close attention to all questions.

By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that you are at least 18 years of age.

D.3.2 Obfuscation: Views on investments

Which of the following do you think is the best long-term investment: bonds, real estate, saving accounts, stock or mutual funds, or gold?

Bonds

Real estate

Saving accounts

Stock or mutual funds

Gold

{page break}

Do you, personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock market right now – either in an individual stock, a stock mutual fund, or in a self-directed 401-K or IRA?

Yes

No

Do not know

D.3.3 Obfuscation: Views on religion

How important would you say religion is in your own life – very important, fairly important, or not very important?

- Very important
- Fairly important
- Not very important

{page break}

At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on American life or losing its influence?

- Increasing
- Decreasing
- No opinion

D.3.4 Self-reported outcomes

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

{page break}

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

{page break}

Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.3.5 Mechanisms

Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other?

Strongly helped

Helped

Somewhat helped

Neither helped nor hurt

Somewhat hurt

Hurt

Strongly hurt

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.”

Strongly agree

Agree

Somewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks.”

Strongly agree

Agree

Somewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

{page break}

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem?

A very serious problem

A serious problem

A problem

A small problem

Not a problem at all

D.3.6 Elicitation of posterior about labor market discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like "Carrie" and "Todd". The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like "Tanisha" and "Kareem".

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants' names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with **white-sounding** names had to be sent out on average **10 times** to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with **black-sounding** names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

> I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out ☐ times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a **bonus of $2** in panel currency.

D.3.7 Confidence in posteriors

How sure are you about your answer to the previous question?

> Very sure

Sure

Somewhat sure

Unsure

Very unsure

D.3.8 Willingness to pay for the information (control group only)

We just explained to you the details of a study which tested for racial discrimination in the labor market.

For each of the seven choices below, you decide whether you would like to receive more information about the results from the study or whether you would like to receive money.

If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will provide you with a short summary of the results, including information on the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out in order to get one callback. If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will also provide you with a link to the research study which further describes the methodology, implementation of the experiment, and discusses the research results.

We will randomly implement your decision for *one* of these choices after the study has ended, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of being implemented.

Information	◯	◯	$0.10 for me
Information	◯	◯	$0.20 for me
Information	◯	◯	$0.30 for me
Information	◯	◯	$0.40 for me
Information	◯	◯	$0.50 for me
Information	◯	◯	$0.75 for me
Information	◯	◯	$1 for me

D.3.9 Information provision (depending on people's choices)

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

`http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/bertrand_emily.pdf`

D.4 Instructions: Experiment 3: Racial stereotypes

D.4.1 Terms of participation

General instructions

This study is conducted by The Choice Lab at NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

You must be a US citizen of at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. If you do not fulfill these requirements, please do not continue any further.

You are not allowed to participate in this study more than once. If you experience a technical error or problem, do not try to restart or retake the study. Rather, send us an email with a description of your problem and we will get back to you.

Please note that your participation will be registered on the following Amazon Mechanical Turk worker ID:

${e://Field/workerId}

The worker ID was retrieved automatically when you clicked on the link that brought you here. This step is necessary for assigning payments to the right account and to ensure that you only participate in this study once.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please email thechoicelab@nhh.no.

I have read and understood the above and want to participate in this study. [Yes, No]

D.4.2 Pre-treatment background questions

1. Please indicate your gender. [Male, Female]
2. What is your age? [18–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; 65 or older]
3. Which category best describes your highest level of education? [Eighth grade or less, Some high school, High school degree/GED, Some college, 2-year college

degree, 4-year college degree, Master's degree, Doctoral degree, Professional degree (JD, MD, MBA)]

4. What was your family's gross household income in 2017 in US dollars? [Less than $15,000; $15,000 to $24,999; $25,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $149,999; $150,000 to $200,000; More than $200,000]

5. Which of the following best describes your race or ethnicity? [African American/Black; Asian/Asian American; Caucasian/White; Native American, Inuit or Aleut; Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; Other; Prefer not to answer]

6. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [Yes, No]

7. In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent? [Republican, Democrat, Independent]

8. In politics, as of today, do you lean towards the Republican Party or lean towards the Democratic Party? [The Republican Party, The Democratic Party; *note: question only shown to Independents*]

D.4.3 Pre-treatment beliefs

In this survey, we will ask you some questions about whites and blacks in America.

Throughout this survey, we will refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks as whites and blacks, respectively.

{*page break*}



The General Social Survey (GSS) is a large and representative survey of Americans.

In the survey, people were asked to rank the importance of the following five job characteristics (from least important to most important):

- High income
- No danger of being fired
- Working hours are short, lots of free time
- Chances for advancement
- Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Among **whites**, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job?

High income

No danger of being fired

Working hours are short, lots of free time

Chances for advancement

Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Among **blacks**, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job?

High income

No danger of being fired

Working hours are short, lots of free time

Chances for advancement

Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

D.4.4 Information treatment



The actual results on which response people most commonly chose as **least** important characteristic of a job were as follows:

Among **whites**, the response "Working hours are short, lots of free time" was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job.

Among **blacks**, the response "Working hours are short, lots of free time" was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job.

Source: The General Social Survey

D.4.5 Views on pro-black policies

We will now ask you a few questions about your attitudes towards policies to help blacks in the labor market.

{*page break*}

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

{*page break, note: We randomize the order of these two questions*}

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.4.6 Post-treatment beliefs

To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

"Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks."

Strongly agree

Agree

Somewhat agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat disagree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

D.5 Instructions: Experiment 4: Political Identity

D.5.1 Treatment group

A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race. We are interested in what you think about this issue.

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

D.5.2 Control group group

A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. We are interested in what you think about this issue.

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

D.5.3 Outcome measure

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

Strongly support

Support

Neither support nor oppose

Oppose

Strongly oppose

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