Norwegian School of Economics Bergen, Autumn, 2020





# Optimization and Cost Allocation in Collaborative Transportation

Potential Savings and Decreased CO<sup>2</sup> Emissions from Optimized Collaboration in Fuel Distribution in Norway

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Master Thesis, Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration, Business Analytics (BAN)

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This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or results and conclusions drawn in this work.

# Preface

This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration, Business Analytics, at Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), autumn 2020.

I took many very interesting courses at NHH and one of my absolutely favorites was Professor Mario Guajardo's course Decision Modelling in Business (BAN402) at autumn 2019. Here we learned the data tool A Mathematical Programming Language (AMPL) and mathematical methods for cost allocation, which are the two main tools I uses in this paper.

The work in this thesis has been very interesting and also challenging particularly regarding data collection.

I would like to thank supervisor Professor Roman Kozlov for enthusiastic and fruitful discussions, and for adapted accessibility in the challenging coronavirus situation.

I would like to thank Eirik Aronsen for highly needed information regarding fuel depots in the analyses.

Bergen, December 20, 2020

Morten Lid

## Abstract

The purpose of this study is to find potential savings and potential reduction in  $CO^2$  emission from an optimized collaboration in distributing fuel in Norway, from fuel depots to gas stations, compared to a non-collaborative fuel distribution. In addition to this the purpose is to make an optimization program in A Mathematical Programming Language (AMPL) for collaborating in distributing fuel in Norway, which can be easily adjusted and expanded regarding input data.

The answers to these questions I aim to find in this thesis are in my opinion very interesting these days of increased focus on effectiveness and the problems regarding global warming from  $CO^2$  emission.

The possible collaborations in this thesis includes the 4 fuel companies Circle K, Shell (ST1), Esso and YX/Uno-X, with their supply points from in total 20 fuel depots to their demand points at gas stations at all cities and places in Norway which is inhabited by 10000 citizens or more.

To get answers to these questions I will do several analyses and calculations. I will process data, create and run several analysis programs in AMPL. From the cost results of full collaboration (grand coalition) I will allocate costs to each company in the mathematic cost allocation method Shapley Values. Then I will from methods in cooperative game theory and results from Shapley Values and other results in AMPL find out if the grand coalition is the most beneficial coalition for each company, or if there are smaller coalitions which can be more beneficial. I will then also find the potential reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> emission from a optimized collaboration.

My findings from the analyses and calculations, given the input data, show that a optimized collaboration in the grand coalition is most beneficial for all the 4 companies and that there is a lot to save for each company from such full collaborative fuel distribution in Norway, compared to non-collaborative distribution. Further my findings, given the input data, show that the potential total decreased  $CO^2$  emission from the trucks from full collaboration is considerable.

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# 1. Introduction

I wanted to analyze and optimize a real-world problem in the data tool A Mathematical Programming Language (AMPL) where the results touch a topic that matters at a considerable level. After considering different topics I decided to analyze and optimize a collaborative distribution of fuel from depots to gas stations in Norway, to find potential savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emissions compared to a non-collaborative distribution. This includes to find out if all the gas companies have highest benefits from joining full collaboration, where all four companies collaborate together in one coalition (grand coalition), or if there are smaller coalitions which can be more beneficial.

By creating a optimizing program in the data tool AMPL and using the cost allocation method Shapley Values including condition tests I can find potential savings in total and for each gas company, and find the potential amount of decreased  $CO^2$  emission from the trucks from a optimized collaborative fuel distribution, compared to a non-collaborative distribution. I think this is an important subject to look into, these days with increased demands on efficiency and the problems regarding global warming due to  $CO^2$  emission.

The thesis with all its analyses and calculations are limited to involve the four main gas companies in Norway; Circle K, Shell (ST1), Esso and YX/UNO-X. Further it is limited to include the gas stations cities and places in Norway which is inhabited by 10000 citizens or more, which in total are 59 cities/places. The thesis will include all the 21 fuel depots in Norway. The analyses is based on distribution of fuel with conventional tank trucks with diesel engines. The possibility of using electric tank trucks is not considered here, as I believe that this, if happens, at least will be several years from now, due to the need of driving long distances with extremely heavy loads, which electric vehicles is not able to do today. This is also what others, which has look into it, believes (Spilde & Skotland, 2016). I will therefore analyze the situation like it is today and in my believe is likely to be in a long period of time.

The return routes of the trucks are not included in the analyses as it is not clear if the trucks always are returned to the supply point in every cases or if they can be hired and therefore not returned to the supply points. The results from the analyses is therefore values for one way transportation, which I see as the core operations in distributing fuel. From this one can understand that the savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emissions is likely to be even larger than the

results show. However, the percentage savings and percentage reduced  $CO^2$  emissions will probably be not much affected from this.

According to Norwegian Competition Authority the four fuel companies Circle K, Shell, Esso and YX can pic up fuel from each other's depots through agreements (Johansen, 2010). This means that these fuel companies can share all depots with each other if they want, without breaking the law. However, the degree of collaboration is not clear, due to difficulties finding clear information on this topic. However, I see it as there is a high probability that distribution of fuel in Norway today is not optimized toward 100% optimization. From this we can not find the potential savings and potential decreased  $CO^2$ emissions from a optimized collaboration in fuel distribution, compared to the collaboration as it is today. However, we can try estimate the potential savings and potential decreased  $CO^2$  emission from a optimized collaboration in fuel distribution, compared to a noncollaborative fuel distribution in Norway to get pointers of the amounts of savings and reduced  $CO^2$  emissions optimization can give, and try find out if a coalition which consists all the four companies are most beneficial or if smaller coalitions can be more beneficial. Maybe finding these results also can shred light on potentials and further encourage to optimization. A optimization program in AMPL could may also be a help in further optimization in fuel distribution in Norway.

The distances between depot and gas stations are possible to find, using updated data tools, I will here use Google Maps for this (Google, 2005).

When it comes to demand from gas stations cities/places we can estimate these data. The same goes for depot capacities, but the latter are more uncertain. I will therefore run three series of analyses in AMPL, three series of corresponding cost allocations and three series of corresponding condition tests. That is, three different approaches regarding depot capacities to get more reliable conclusions from the results.

The distribution of fuel, which includes both gas and diesel, is in this study merged to one, as to analyze these two fuels separately would only give minimal changes to the results. As mentioned already depot capacities are uncertain, then it would be meaningless to analyze gas and diesel separately as the results already will probably have way more inaccuracy from uncertain depot capacities compared to the inaccuracy from analysing gas and diesel as one.

The cost for transporting fuel is also possible to estimate, I have calculated this from own knowledge and statements from workers in the industry.

I will in this thesis aim to find reliable results and pointers for what potential savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emissions are possible from a optimized collaboration in fuel distribution in Norway, which also includes to find out if a optimized collaboration involves all the 4 main gas companies or if smaller coalitions are more beneficial.

I will in this thesis also aim to make a AMPL program which is suitable and easy to use regarding adjustments, changed and added data for use in collaborative fuel distribution in Norway.

Below the introduction chapter there will be a theoretical chapter, where I introduce the building blocks needed for the analyses and calculations.

In the methods chapter I will explain how I collected, calculated and used the data, explain how I created and run the AMPL program and show how I calculated and allocated the costs in Shapley Values. Further I will show how I checked these allocated costs for several conditions. This chapter is followed by a second methods chapter where I will show how I created new modified files in AMPL to run several different analyses. There will also come explanations regarding further changes in the AMPL files and calculations in the results chapter, to make the thesis easier to follow for the reader.

I will then in the results chapter run all the analyses and do all the corresponding calculations, including cost allocations and corresponding condition tests and show results at each section. As mentioned I will in this chapter explain some of the changes I will be doing along the different analyses and calculations to make the thesis easier to follow for the reader.

Then I will discuss the findings in the discussion chapter.

I will finally write conclusions in the conclusion chapter.

# 2. Theory

In this thesis I want to find potential savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emissions from a optimized collaborative distribution of fuel from depots to gas stations in Norway, compared to a non-collaborative fuel distribution, which includes to find out if all the gas companies have most benefits from joining a full collaboration (grand coalition).

To accomplish the analyses and calculations for finding answers to these questions I needed information, analysis tools and methods. I will here give a introduction of these building blocks which I needed in my analyses and calculations, as a understanding of what they are. This will involve information blocks and concepts, analysis program and calculation methods. However, the technical parts of how I collected, processes and uses these blocks, concepts and tools will come in the methodical chapters.

# 2.1 Gas stations

## 2.1.1 Locations

The four companies Circle K, Shell (ST1), Esso and YX/UNO-X has gas stations which are located in very many cities and places in Norway. Most cities and larger places have all four companies' gas stations represented. However, the locations of the gas stations is mostly located at cities and places which has citizens of a certain size, there are not so many gas stations in the middle of nowhere. This thesis is limited to the cities/places in Norway which have citizens of 10000 or more, which are 59 cities/places (Thorsnæs, 2019).

All the 59 cities/places are listed below:

Oslo

Bergen

Stavanger

Trondheim

Fredrikstad

Drammen
Porsgrunn
Kristiansand
Ålesund
Moss
Haugesund
Tønsberg
Sandefjord
Arendal
Bodø
Tromsø
Hamar
Halden
Larvik
Kongsberg
Askøy
Molde
Harstad
Gjøvik
Lillehammer
Horten

Jessheim

Ski

Mo I Rana

Kristiansund

Korsvik

Tromsdale

Hønefoss

Alta

Elverum

Stjørdalshalsen

Askim

Narvik

Leirvik

Osøyro

Råholt

Drøbak

Grimstad

Vennesla

Nesoddtangen

Steinkjer

Bryne

Kongsvinger	
Kopervik	
Knarrvika	
Egersund	
Ålgård	
Lommedalen	
Mandal	
Ås	
Brummunddal	
Førde	
Levanger	
Konnerud	

## 2.1.2 Demand

Every gas station's city/place has a annual- and statistical demand of fuel. These is mostly corresponding to the size of the population in the city/place.

## 2.2 Depots

## 2.2.1 Locations

The gas stations are located throughout Norway at smaller and larger places and cities.

The 4 companies Circle K, Shell (ST1), Esso and YX/UNO-X owns in total 20 fuel depots in Norway and drives fuel from depots to their gas stations in Norway. In addition Equinor has

a depot at Mongstad, but this company do not own or operate any gas stations, which the other four companies does (E. Aronsen, personal communication, 2020). Fuel depots are often located near the sea, but not all.

In the following I have noted Shell (ST1) as Shell and YX/Uno-X as YX, due to that I think most people are most familiar to just Shell and just YX. I think the paper now will be easier to follow for the reader.

The 21 depot's locations in Norway are listed below (E. Aronsen, personal communication, 2020):

Cicle K

Cities/places for Circle K's depots in Norway:

Alta

Harstad

Trondheim

Førde

Kristiansand

Oslo

#### Shell

Cities/places for Shell's depots in Norway:

Tananger

Vestervika

Skjelnan

16

#### Kirkenes

Balsfjord

Larsgården

Lillesund

Sjursøya

## Esso

Cities/places for Esso's depots in Norway:

Trondheim

Bergen

Slagen

Fredrikstad

#### YΧ

Cities/places for YX's depots in Norway:

Mo I Rana

Stavanger

In addition Equinor has a depot at Mongstad at their oil refinery, however Equinor do not own or operate any gas stations, so this depot is only included in three extra analyses in the cases where all four companies collaborate. This is because all the other 45 analyses have to be done without Equinor, thus all analyses for the calculation in Shapley Value formula has to be done without Equinor's depot, to get a correct calculation.

#### 2.2.2 Capacities

The depots have different capacities in the tank at their depots, every depot is not equal regarding volume in the depot's tank. However, the depots get refilled, so in practice the volume of the tank at each depot is not the true capacity.

## 2.3 Distances

Distances is the distances in km the fuel trucks which distributes the fuel from the depots to the gas stations has to drive. These are one distance per delivering operation, which in these analyses is 1180 distances(routes). The return routes are not included in the analyses.

# 2.4 Coalitions

The companies can choose to stand alone or to collaborate in smaller or larger coalitions. The larger the coalition the more the companies can expect to save, if all the companies do contribute to the collaboration. A company that do not contribute to the collaboration and therefore should not be in the collaborative coalition is e.g. a company that operates only at regions where none of the other companies operates, hence there can not be created savings from this company.

In game theory, a coalition where all the players (companies) are represented is called the grand coalition (Coalition Theory Network, 2020).

## 2.5 AMPL

A Mathematical Programming Language (AMPL) is a computational mathematical programming tool. AMPL is a tool which is typically used for optimization problems in for example transportation, shipping, oil refinery or electricity markets, where one wants to

optimize the routes in transporting and shipping, optimize the flows in a oil refinery or optimize the power management in electricity markets.

A major advantage of the program is that it can handle a high amount of input data (Robert Fourer, 2003). This comes to use in tasks were one have large scale problems (Havås, Alfred, Jim, & Mirjam, 2013), like for example very many routes to chose from or very many constrains to fulfill.

For each analysis one want to run in AMPL, the program need four files, which are the model file, the data file, the run file and the text file.

The model file is usually created without numbers, but contains the minimizing or maximization function and conditions, where these are linked to the numbers in the data file. Plus different coding for the program.

The data file is created with sets and parameters, with often very many parameters and large tables of numbers.

The run file is coded for deciding which model file one wants to use in the analysis, which data file and what(results) to display in which text file.

## 2.6 Game theory

#### 2.6.1 Shapley Values

Shapley Values is a well-known mathematical method for allocating cost or payoff from a coalition to the participants (players), were all these players collaborating. Shapley Values has a formula for calculating the players allocated cost or payoff. One can either put all possible coalition costs (including stand-alone costs) into the formula and get the result for the current player's allocated cost. Or one can put coalition payoffs (including stand-alone costs) into the formula and get the result for the current player's allocated cost. Or one can put coalition payoffs (including stand-alone costs) into the formula and get the result for the current player's allocated payoff. The formula and mechanism is the same in the two cases.

The purpose in cost allocation is to allocate the coalition's (grand coalition) cost to each player in a fair way, so each player gets their cost reduced (from collaborating) according to

how much they contribute to the collaboration. The sum of the allocated costs is equal to the coalition (grand coalition) cost.

The purpose in payoff allocation is to give each player payoff according to how much they contribute to the collaboration.

Technically the cost in cost allocation is allocated to a player according to the average marginal cost the coalition gets at the moment this player enters the coalition, were the coalition is formed one by one player (Centon, 2019). To find the average marginal cost the grand coalition gets of a specific player one must calculate the marginal cost the coalition gets the moment this player enter the coalition, and calculate this in all possible order(sequences) the grand coalition can be formed. Then one need to sum all these costs and divide the sum by the number of cases. The marginal cost of this player in each of these cases is the cost of the coalition as it is when this player has entered the coalition minus the cost of the coalition right before this player entered the coalition. There can also be none or one player in the "coalition" at the moment right before this player enter this "coalition".

For payoff allocation it will be the same mechanism, were Shapley Values finds the average increased savings (payoff) the coalition gets of this player.

To get a better understanding of Shapley Values calculation I will show the mechanism in a simple example of three players. Here I will also prove that Shapley Values can be used both for payoff allocation and for cost allocation.

Imagine we have the three players A, B and C, collaborating in a coalition, were all three players collaborating, and that they have reduced the total cost due to the collaborating.

I will show the calculations for player A:

We have in this example the optimized costs and optimized payoff for all possible coalitions these three players can form, inclusive stand-alone costs:

Coalition	Ontimized cost	Devieff
Coantion	Optimized cost	Payoff
A:	11	0
B:	12	0
C:	13	0
AB:	18	5
AC:	10	14
BC:	22	3
ABC:	19	17

All possible sequences (order) the coalition (grand coalition) can be formed and calculation of the marginal cost of player A:

Order		Marginal costs
ABC	(A – 0)	11 - 0 = 11
ACB	(A – 0)	11 - 0 = 11
BAC	(AB - B)	18 - 12 = 6
BCA	(ABC – BC)	19 - 22 = -3
CAB	(AC – C)	10 - 13= -3
CBA	(ABC – BC)	19 - 22 = -3
		= 19

19/6 = 3.167

This means that the allocated cost from Shapley Values to player A is 3.167, which is the average marginal cost of player A.

All possible sequences (order) the coalition (grand coalition) can be formed and calculation of the increased savings (payoff) of player A:

Order		Increased payoff
ABC	(0 – A)	0 - 0 = 0
ACB	(0 – A)	0 - 0 = 0
BAC	(AB – B)	5 - 0 = 5
BCA	(ABC – BC)	17 - 3 = 14
CAB	(AC – C)	14 - 0 = 14
CBA	(ABC – BC)	17 - 3 = 14
		= 47

47/6 = 7.833

This means that the allocated payoff from Shapley Values to player A is 7.833

Payoff for player A should also be the same as; stand alone cost for A minus player A's allocated cost from Shapley Values. Lets check:

11 - 3.167 = 7.833 (yes)

This proves that the Shapley Value can be used for both cost allocation and for payoff allocation.

Shapley Values also have a formula which can be used to calculate Shapley Values (allocated cost or payoff). However, there exist different versions, which of course gives the same results. The most common version seems to be the following version (Cotra, 2019):

$$arphi_i(v) = \sum_{S \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} rac{|S|! \; (n-|S|-1)!}{n!} (v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S))$$

Where n is the total number of players and S is the subsets of N not containing player i.

Shapley Value (allocated cost) for player A:

((2/6) x (A)) + ((1/6) x (AB-B+AC-C)) + ((2/6) x (ABC-BC))= ((2/6) x (11)) + ((1/6) x 18-12+10-13)) + ((2/6) x (19-22))= 3.667 + 0.5 + (-1)= 3.167 (yes)

#### 2.6.2 Conditions

According to cooperative game theory a coalition's cost allocation belongs to the core if the cost allocation is based on a coalition where there are no other smaller coalitions that can be more beneficial in the game. Also according to game theory a cost allocation is stable if none of the players are more beneficial to break out to form smaller coalitions or stand alone. A cost allocation can belong to the core and still not be stable, this is usually happening when the cost allocation is not fair regarding to how much saving each player gets compared to the company's contribution to the collaboration.

To find out if a cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core the cost allocation will first be checked regarding the two conditions, the individual rational- and the coalition rational condition. Finally the summed allocated costs will be checked regarding the efficiency condition.

The individual rational condition is to check whether each player's allocated cost is lower than the corresponding stand-alone cost. If this is the case for all the players the individual rational condition is fulfilled.

The coalition rational condition is to check if each possible coalition's (not stand alone and grand coalition) summed allocated costs is lower than that coalition's optimized cost. If this is the case for each possible coalition, the coalition rational condition is fulfilled.

The efficiency condition is to check if the summed allocated costs is equal to the grand coalition cost. This is simply to check if all costs are allocated and to check that no further costs is added.

# 3. Creating and run the AMPL program

## 3.1.1 Coalitions

The companies can distribute fuel alone as stand alone companies or they can form coalitions of two-, three- or four players(companies) to collaborate in distributing fuel. To do all the analyses I need to do in this thesis to find the answers I seek to find I need to investigate all the coalitions the 4 companies can form, plus the 4 players coalition including Equinor's depot. To allocate the costs from the 4 players coalition (grand coalition) I need the optimized cost results from AMPL for each possible coalition the 4 companies Circle K, Shell, Esso and YX can form. All these analyses will be done in three series, due to three different approaches regarding depot capacities.

#### All possible coalitions the companies can form

I have listed all the possible coalitions the 4 companies can form below, these are both stand alone and collaborative oriented. For the last and fully collaborated(grand coalition) case I have run 2 different analyses, where the last will include Equinors depot at Mongstad. But as mentioned the latter is not included in the cost allocation formula I uses. However I have used the collaboration situation when Equinor is included when I calculates the second analysis for potential savings and what amount of decreased CO<sup>2</sup> emission is possible, from a perfect collaboration compared to the cases when the companies stand alone and do not collaborate at all.

Circle K Shell Esso YX Circle K / Shell Circle K / Esso Circle K / YX Shell / Esso Shell / YX Esso / YX Circle K / Shell / Esso Circle K / Shell / YX Circle K / Esso / YX Shell / Esso / YX Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX

We can see that this is in total 15 different coalitions, including stand alone configurations for the 4 companies. As I wish to find and analyze what collaborations are interesting from the companies point of view regarding cost and to find possible savings which also leads to finding potential emission reductions I have done 45 different analysis in AMPL, plus the 3 analyses which includes Equinors depot at Mongstad at the full collaborative cases, plus 5 analyses for  $CO^2$  emission. However the 45 analyses are 15 x 3 analyses where the only differences in the 3 series is the depot capacities, due to uncertain numbers. By analysing using these 3 different approaches I will shred more light on the final results and get more reliable conclusions.

# 3.2 AMPL program

To make the AMPL program I first made one model file that is used unchanged for all the 53 analyses, and for each of the 53 analyses I made one unique data file, one unique run file and one unique text file. So in total 160 files in AMPL. Since I made the model file with no numbers, it allows me to not change anything in the model file when I want to change any numbers for the data. This makes it a lot easier to adjust the program regarding changed data for doing more analysis later on.

Note that all the green text in the program is not parts of the coding, only explanations for the coding.

An overview of the naming of all the 160 AMPL files is given in the appendix.

## 3.3 Model file

Here I explain and show the model file I have created, which when made with no numbers can be used unchanged through all the 53 different analyses. As you will see I have used no numbers in the model file, because all numbers which may change to different analyses, I want to keep in the data files. The program will then be user friendly and easier to change for further analyses.

#### 3.3.1 Mathematical formulation

Mathematical formulation of objective function and constrains:

$$min \ z = \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J} k_{ij} \ c_{ij} f_{ij}$$

s.t

$$\sum_{j\in J} f_{ij} \leq s_i, \qquad i\in I$$

(1)

$$\sum_{i\in I} f_{ij} = d_j , \qquad j \in J$$

$$f_{ij} \ge 0$$
,  $i \in I, j \in J$ 

#### 3.3.2 Model file

The model file have several components, which will be connected to the values and names in the data file trough the run file.

"set I" to include all the names for all "I", which is the depots.

"set J" to include all the names for all "J", which is the cities/places.

"param k" to tell the program that "k" is the table of all values for all "I" to all "J", which is all the 1180 distances from depots to cities/places.

"param s" to tell the program that "s" is all values for all "I", which will be the corresponding restrictions for max supply for each depot.

"param d" to tell the program that "d" is all values for all "J", which will be the corresponding restrictions for required demand for each city/place.

"param c" to tell the program that "c" is a constant, which will be the cost constant used in the formula.

"var f" tells the program that the quantity (litres of fuel in 1000 litre) can not be negative.

"minimize z" tells the program to make a minimized solution for "z" from the formula below it, given restrictions.

"Sum" followed by the formula below "minimize z" tells the program what to minimize, which is to multiply the values for the routes "I" to "J" it chooses to use with the cost constant "c" multiplied with the corresponding quantity it chooses to use for the corresponding route "I" to "J". It will tell the program that "z" is the sum of all this series of sums it uses.

"subject to" tells the program that what is coded below "subject to" is restrictions which the solution has to fulfill when the program minimizes "z".

The first restriction tells the program that each "I" can be equal to or less than the corresponding "s", which is the corresponding max supply for each depot.

The second restriction tells the program that each "J" must be equal to the corresponding "d", which is the corresponding required demand for each city/place.

Figure 3.3.2.1. Model file

```
Model.mod %
set I; # set of supply points (depots places)
set J; # set of demand points (gas station places)
param k{I,J}; # distances in km between depots and gas stations
param s{I}; # supply quantity in 1000 litres fuel
param d{J}; # demand quantity in 1000 litres fuel
param c; # cost per 1000 litre km
var f{I,J} >=0; # 1000 litres fuel transported from I to J
minimize z:
    sum{i in I, j in J} (k[i,j]*c*f[i,j]); /* minimizes the total cost, given the restrictions below */
subject to
maxsupply {i in I}:
    sum{j in J} f[i,j] <= s[i]; # max supply of fuel in 1000 litre
requireddemand {j in J}:
    sum{i in I, f[i,j] = d[j]; /* litres of fuel in 1000 litre required from
    gas station places */</pre>
```

# 3.4 Data file

## 3.4.1 Gas stations locations

I have in the analyses included places/cities for gas stations which holds 10000 citizens or more only, specifically 59 places/cities. All these places/cities I found at Store norske leksikon (Thorsnæs, 2019). When considering this I assume all the 4 companies have gas stations at all these places/cities. This assumption is based on own observations and research, where I found that this assumption seems to hold. If I had included considerable smaller places in Norway this would not be the case, as a small population of course will not give a large enough market for several gas stations, there will some places in Norway only be three, two, one or no gas stations.

The reason why I set the limit at 10000 is that I think this will give strong indications of the information I seek to find. There are values of another parameter in the model that are

estimated, since the true values are missing due to difficulties to procure them. Regarding this parameter I thinking of the missing of true capacities for the depots. This parameter will probably create much higher levels of inaccuracy than the missing of smaller places in the model, especially places in the south part of Norway, due to larger and closer populations. Therefore I think it would be meaningless to create the model more accurate regarding the population limit mentioned above at this level of investigation. Another aspect of the depot capacities is that the gas companies probably can easily adjust these capacities to some extent, because they constantly is filled and are therefore probably in practice nearly impossible to give accurate values in the data files.

I will in this study and all its analyses therefore try to find patterns and results which is only accurate to a certain level. Then it would be meaningless to include all places with all gas stations in Norway in these analyses. I still believe to find patterns and results which will give answers at an reasonable level of realistic accuracy.

However, if the program in the future should be changed with more accurate input data, as accurate capasities of the depots and accurate demands for each place/city of each company, it would give more meaning to include more places with a smaller number of citizens.

#### 3.4.2 Depot locations

The locations(cities/places) for the 4 companies 20 depots in Norway depot I have collected from communication with a person (E. Aronsen, personal communication, 2020). This communication was done after difficulty to find updated and reliable information regarding depot locations from research, as I wanted to have reliable depot locations as they are today, to make analyses of good quality.

#### 3.4.3 Distances

All the distances from depots to gas stations cities/places I collected using the tool Google Maps (Google, 2005). This is 1180 distances which I plotted directly into the AMPL program (data files).

From my experience and perception from people in the society Google Maps is a wellknown and trusted tool to find the best route to drive when one planning to drive from one destination to a another given destination. I have used this tool myself a lot in my leisure time for years and I trust it a lot. My experience is also that this tool is updated very rapidly to new roads and changes in the roads in Norway. I also find this tool very user friendly and effective to use. These distances I believe is very accurate to reality, as they are based on roads for cars and are based on the routes from one location to another location which are best suitable regarding time used for the ride, which often are the absolutely shortest route or at least one of the shortest routes depending on the quality of the road.

Based on this evaluation I therefore chose Google Maps to find all the 1180 distances I used in the AMPL program.

#### 3.4.4 Depot capacities

I tried to find information on depot capacities, but this seemed difficult and maybe impossible to find information from research. The information regarding depot capacities may also be confidential (E. Aronsen, personal communication, 2020).

Therefore the depot capacities at each depot in the analyses is not accurate to reality, only estimated. I have therefore run three series analyses with three different approaches regarding depot capacities, as I do not have access to accurate data.

However, it would probably be difficult to determine an actual capacity due to the fact that depots are being refilled. The depots are being refilled either from the company that picked up fuel from the depot or from the company that owns the depot (E. Aronsen, personal communication, 2020). As I see it the actual capacity depends mostly on the capacity of the delivery system to the depots. Because of uncertain depot capacities the results in this analyses are not absolutely correct, but I still believe the analysis results will be not far from the truth and give pointers which probably are correct to reality.

Here in the first serie of analyses I have given all depots the equal capacity which is the total annual consumption of fuel in Norway divided by the total number of depots multiplied with approximately 1.5 to give overcapacities at a middle extent.

Total annual fuel consumption in Norway in 1000 litre: 4874893

Total number of fuel depots in Norway including Mongstad: 21

4874893 / 21 x 1.5 = 348206.6

Depot annual capacities in 1000 litre for each depot I have then rounded to: 350000

#### 3.4.5 Gas station demand

The required demands of fuel for each city/place I have set up I expect is a good estimate as I have calculated these data from collecting data for the amount of citizens at each city/place from the updated Store Norske Leksikon (Thorsnæs, 2019) and statistic total annual fuel consumption in Norway from the well-known Statistisk Sentralbyrå (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2020). Calculating each cities/places demand includes a lot of numbers and calculations as the numbers change from what coalition I going to analyze. All this calculations I have done in the excel file Thesis Data, and further copied and pasted several different number series into the data files of the corresponding analyses in AMPL.

Figure 3.4.5.1. Excel file

	A	B	С	D	E		G	н
		insumption in 1000 litre for Norv						
	Gas for vehicles		CIALT Circle K/Alta	232137.8	Circle K	350000.0	5000000.0	316868.0
	Diesel for vehicle		CIHAR Circle K/Harstad		Shell	350000.0	5000000.0	237651.0
	Diesel	918473	CITRH Circle K/Trondheir		Esso	350000.0	5000000.0	329055.3
	Sum	4874893	CIFOR Circle K/Førde	232137.8	YX	350000.0	5000000.0	365617.0
			CIKRI Circle K/Kristiansar		Equinor	350000.0	5000000.0	312297.8
			CIOSL Circle K/Oslo	232137.8				
;			SHTAN Shell/Tananger	232137.8				
1			SHVES Shell/Vestervika	232137.8				
)			SHSKJ Shell/Skjelnan	232137.8				
			SHKIR Shell/Kirkenes	232137.8				
2			SHBAL Shell/Balsfjord	232137.8				
1			SHLAR Shell/Larsgarden	232137.8				1
L.			SHLIL Shell/Lillesund	232137.8				
			SHSJU Shell/Sjursøya	232137.8				
			ESTRH Esso/Trondheim					
			ESBER Esso/Bergen	232137.8				
;			ESSLA Esso/Slagen	232137.8				
1			ESFRE Esso/Fredrikstad					
0			YXMOI YX/Mo i Bana	232137.8				
1			YXSTA YX/Stavanger	232137.8				
2								
			EQMON Equinor/Mongs	202101.0				
3 4			oum	4014033.0				
5								
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Dities/plases for gas stati			laces	Annual fuel consumption in 1000 litre for cities		Required annual demand in 1000 litre for
Dslo	1019513	32.716 %	OSL	1594850	OSL	518326
Bergen	257082	8.250 %	BER	402160	BER	130702
Stavanger	225020	7.221%	STA	352004	STA	114401
Frondheim	186364	5.980 %	TBH		TBH	94748
Fredrikstad	113622	3.646 %		177742		57766
Drammen	107930	3.463 %		168838	DRA	
Porsgrunn	93255	2.992 %	POR		POR	
Kristiansand	64057	2.056 %	KBI	100206	KBI	32567
Ålesund	53254	1.703 %	ALE	83307	ALE	27075
Tønsberg	52413	1.682 %		82000	TON	
Moss	47135	1.513 %		73734		23964
Haugesund	45040	1.445 %		70457		22899
Sandefjord	44368	1.424 %		69406		22557
Arendal	43515	1.396 %	ARE	68072	ARE	22123
Bodø	41720	1.339 %	BOD	65264	BOD	21211
Tromsø	40471	1.299 %	TRO	63310	TRO	20576
Hamar	27947	0.897%	HAM	43718	HAM	14208
Halden	25708	0.825 %	HAL	40216	HAL	13070
Larvik	24647	0.791 %	LAR	38556	LAR	12531
Kongsberg	22219	0.713 %	KON		KON	11296
Kongsberg Askøy	22088	0.709 %	ASO		ASO	11230
Molde	21103	0.677 %	MOL		MOL	
Harstad	21070	0.676 %	HAR		HAR	10712
Gjøvik	20589	0.661%	GJO	32208	GJO	10468
Lillehammer	20580	0.660 %	LIL	32194	LIL	10463
Horten	20504	0.658 %	HOR	32075	HOR	10424
Jessheim	20016	0.642 %	JES	31312	JES	10176
Ski	19546	0.627%	SKI	30576	SKI	9937
Mo i Rana	18899	0.606 %	MOL	29564	MOL	9608
Kristiansund	18273	0.586 %	KRU		KRU	9290
Korsvik	17981	0.577 %	KOR		KOR	
Tromsdalen	17377	0.558 %	TRD		TRD	8835
Hønefoss	17055	0.547 %	HON		HON	8671
Alta	15342	0.432%	ALT	24000	ALT	7800
Elverum	15117	0.485 %	ELV	23648	ELV	7686
Stjørdalshalsen	14723	0.472 %	STJ	23032	STJ	7485
Askim	14488	0.465 %	ASK	22664	ASK	7366
Narvik	14148	0.454 %	NAB	22132	NAB	7193
Leirvik	14126	0.453 %	LEI	22098	LEI	7182
Osøyro	13911	0.446 %	080	21761	080	7072
Råholt	13504	0.433 %		21125	BAH	
Drøbak	13393	0.430 %		20951		6809
Grimstad	13304	0.427 %	GRI	20812	GRI	6764
Vennesla	13118		VEN		VEN	6663
		0.421%				
Nesoddtangen	13076	0.420 %	NES	20455	NES	6648
Steinkjer	12985	0.417 %	STE	20313	STE	6602
Bryne	12202	0.392 %		19088	BRY	6204
Kongsvinger	12034	0.386 %	KOV	18825	KOV	6118
Kopervik	11561	0.371%	KOP	18085	KOP	5878
Knarrvika	11502	0.363 %	KNA	17993	KNA	5848
Egersund	11433	0.367 %	EGE	17885	EGE	5813
Ålgård	11335	0.364 %		17732	ALG	5763
Lommedalen	11200	0.359 %		17520		5694
Mandal	10909	0.350 %		17065		5546
Ås	10868	0.349 %		17001	AAS	
ns Brumunddal	10660	0.343 %		16676		5420
Førde	10339	0.332 %		16174		5256
Levanger	10333	0.332 %		16164	LEV	5253
Konnerud	10314	0.331%	KOU	16134	KOU	5244
Sum	3116292	100.000 %		4874893		1584340
	ļ		_			
	ļ	-	_			

# Figure 3.4.5.3. Excel file

P	Q	B	S	Т	U	v
K	Required annual demand in 1000 litre for S		Required annual demand in 1000 litre for B			Sum Required annual demand in 1000 litre for Circle K/Shell/
DSL	518326		358841		199356	
BER	130702	BER	30486	BER	50270	
STA	114401	STA	79201	STA	44001	
TRH	94748	TBH	65595	TBH	36442	
FRE	57766	FRE	39992	FRE	22218	
DRA	54872	DRA	37988	DRA	21105	
POR	47411	POR	32823	POR	18235	
KRI	32567		22546	KBI	12526	
ALE	27075		18744	ALE	10413	
TON	26650		18450		10250	
	23964		16590	MOS		
	22899		15853	HAU		
	22557		15616	SAN		
	22123		15316	ARE		
	21211		14684	BOD		
TRO	20576		14245	TRO		
	14208	HAM		HAM		
HAL	13070		3043	HAL	5027	
LAR	12531	LAR		LAR	4819	
KON	11296	KON ASO		KON		
ASO MOL	11230 10729	MOL		ASO MOL		
HAR	10712	HAR		HAR		
GJO	10468	GJO			4026	
LIL	10463	LIL	7244	LIL	4024	
HOR	10424	HOR			4009	
JES	10176		7045	JES	3914	
SKI	9937	SKI	6880	SKI	3822	
MOL	9608	MOL			3696	
KRU	9290		6432	KRU		
KOR	9142		6329	KOR		
	8835	TRD			3398	
HON	8671	HON	6003	HON	3335	
ALT	7800	ALT	5400	ALT	3000	
ELV	7686	ELV	5321	ELV	2956	
STJ	7485		5182	STJ	2879	
ASK	7366		5099	ASK	2833	
	7193		4980	NAB		
LEI	7182		4972	LEI	2762	
080	7072		4896		2720	
RAH	6866	RAH		BAH		
DRO	6809	DRO		DRO		
GRI	6764		4683	GRI	2601	
VEN	6663	VEN		VEN		
NES	6648		4602		2557	
STE	6602	STE			2539	
	6204	BRY			2386	
KOV KOP	5118 5878		4236 4063	KOV KOP	2353	
KOP KNA	5848		4063		2249	
EGE	5813		4040		2240	
ALG	5763		3990	ALG	2216	
LOM	5634		3342	LOM		
	5546		3840	MAN		
AAS	5525		3825	AAS		
	5420	BRU		BRU		
FOR	5256		3639		2022	
LEV	5253		3637	LEV	2021	
KOU	5244		3630	KOU		
	1584340		1036851			4874893.0

# Figure 3.4.5.4. Excel file

W		Y		AA		AC	AD
	Required annual demand in 1000 litre for Circle K/						
	1036652		877167		717682		877167
			221188		180972		221188
STA	228803		193602	STA	158402	STA	193602
TRH	189497	TRH	160344	TRH	131190	TRH	160344
FRE	115532	FRE	97758	FRE	79984	FRE	97758
DRA	109744	DRA	92861	DRA	75977	DRA	92861
	94823	POR	80235	POR	65647	POR	80235
KRI ALE	65134 54149	KBL	55113 45819	KRI ALE	45093 37488	KRI ALE	55113 45819
	53300		45100	TON	36300	TON	45100
	47927		40554	MOS			40554
HAU	45797	HAU		HAU	31706	HAU	38751
SAN	45114		38173	SAN	31233	SAN	38173
ARE	44247		37439	ARE	30632	ARE	37439
	42421		35895		29369		35895
TRO			34820	TRO		TRO	
	28417		24045		19673		24045
HAL	26140		22119	HAL	18037	HAL	22119
LAR	25061	LAR	21206	LAR	17350	LAR	21206
KON	22533	KON	19117	KON	15641	KON	19117
ASO	22459		19004	ASO	1554.9	ASO	19004
MOL	21458	MOL		MOL		MOL	
	21424		18128		14832	HAB	18128
GJO	20935		17714	GJO	14494	GJO	17714
LIL	20326	LIL	17707	LIL	14487	LIL	17707
	20849		17641	HOR	14434		17641
JES	20352	JES	17221	JES	14030	JES	17221
SKI	19875	SKI	16817	SKI	13759	SKI	16817
MOL	19217	MOL	16260	MOL	13304	MOL	16260
KRU	18580	KRU	15722	KRU	12863	KRU	15722
KOR	18283		15470	KOR	12658	KOR	15470
TRD	17669		14951	TRD	12232	TRD	14951
HON	17342	HON	14674	HON	12006	HON	14674
ALT	15600	ALT	13200	ALT	10800	ALT	13200
ELV	15371	ELV	13006	ELV	10642	ELV	13006
STJ	14971	STJ	12667	STJ	10364	STJ	12667
ASK	14732	ASK	12465	ASK	10199	ASK	12465
NAR	14386	NAR	12173	NAR	9959	NAB	12173
LEI	14363	LEI	12154	LEI	9944	LEI	12154
oso	14145	080	11969	080	9793	080	11969
RAH	13731	BAH	11619	RAH	9506	BAH	11619
DRO	13618	DRO	11523	DRO	9428	DRO	11523
GRI	13528	GRI	11446	GRI	9365	GRI	11446
VEN	13339	VEN	11286	VEN	9234	VEN	11286
NES	13296	NES	11250	NES	3205	NES	11250
STE	13203	STE	11172	STE	9141	STE	11172
	12407		10438		8590	BRY	10498
кον	12236		10354	KOV	8471	KOV	10354
KOP	11755	KOP	3347	KOP	8138	KOP	3347
KNA	11695	KNA	3836	KNA	8097	KNA	3836
EGE	11625	EGE	9837	EGE	8048	EGE	9837
ALG	11526	ALG		ALG	7979	ALG	9752
LOM	11388		9636	LOM		LOM	
			9386		7679	MAN	
	11051	AAS	9351	AAS	7650		9351
BRU	10839	BRU		BRU	7504	BRU	9172
FOR	10513	FOR	8895	FOR	7278	FOR	8895
LEV	10507	LEV	8890	LEV	7274	LEV	8890
KOU	10487	KOU	8874	KOU	7261	KOU	8874
	3168680		2681191		2193702		2681191
							÷ •

Figure 3.4.5.5. Excel file

AE	AF	AG		AL		AK	
so			Required annual demand in 1000 litre for Ess				
	717682		558197		1395493		1236008
	180972		140756		351890		311674
STA	158402 131190	STA	123202 102037	STA TBH	308004 255032	STA TBH	272803
	79984		62210		155524		137750
	75977		59093		147733		130843
	65647		51058		127646	POR	113058
KBI	45033	KBL	35072	KBI	87680	KBL	77660
	37488		29157	ALE	72893	ALE	64563
	36900		28700	TON	71750	TON	63550
	33181		25807	MOS	64518	MOS	
	31706		24660	HAU	61650	HAU	54604
	31233		24292	SAN	60730	SAN	53790
	30632		23825	ARE	59563	ARE	52755
	29369		22842		57106		
	28489		22158	TRO	55396	TRO	49065
HAM	19673	HAM	15301	HAM	38253	HAM	33882
HAL	18097	HAL	14075	HAL	35189	HAL	31167
LAR	17350	LAB	13495	LAB	33736	LAR	29881
KON	15641	KON	12165	KON	30413	KON	26937
ASO	1554.9	ASO	12093	ASO	30234	ASO	26778
MOL	14855	MOL	11554	MOL	28885	MOL	25584
HAR	14832	HAR	11536	HAR	28840	HAR	25544
GJO	14494	GJO	11273	GJO	28182	GJO	24961
LIL	14487	LIL	11268	LIL	28170	LIL	24350
HOR	14434	HOR	11226	HOR	28066	HOR	24858
JES	14090	JES	10353	JES	27398	JES	24266
SKI	13759	SKI	10702	SKI	26754	SKI	23697
MOL	13304	MOL	10347	MOL	25869	MOL	22912
KRU	12863	KRU	10005	KRU	25012	KRU	22153
KOR	12658	KOR	3845	KOR	24612	KOR	21799
TRD	12232	TRD	9514	TRD	23785	TRD	21067
HON	12006	HON	9338	HON	23345	HON	20677
ALT	10800	ALT	8400	ALT	21000	ALT	18600
ELV	10642	ELV	8277	ELV	20632	ELV	18327
STJ	10364	STJ	8061	STJ	20153	STJ	17849
ASK	10199	ASK	7932	ASK	19831	ASK	17565
NAR	3353	NAB	7746	NAB	19366	NAB	17152
LEI	3344	LEI	7734	LEI	19335	LEI	17126
080	9793	080	7616	080	19041	080	16865
RAH	3506	BAH	7394	BAH	18484	RAH	16372
DRO	9428	DRO	7333	DRO	18332	DRO	16237
GRI	9365	GRI	7284	GRI	18210	GRI	16123
VEN	3234	VEN	7182	VEN	17956	VEN	15304
NES	3205	NES		NES	17898	NES	15853
STE			7109	STE	17774	STE	15742
BRY	8530	BRY	6681	BRY	16702	BRY	14793
коγ		KOV	6589	KOV	16472	KOV	14589
KOP		KOP	6330	KOP	15825	KOP	14016
KNA		KNA		KNA	15744	KNA	13944
EGE		EGE		EGE	15643	EGE	13861
ALG	7979	ALG	6206	ALG	15515	ALG	13742
LOM		LOM		LOM	15330	LOM	13578
MAN		MAN		MAN	14932	MAN	
AAS		AAS		AAS	14876	AAS	13176
BRU		BRU		BRU	14591	BRU	12924
FOR		FOR			14152	FOR	12535
LEV	7274	LEV		LEV	14144	LEV	12527
KOU		KOU		KOU	14118	KOU	12504
	2193702		1706213		4265531		3778042
		-					

Figure	3	.4.5	.6.	Excel	file
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AM.	AN Design descent des constructions des constructions	AO	AP
YX DSL	Required annual demand in 1000 litre for Circle K/Es: 1076523	o/YX OSL	Required annual demand in 1000 litre for Shell/Essol' 1076523
BER	271458	BER	271458
STA	237603		237603
		STA	
TRH	196785	TRH	196785
FRE	119976	FRE	119976
DRA	113965	DRA	113965
POR	98470	POR	98470
KRI	67639	KRI	67639
ALE	56232	ALE	56232
	55350	TON	55350
	49771	MOS	49771
HAU	47559	HAU	47559
SAN	46849	SAN	46849
ARE	45348	ARE	45948
	44053	BOD	44053
	42734	TRO	42734
	29510	HAM	29510
HAL	27146	HAL	27146
LAR	26025	LAR	26025
KON	23461	KON	23461
ASO	23323	ASO	23323
	22283	MOL	22283
HAR	22248	HAR	22248
GJO	21740	GJO	21740
LIL	21731	LIL	21731
HOR	21651	HOR	21651
JES	21135	JES	21135
SKI	20639	SKI	20639
MOL	19956	MOL	19956
KRU	19295	KRU	19295
KOR	18986	KOR	18986
TRD	18349	TRD	18349
HON	18009	HON	18009
ALT	16200	ALT	16200
ELV	15362	ELV	15962
STJ	15546	STJ	15546
ASK	15298	ASK	15298
NAB	14939	NAB	14939
LEI	14916	LEI	14916
080	14689	080	14689
RAH	14259	BAH	14259
DRO	14142	DRO	14142
GRI	14048	GRI	14048
VEN	13852	VEN	13852
NES	13807	NES	13807
STE	13711	STE	13711
BRY	12884	BRY	12884
KOV	12004	KOV	12004
KOV	12207	KOP	12101
KNA	12145	KNA	12145
EGE	12072	EGE	12072
ALG	11969	ALG	11969
	11826	LOM	11826
	11519	MAN	11519
AAS	11476	AAS	11476
BRU	11256	BRU	11256
FOR	10917	FOR	10917
LEV	10911	LEV	10911
KOU	10891	KOU	10891
	3290553		3290553

#### 3.4.6 Cost for transportation

I have calculated the cost parameter "c" manually, from a source from internet, own knowledge and statements from people in the industry. This is hence an estimated parameter, but I believe the parameters value is not far from the true:

Cost for 1 litre diesel on average in Norway October 2020 = 13.24 NOK (GlobalPetrolPrices, 2020)

From own knowledge and statements from people in the driver industry a gas truck's tank contains when full tank typical 40000 litre and a truck driving with full tank of that amount consumes at average approximately 0.4 litre diesel per km driving.

Tank volum at truck: 40000 litre

To get the value for per 1000 litre: 40000 / 1000 = 40

0.4 / 40 = 0.01

This gives that a truck's consumption of diesel is estimated to 0.01 litre diesel per 1000 litre km, given that the truck is driven with full tank of 40000 litre on the truck.

 $0.01 \ge 13.24 = 0.1324$ 

This gives that cost for consume of diesel is 0.1324 NOK per 1000 litre km

Based on rest time for the driver and estimated salary; salary: 200 NOK/hour

Based on own observation on average speed: 65 km/hour

200 / 65 = 3.077

This gives salary 3.077 NOK per km, given the truck are driven with full tank of 40000 litre

This gives salary 0.077 NOK per 1000 litre km

Estimated maintenance cost for truck: 0.1 per 1000 litre km

0.1324 + 0.077 + 0.1 = 0.3094

This gives transportation cost: 0.31 NOK per 1000 litre km

#### 3.4.7 Sets and parameters

In the data files I will keep all the data for the analyses. The data files are organized in sets and parameters, and gives names to the sets and values to the parameters.

"set I" gives names (initials) to all the 20 depots.

"set J" gives names to all the 59 cities/places.

Param "k" gives values to all "I" to "J", which is all the 1180 distances between depots and the gas stations cities/places.

Param "s" gives values to all "I", which is max supply fuel in 1000 litres for each depot, which is a restriction.

Param "d" gives values to all "J", which is required demand fuel in 1000 litre for each city/place, which is a restriction.

Param "c" gives a value to the cost constant "c" for the cost of transporting fuel per 1000 litre KM in NOK, which is a part of the minimizing formula.

#### 3.4.8 Data file

The data files are containing a lot of data, particularly regarding distances, each of the data files contains 1180 distances. I will here show several screen shots were all these screen shots are parts of the same data file (the data file from the analysis where we have full collaboration included Equinor's depot at Mongstad, with "equal" depot capacities).

#### Figure 3.4.8.1. Data file




Figure 3.4.8.2. Data file



#### Figure 3.4.8.3. Data file

Figure 3.4.8.4. Data file

Data.dat 🔀 🖪 Model.mod	🗿 Run.run 📄 Text.txt	-
HAL: Halden		
LAR: Larvik		
KON: Kongsb	ing	
ASO: Askøy		
MOL: Molde		
HAR: Harsta		
GJO: Gjøvik		
LIL: Lilleh	mmer	
HOR: Horten JES: Jesshe		
SKI: Ski	m	
MOI: Mo i R		
KRU: Kristi		
KOR: Korsvi		
TRD: Tromsd		
HON: Hønefo		
ALT: Alta	2	
ELV: Elveru		
STJ: Stjørd		
ASK: Askim	251142201	
NAR: Narvik		
LEI: Leirvi		
OSO: Osøyro		
RAH: Råholt		
DRO: Drøbak		
GRI: Grimst	d	
VEN: Vennes	a	
NES: Nesodd	angen	
STE: Steink		
BRY: Bryne		
KOV: Kongsv	nger	
KOP: Koperv	.k	
KNA: Knarrv		
EGE: Egersu	d	
ALG: Ålgård		
LOM: Lommed	len	
MAN: Mandal		
AAS: Ås		
BRU: Brummu	ddal	
FOR: Førde		
LEV: Levang		
KOU: Konner	d	

Figure 3.4.8.5. Data file

	The da */	ta in th	e follow	ing tabl	e are di.	stances	in km be	tween de	pots and	cities/	places o	f gas st	ations:						
	OSL	BER	STA	TRH	FRE	DRA	POR	KRI	ALE	TON	MOS	HAU	SAN	ARE	BOD	TRO	HAM	HAL	LAR
CIALT	1733	2094	2286	1390	1821	1777	1891	2053	1685	1837	1789	2177	1856	1993	770	380	1623	1838	1869
CIHAR	1397	1602	1950	910	1485	1441	1555	1716	1205	1501	1453	1724	1520	1657	313	300	1287	1511	1532
CITRH	491	627	933	1	579	535	650	810	299	595	547	745	614	751	701	1128	381	605	627
CIFOR	419	174	380	529	508	417	534	696	247	480	476	309	499	636	1226	1653	417	534	512
CIKRI	324	469	235	822	293	285	176	1	870	230	255	314	209	71	1520	2064	452	319	193
CIOSL	7	467	447	497	88	47	162	323	550	107	56	447	126	264	1195	1747	132	114	139
SHTAN	445	212	13	1048	524	402	406	237	630	461	486	85	440	445	1745	2297	683	550	424
SHVES	1192	1397	1744	704	1279	1235	1350	1511	999	1295	1247	1518	1314	1452	5	534	1081	1305	1327
SHSKJ	1746	1826	2299	1133	1834	1790	1905	2065	1429	1850	1802	1947	1869	2006	537	10	1636	1860	1882
SHKIR	1884	2191	2275	1519	1918	1874	1989	2150	1815	1934	1886	2275	1953	2090	1214	787	1720	1880	1965
SHBAL	1543	1748	2095	1055	1783	1738	1852	2015	1351	1798	1751	1870	1816	1954	459	99	1432	1809	1831
SHLAR	525	417	623	295	628	585	699	860	6	611	596	562	630	801	993	1420	419	654	676
SHLIL	445	148	81	822	510	402	367	312	565	430	478	11	410	377	1519	1946	573	536	393
SHSJU	7	467	447	497	88	47	162	323	550	107	56	447	126	264	1195	1747	132	114	139
ESTRH	491	627	933	1	579	535	650	810	299	595	547	745	614	751	701	1128	381	605	627
ESBER	464	1	210	698	553	443	402	468	422	484	521	139	492	462	1395	1822	477	579	428
ESSLA	103	483	468	595	61	63	74	234	648	12	26	436	38	175	1293	1844	230	87	50
ESFRE	92	555	521	579	1	108	127	288	632	69	39	508	91	229	1277	1828	214	37	104
YXMOI	954	1159	1507	467	1042	998	1112	1273	762	1058	1010	1281	1077	1214	235	662	844	1068	1089
YXSTA	445	212	13	1048	524	402	406	237	630	461	486	85	440	445	1745	2297	683	550	424
EQMON	498	64	270	657	586	477	436	502	375	518	554	199	479	496	1354	1781	510	612	462
;																			
param						0.111													
	annual s	uppiy of	tuel tr	om aepot	s in 100	0 litres													
CIALT	350000 350000																		
CITRH																			
	350000 350000																		
CIFOR CIKRI	350000																		
CIOSL	350000																		
SHTAN	350000																		
SHVES	350000																		
SHVES	350000																		
SHSKJ	350000																		
SHBAL	350000																		
SHLAR	350000																		
SHLIL	350000																		

Figure 3.4.8.6. Data file

	MOL HAR	GJO	LIL	HOR	JES	SKI	MOI	KRU	KOR	TRD	HON	ALT	ELV	STJ	ASK	NAR	LEI
	1605 538	1668	1680	1828	1692	1755	893	1583	2051	379	1743	1	1593	1356	1811	470	220
	1125 1	1283	1241	1492	1356	1418	437	1103	1714	298	1407	538	1263	876	1447	100	175
576 651	220 909	377	336	586	450	512	474	198	809	1127	470	1389	357	34	541	897	682
424 199	275 1434	368	381	471	436	445	999	345	694	1652	363	1956	444	559	470	1422	254
	821 1728	432	508	244	367	350	1292	895	8	2062	342	2055	467	853	301	1886	359
	502 1403	132	189	99	48	25	967	575	321	1745	61	1736	147	528	50	1390	474
	658 1953	537	581	475	598	471	1518	863	244	2296	440	2286	698	1078	496	1943	130
	920 316	1077	1036	1287	1151	1213	231	898	1509	533	1170	772	1057	671	1241	303	154
	1349 305	1506	1465	1841	1705	1767	660	1327	2064	7	1756	299	1606	1100	1796	237	197
	1735 917	1765	1777	1926	1789	1851	1191	1713	2148	786	1840	462	1689	1486	1853	832	230
	1271 227	1429	1387	1789	1502	1717	582	1249	2011	88	1553	337	1555	1022	1745	159	189
	77 1201	403	361	602	500	562	765	148	858	1418	495	1709	446	326	591	1188	497
	593 1728	477	490	431	488	471	1292	664	319	2179	440	2177	588	852	496	1715	66
	502 1403 220 909	132 377	189 336	99 586	48 450	25 512	967 474	575 198	321 809	1745 1127	61 470	1736 1389	147 357	528 34	50 541	1390 897	474 682
	449 1603	428	440	475	450	489	1168	520	475	1826	408	2092	504	728	515	1590	84
	599 1501	211	287	15	146	65	1065	673	232	1820	121	1834	245	626	71	1488	463
	583 1485	211	271	52	130	71	1005	657	286	1843	149	1818	229	610	55	1400	535
	682 443	840	798	1049	913	975	7	660	1271	660	964	900	820	433	1004	430	130
	658 1953	537	581	475	598	471	1518	863	244	2296	440	2286	698	1078	496	1943	130
	403 1563	461	474	509	515	523	1127	474	508	1780	442	2126	538	687	548	1550	144

Figure 3.4.8.7. Data file

050	RAH	DRO	GRI	VEN	NES	STE	BRY	KOV	KOP	KNA	EGE	ALG	LOM	MAN	AAS	BRU	FOR	LEV	KCU
2094 1677	1676 1340	1767 1430	2010 1673	2065 1729	1776 1440	1270 790	2271 1935	1655 1355	2191 1737	2105 1613	2232 1895	2258 1922	1753 1417	2096 1760	1762 1425	1636 1299	1909 1429	1311 831	1784 1448
627	434	524	767	823	534	120	922	449	759	638	990	905	511	854	520	394	523	81	542
201	434	453	653	603	463	645	408	493	326	185	452	406	405	568	448	403	1	606	419
414	383	326	52	18	342	938	221	418	308	480	181	208	319	46	286	464	700	899	285
467	64	33	280	335	43	614	436	99	461	478	502	419	29	367	28	145	423	574	55
185	614	445	283	245	461	1164	31	649	78	223	77	31	440	194	453	695	383	1125	402
1423	1134	1225	1468	1523	1234	585	1730	1150	1532	1408	1690	1717	1211	1555	1220	1094	1223	625	1243
1852	1689	1779	2022	2078	1789	1014	2284	1694	1961	1848	2245	2271	1766	2109	1775	1649	1652	1054	1797
2191	1773	1863	2107	2163	1873	1402	2264	1751	2288	1932	2329	2247	1856	2194	1859	1732	2039	1443	1882
1774	1485	1729	1970	2026	1738	936	2081	1646	1883	1759	2041	2068	1563	2058	1724	1445	1575	977	1594
443	483	574	817	872	583	411	651	515	569	428	694	649	536	904	569	405	243	372	558
120	505	445	359	321	461	938	109	539	15	161	152	107	440	269	453	512	319	899	402
467	64	33	280	335	43	614	436	99	461	478	502	419	29	367	28	145	423	574	55
627	434	524	767	823	534	120	922	449	759	638	990	905	511	854	520	394	523	81	542
30	479	486	466	452	508	814	238	546	156	13	281	236	450	398	493	462	175	775	443
437	162	104	191	247	120	711	453	196	450	494	413	440	97	278	57	243	479	672	64
555	146	69	245	300	87	695	507 1492	180 912	522 1294	566	467	494	117 974	332	63	227 856	511 986	656	114 1009
1186 185	897 614	987 445	1230 283	1286 245	997 461	347 1164	31	649	78	1170 223	1452 77	1479 31	974 440	1317 194	982 453	695	383	388 1125	402
90	512	532	500	486	541	773	298	572	216	75	341	296	440	458	527	496	129	734	402

Figure 3.4.8.8. Data file

*Data.dat % 🕅 Model.mod 🖷 Run.run 📄 Text.txt	-
ESTRH 350000	
ESBER 350000	
ESSLA 350000	
ESFRE 350000	
YXMOI 350000	
YXSTA 350000	
EQMON 350000	
;	
param d :=	
$\overset{\mathrm{i}}{\mathrm{#}}$ required annual total demand of fuel at the gas stations cities/places in 1000 litres	
OSL 1594850	
BER 402160	
STA 352004	
TRI 291534	
FRE 177742 DRA 168838	
POR 145881	
KRI 100206	
ALE 83307	
TON 82000	
MOS 73734	
HAU 70457	
SAN 69406	
ARE 68072	
BOD 65264	
TRO 63310	
HAM 43718	
HAL 40216	
LAR 38556	
KON 34758	
ASO 34553	
MOL 33012	
HAR 32960	
GJ0 32208	
LIL 32194 HOR 32075	
JES 31312	
SKI 30576	
MOI 29564	
KU 28585	
K07 28128	
	>

Figure 3.4.8.9. Data file

🔒 *Data.dat 🐹 🔒 Model.mod	Run.run	E Text.txt	
GJO 32208			~
LIL 32194			
HOR 32075			
JES 31312			
SKI 30576			
MOI 29564			
KRU 28585			
KOR 28128			
TRD 27183			
HON 26680			
ALT 24000			
ELV 23648			
STJ 23032			
ASK 22664			
NAR 22132			
LEI 22098			
OSO 21761			
RAH 21125			
DRO 20951			
GRI 20812			
VEN 20521			
NES 20455			
STE 20313			
BRY 19088			
KOV 18825			
KOP 18085			
KNA 17993			
EGE 17885			
ALG 17732			
LOM 17520			
MAN 17065			
AAS 17001			
BRU 16676			
FOR 16174			
LEV 16164			
KOU 16134			
;			
param c :=			
# cost for transport of	fuel per 10	1001 km in NOV	
0.31	ider bei 16	NOL KII IN NUK	
			~
;			

## 3.5 Run file

#### 3.5.1 Comandoes

The run file here content several commands for the program.

It first tells the program to reset, so that no stored codes will disturb from previous analyses.

Then it tells the program what model file to use, which here is "Model.mod".

Then it tells the program what data file to use, which here is "Data.dat".

Then it tells the program which solver to use, which here is cplex.

Then it tells the program what to display in which text file, which here is from the optimized solution to both display the minimized cost "z", and "f" which is a table of all the quantities for all the corresponding routes "I" to "J", to the text file "Text.txt".

#### 3.5.2 Run file

Figure 3.5.2.1. Run file

A *Data.dat A Mo	odel.mod 🛛 🔒 Run.ru	un 🛛 📄 Text.txt
<pre>reset; model Model.mo data Data.dat; option solver solve; display z, f &gt;</pre>	cplex;	

### 3.6 Text file

#### 3.6.1 Explanation

The text file now from a optimized solution first shows the minimized annual cost "z" in NOK.

Further it shows "f", which is all the amounts in 1000 litres for all corresponding routes "I" to "J" the optimized solution have chosen. This is the amount of fuel each depot should transport to what city/place in an annual basis which will give the lowest possible total cost, given the restrictions. This analyse apply to the analysis variant where all 4 companies collaborating including that they can transport fuel from Equinor's depot at Mongstad.

# 3.6.2 Text file

Figure 3.6.2.1. Text file

t		/odel.mod	A Ru	n.run	Text.txt 🕅					
0	6766000									
	] (tr) CIALT	CIFOR	CIHAR	CIKRI	CIOSL	CITRH	EQMON	ESBER		
1	CIALI 0	CIFUR 0	CIHAR 0	0	0	0 CI I KH	EQMON	ESBER Ø	:=	
		0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	24000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
1	24000	0	0	68072	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	00072	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34553		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	86713	34553		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	86713	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0 16676	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	10070	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	16174	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0 0	0	0	0	32208	0	0		
	0	0	0	20812	0	32208	0	0		
	0	0	0	20812	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	32960	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	32960	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	26680	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	20080	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	31312	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	17993	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	17995	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	28128	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	20120	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	0	0	18825	0	0		
	0	0	0	100206	0	18825	0	0		
	0	0	0	100200	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	38556	0	0	0	0		
	0	0	0	38556	0	0	0	0		
	0		0		0	0 16164	0	0		
	0	0	0	0 0	0	16164	0	0		

### Figure 3.6.2.2. Text file

A Data.d	at 🔒 M	Model.mod	A Rur	n.run	📄 Te	xt.txt 🛛			
LOM	0	17520	0	(	0	0	0	0	0
MAN	õ	0	ø		õ	õ	ø	ø	õ
MOI	õ	ō	ø			ø	ø	õ	ō
MOL	ō	0	ø			0	ø	ō	0
MOS	ō	0	ø			0	ø	ø	0
NAR	0	0	22132			0	0	0	0
NES	0	0	0		ø	0	0	ø	0
OSL	0	289626	0			50000		139113	0
050	0	0	0			0	0	21761	0
POR	ō	0	ø	7370		ē	ø	0	ō
RAH	ō	0	ø	(			21125	0	0
SAN	0	0	ø			0	0	0	0
SKI	ő	ő	ő		õ	õ	ø	ø	õ
STA	ø	õ	ø			õ	ø	ø	õ
STE	ő	ő	ő	, i			20313	õ	ø
STJ	õ	ő	ő		õ		23032	õ	õ
TON	ő	ő	ő	, i		õ	0	õ	ő
TRD	ő	ő	ő	, i		ő	õ	õ	ő
TRH	ő	ő	ő		õ		70345	ø	ő
TRO	ő	ø	ő	, in the second s		0	0	õ	ø
VEN	õ	ő	ő	2052		õ	õ	õ	ø
				2052.	-	•		0	0
1.1	ESFRE	ESSLA	ESTRH	SHBAL S	SHKTR	SHLAR	SHLIL	SHSJU	SHSKJ
AAS	0	17001	0	0	0	0	6		0
ALE	ő	0	ő	õ	õ	83307	é		ő
ALG	õ	ő	ø	õ	ø	0	é		ő
ALT	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ő	è		ő
ARE	ő	ő	õ	õ	ø	õ	è		ő
ASK	22664	ő	ø	ø	ø	ő	é		ő
ASO	22004	ő	ő	ø	ø	ő	ē		ő
BER	ő	ő	ø	ø	ø	ő	ē		ő
BOD	ő	0	ő	ø	ø	0	é		0
BRU	ő	0	ő	0	0	0	é		0
BRY	0	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
DRA	0	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
DRO	20951	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
				-					
EGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
ELV	0	0	23648	0	0	0	6		0
FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
FRE	177742	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
G30	0	0	0	0	0	0	6		0
GRT	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	9 0	0

Figure 3.6.2.3. Text file




Figure 3.6.2.4. Text file





Figure 3.6.2.5. Text file



# 4. Changes in the AMPL files

### 4.1 Stand-alone analysis

In stand-alone all companies work for them self and no collaboration is done in the distribution of fuel. To analyze this in AMPL it require in total 4 unique data files, 4 unique run files, 4 unique text files, which all are different from the files at full collaboration analysis, and the model file which I keep unchanged as mentioned earlier.

#### 4.1.1 Data file

#### Circle K

Changes here is in parameter s and in parameter d. Changes in d for changed capasities, do to the fact that this analysis apply only to the cost of Circle K's stand alone cost for their own needs for fuel distributed from their depots to their gas stations. This gives zero to the other companies s.

Parameter d is changed as well as Circle K only have 0.325 of the fuel market.

Below I show changes in the data file for the Circle K stand alone analysis.

I only give Circle K capacities, the other companies have now capacities zero.

Figure 4.1.1.1. Circle K stand-alone data file

```
🖪 DataCi.dat 🔀
      param s
# max an
CIALT
CIHAR
CITRH
                      ual supply of fuel from depots in 1000 litres
                   350000
350000
                   350000
        CIFOR
                    350000
       CIKRI
CIOSL
SHTAN
                    350000
350000
       SHVES
       SHSKJ
SHKIR
SHBAL
       SHLAR
       SHLTL
       SHSJU
ESTRH
ESBER
       ESSLA
       ESFRE
                   0
0
0
       YXMOI
      YXSTA
EQMON
```


I have now adjusted the demands for the places/cities to match the demands of Circle K's gas stations only, which is 0.325 of the market. This numbers I have calculated in the excel file Thesis Data.

Figure 4.1.1.2. Circle K stand-alone data file

0ataCi.dat ⊠	
param d :=	
# required OSL 518326	d annual total demand of fuel at the gas stations cities/places in 1000 litres
BER 130702	
STA 114401	
TRH 94748	•
FRE 57766	
DRA 54872	
POR 47411	
KRI 32567	
ALE 27075	
TON 26650	
MOS 23964	
HAU 22899	
SAN 22557 ARE 22123	
BOD 21211	
TRO 20576	
HAM 14208	
HAL 13070	
LAR 12531	
KON 11296	
ASO 11230	
MOL 10729	
HAR 10712	
GJ0 10468	
LIL 10463 HOR 10424	
JES 10176	
SKI 9937	
MOI 9608	
KRU 9290	
KOR 9142	
TRD 8835	
HON 8671	
ALT 7800	
ELV 7686	
STJ 7485	
ASK 7366	
NAR 7193	
LEI 7182	
DSO 7072	
RAH 6866	
DRO 6809	
GRI 6764	
/EN 6669	
IES 6648	
TE 6602	
3RY 6204	
(OV 6118	
OP 5878	
(NA 5848	
GE 5813	
LG 5763	
.OM 5694	
1AN 5546	
AS 5525	
3RU 5420	
RU 5420 OR 5256	
3RU 5420 FOR 5256 LEV 5253	
3RU 5420 FOR 5256 LEV 5253	
3RU 5420 FOR 5256 LEV 5253 KOU 5244	
3RU 5420 FOR 5256 EV 5253 KOU 5244	
BRU 5420 FOR 5256 LEV 5253 KOU 5244 ; param c :=	
BRU 5420 FOR 5256 LEV 5253 COU 5244 FOR C :=	transport of fuel per 1000L km in NOK

Further I have done equivalently prosedures in the analyzes of the other companies.

Shell






Figure 4.1.1.4. Shell stand-alone data file

ataSh.dat %	
param d :=	
# required annual total demand of fuel at the gas stations cities/places in 1000 litres	
SIL 518326	
SE 136702	
STA 11401	
THE 94748	
RE 57766	
NR 54872	
DR 4741	
KRI 32567	
ALE 27075	
TON 26650	
MOS 23964	
NG 2304 HAU 22899	
NA 22557	
ARE 2213	
NRC 22123 500 21211	
NO 20576	
140 1278	
HAL 13070	
AR 12531	
EM 1296	
Non 11230	
NOL 10729	
AR 1072	
10/12/ 5/0 10468	
10 10403	
He 10424	
15 10176	
SKI 9937	
MI 9608	
KU 9290	
KR 914Z	
Non 5142 TRD 8835	
No 8671	
7686	
51 7485	
SK 7366	
Nar 7193	
LEI 7182	
<	

Figure 4.1.1.5. Shell stand-alone data file

S0 7072
AH 6866
RO 6809
RI 6764
EN 6669
ES 6648
TE 6602
RY 6204
OV 6118
OP 5878
NA 5848
GE 5813
LG 5763
OM 5694
AN 5546
AS 5525
RU 5420
OR 5256
EV 5253
OU 5244
aram c :=
cost for transport of fuel per 1000L km in NOK
. 31

### Esso

Figure 4.1.1.6. Esso stand-alone data file

```
DataEs dat %
param s :=
# max annual supply of fuel from depots in 1000 litres
CIALT 0
CIHAR 0
CITRH 0
CIFOR 0
CIKRI 0
CIFOR 0
CIKRI 0
SHTAN 0
SHVES 0
SHKIR 0
SHBAL 0
SHBAL 0
SHBAL 0
SHBAL 0
SHLR 0
SHSJU 0
ESTRH 350000
ESSER 350000
ESSER 350000
ESFR 350000
E
```

ataEs.dat 🛛	
param d :=	
	annual total demand of fuel at the gas stations cities/places in 1000 litres
OSL 358841	0
BER 90486	
STA 79201	
TRH 65595	
FRE 39992	
DRA 37988	
POR 32823	
KRI 22546	
ALE 18744	
TON 18450	
MOS 16590	
HAU 15853	
SAN 15616	
ARE 15316	
BOD 14684	
TRO 14245	
HAM 9837	
HAL 9049	
LAR 8675	
KON 7820	
ASO 7774	
MOL 7428	
HAR 7416	
GJ0 7247	
LIL 7244	
HOR 7217	
JES 7045	
SKI 6880	
MOI 6652	
KRU 6432	
KOR 6329	
TRD 6116	
HON 6003	
ALT 5400	
ELV 5321	
STJ 5182	
ASK 5099	
NAR 4980	
LEI 4972	
000 4000	

Figure 4.1.1.7. Esso stand-alone data file

Figure 4.1.1.8. Esso stand-alone data file

OSO 4896 RAH 4753 DRO 4714 GRI 4683 VEN 4617 NES 4602 STE 4570 BRY 4295 KOV 4236 KOP 4069 KNA 4048 EGE 4024 ALG 3990 LOM 3942 MAN 3840 AAS 3825 BRU 3752 FOR 3639 LEV 3637 KOU 3630 ; param c := # cost for transport of fuel per 1000L km in NOK 0.31 ;

# YΧ

Figure 4.1.1.9. YX stand-alone data file

ataYX.da	: 23								
param	s ·-								
	annual	supply	of	fuel	from	denots	in	1000	litro
CIALT	0	Suppry	01	Tuci	110	ucpocs	111	1000	1100
CTHAR	ő								
CTTRH	ø								
CTEOR	0								
CIKRI	0								
CIOSL	0								
SHTAN	0								
SHVES	0								
SHSKJ	0								
SHKIR	0								
SHBAL	0								
SHLAR	0								
SHLIL	0								
SHSJU	0								
ESTRH	0								
ESBER	0								
ESSLA	0								
ESFRE	0								
YXMOI	35000	0							
YXSTA	35000	0							
EQMON	0								
;									

Figure 4.1.1.10. YX stand-alone data file

aYX.dat 🛿				
param d :=				
	ual total demand of fuel at the g	s stations cities/places i	n 1000 litres	
OSL 199356	0			
3ER 50270				
TA 44001				
TRH 36442				
RE 22218				
DRA 21105				
POR 18235				
(RI 12526				
ALE 10413				
TON 10250				
105 9217				
AU 8807				
SAN 8676				
ARE 8509				
30D 8158				
FRO 7914				
IAM 5465				
AL 5027				
AR 4819				
(ON 4345				
ASO 4319				
10L 4126				
AR 4120				
JO 4026				
IL 4024				
IOR 4009				
JES 3914				
SKI 3822				
10I 3696				
(RU 3573				
(OR 3516				
RD 3398				
ION 3335				
ALT 3000				
ELV 2956				
STJ 2879				
ASK 2833				
IAR 2767				
EI 2762				
150 2720				
< 7770 <				

Figure 4.1.1.11. YX stand-alone data file

```
OSO 2720

RAH 2641

DRO 2619

GRI 2601

VEN 2565

STE 2539

BRY 2386

KOV 2353

KOP 2261

KNA 2249

EGE 2236

ALG 2216

LOM 2190

MAN 2133

AS 2125

BRU 2084

FOR 2022

LEV 2021

KOU 2017

;

param C :=

# cost for transport of fuel per 1000L km in NOK


0.31

;
```

### 4.1.2 Run file


#### Circle K

Figure 4.1.2.1. Circle K stand-alone run file




#### Shell

Figure 4.1.2.2. Shell stand-alone run file



#### Esso





### YΧ

Figure 4.1.2.4. YX stand-alone run file

```
RunYXrun S
reset;
model Model.mod;
data DataYX.dat;
option solver cplex;
solve;
display z, f > TextYX.txt;
```

### 4.1.3 Text file results

### Circle K

Here we can see that only Circle K is distributing fuel to their gas stations at their demands from their depots within their capacities.

Figure 4.1.3.1. Circle K stand-alone text file

TextCi.t	xt 🖾 📄												
z = 1	1311610	90											
f [*,	,*] (tr	)											
# \$8	= ESBER	2											
# \$9	= ESFRI	=											
# \$10	0 = ESSI	A											
# \$11	1 = ESTP	RH											
	2 = SHB/	AL .											
	CIALT	CIFOR	CIHAR	CIKRI	CIOSL	CITRH	EQMON	\$8	\$9	\$10	\$11	\$12	:=
AAS	0	0	0	0	5525	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ALE	0	0	0	0	0	27075	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ALG	0	0	0	5763	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ALT	7800	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ARE	0	0	0	22123	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ASK	0	0	0	0	7366	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
AS0	0	11230	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
BER	0	130702	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
BOD	0	0	21211	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
BRU	0	0	5420	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
BRY	0	0	0	6204	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
DRA	0	54872	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
DRO	0	0	0	0	6809	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
EGE	0	0	0	5813	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ELV	0	0	0	0	0	7686	0	0	0	0	0	0	
FOR	0	5256	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
FRE	0	0	0	57766	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
GJ0	0	0	0	0	0	10468	0	0	0	0	0	0	
GRI	0	0	0	6764	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HAL	0	0	0	13070	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HAM	0	0	0	0	0	14208	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HAR	0	0	10712	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HAU	0	22899	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HON	0	3156	0	0	0	5515	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HOR	0	0	0	10424	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
JES	0	0	0	0	0	10176	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KNA	0	5848	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KON	0	11296	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KOP	0	5878	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KOR	0	0	0	9142	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KOU	0	5244	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KOV	0	0	0	0	0	6118	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KRI	0	0	0	32567	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

TextC	i.txt 🖂														
KRU	0		0	9290		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LAR	e		ø	9290	1253		ő		0	0	0	ø	ø	ø	ø
LEI	e		7182	ø	125.	0	ő		0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
LEV	ø		0	5253		ø	ø		ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
LIL	ø		ø	10463		õ	ő		õ	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
LOM	ē		ø	5694		õ	ő		õ	ø	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø
MAN	ĕ		ŏ	0	554		ŏ		õ	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ
MOI	ø		ŏ	9608		0	õ		õ	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	ø
MOL	ø		õ	10729		õ	õ		ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
MOS	ē		ø	0	2396		ø		0	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	õ
NAR	ē		ø	7193		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NES	ē		0	0		0	6648		0	0	ø	0	0	0	0
0SL	0		ø	37471			13715	1671	40	0	ø	ø	0	0	0
050	0		7072	0		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POR	0		0	0	4741	11	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RAH	0		0	0		0	0	68	66	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN	0		0	0	2255	57	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SKI	0		0	0		0	9937		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STA	0	7	9365	0	3503	36	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STE	0		0	6602		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STJ	0		0	7485		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TON	0		0	0	2665	50	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRD	0		0	8835		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRH	0		0	0		0	0	947	48	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRO	0		0	20576		0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VEN	0		0	0	666	59	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
÷	SHKIR										:=				
AAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
ALE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
ALG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
ALT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
ARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
ASK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
AS0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
BER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
BOD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
BRU BRY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0	0						
	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0 0	0 0						
DRA DRO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
EGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						
COE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0						

Figure 4.1.3.2. Circle K stand-alone text file

Figure 4.1.3.3. Circle K stand-alone text file

TextCi.txt	x								
ELV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FOR	ø	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ	ø	õ
FRE	0	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø
GJ0	0	0	0	ø	0	0	0	0	0
GRI	0	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	0
HAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KNA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KOP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KOU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KOV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KRI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KRU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LOM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MOI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MOL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OSL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0S0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
POR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RAH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SKI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRD <	Ø	Ø	0	0	Ø	Ø	Ø	ø	0
1									

```
Figure 4.1.3.4. Circle K stand-alone text file
```

 TRD
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
 0
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#### Shell

Here we can see that only Shell is distributing fuel to their gas stations at their demands from their depots within their capacities.

Figure 4.1.3.5. Shell stand-alone text file

Figure 4.1.3.6. Shell stand-alone text file

```
TextSh.txt 🕅
       KON
KOP
KOR
KOV
KRU
LEV
LEV
LEV
LIL
LOV
MOI
MOI
MOI
MOS
NAR
NAS
NAS
SSAN
SKI
STA
STA
STA
STA
STA
TON
TRD
TRD
VEN
                                                                                                                                                                        0
0
6118
0
9290
0
0
0
0
10463
                                                                                                                                           0
0
                                                                                                                                                                                   0
                                                                                                                                                                        10729
0
0
                                                                                                                                                                                                         0
                                                                                                                                                                       201893
                                                                                                                                                                                                         0
                                                                                                                                                                                               0
7072
47411
                                                                                                                                                                          6866
                                                                                                                                                                                               0
22557
                                                                                                                                                                        0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15681
                                                                                                                                                                                               0
0
26650
0
0
0
0
                                                                                                                                                                                  0
0
                                                                                     SHVES YXMOI
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
                       SHSJU
0
0
0
0
7366
0
0
                                            SHSKJ
0
0
7800
0
0
0
                                                                                                                    YXSTA
0
0
0
0
0
0
                                                                 SHTAN
5525
                                                                                                                                           :=
       :
ALE
ALG
ALT
ARE
ASK
ASO
BER
                                                                     5763
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
                                                       0
```

Figure 4.1.3.7. Shell stand-alone text file

TextSh.tx	t 23					
BOD	0	0	0	21211	0	0
BRU	0	0	0	0	0	0
BRY	0	0	6204	0	0	0
DRA	0	0	54872	0	0	0
DRO	0	0	6809	0	0	0
EGE	0	0	5813	0	0	0
ELV	0	0	0	0	0	0
FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0
FRE	16264	0	37079	0	0	0
GJO	0	0	0	0	0	0
GRI	0	0	6764	0	0	0
HAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAM	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAR	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAU	0	0	0	0	0	0
HON	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOR	0	0	0	0	0	0
JES	0	0	0	0	0	0
KNA	0	0	0	0	0	0
KON	0	0	11296	0	0	0
KOP	0	0	0	0	0	0
KOR	0	0	9142	0	0	0
KOU	0	0	5244	0	0	0
KOV	0	0	0	0	0	0
KRI	0	0	32567	0	0	0
KRU	0	0	0	0	0	0
LAR	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEI	0	0	0	0	0	0
LEV	0	0	0	5253	0	0
LIL	0	0	0	0	0	0
LOM	0	0	5694	0	0	0
MAN	0	0	5546	0	0	0
MOI	0	0	0	9608	0	0
MOL	0	0	0	0	0	0
MOS	0	0	23964	0	0	0
NAR	0	0	0	0	0	0
NES	0	0	6648	0	0	0
	316433	0	0	0	0	0
050	0	0	0	0	0	0
POR	0	0	0	0	0	0
RAH	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAN	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 4.1.3.8. Shell stand-alone text file

SKI	9937	0	0	0	0	0
STA	0	0	114401	0	0	0
STE	0	0	0	6602	0	0
STJ	0	0	0	7485	0	0
TON	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRD	0	8835	0	0	0	0
TRH	0	0	0	79067	0	0
TRO	0	20576	0	0	0	0
VEN	0	0	6669	0	0	0
;						

### Esso

Here we can see that only Esso is distributing fuel to their gas stations at their demands from their depots within their capacities.

Figure 4.1.3.9. Esso stand-alone text file

extEs.	xt 23]														
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ALG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3990	0	0	0	0	0	0	)
ALT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5400	0	0	0	
ARE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15316	0	0	0	6	
ASK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5099	0	0	0	0	6	
AS0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7774 90486	0	0	0	0	0	0	
BER BOD	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	90486 0	0 0	0 0	0 14684	0 0	0 0	0 0	
BRU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3752	0	14084	0	0	6	
BRY	ø	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	4295	0	ø	0	ø	ø	e	
DRA	õ	0	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	0	õ	37988	ø	ø	0	e	
DRO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4714	0	0	0	0	0	)
EGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4024	0	0	0	0	0	0	
ELV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5321	0	0	0	0	6	
FOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3639	0	0	0	0	0	6	
FRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	39992	0	0	0	0	0	
GJO GRI	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	7247 4683	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	
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HON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6003	0	0	0	0	)
HOR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7217	0	0	0	6	
JES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7045	0	0	0	0	6	
KNA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4048	0	0	0	0	0	0	
KON KOP	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0 4069	0 0	7820 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	
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Figure 4.1.3.10. Esso stand-alone text file

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        YXSTA

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Figure 4.1.3.11. Esso stand-alone text file

TextEs.	xt 23							
BRY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
DRA	ø	0	ø	ø	0	ø	ø	
DRO	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	ø	
EGE	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ	ø	õ	
ELV	õ	õ	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	
FOR	õ	ø	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	
FRE	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	
GJO	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ	
GRI	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	
HAL	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ	ő	õ	
HAM	õ	õ	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	
HAR	õ	ø	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	
HAU	õ	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	õ	
HON	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	
HOR	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	
JES	õ	õ	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	
KNA	õ	ø	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	
KON	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	
KOP	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	ø	
KOR	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ	ø	õ	
KOU	õ	õ	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	
KOV	õ	õ	õ	ő	õ	ø	õ	
KRI	ø	0	ø	0	0	ø	ø	
KRU	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	
LAR	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ	ø	õ	
LEI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LEV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
LIL	ø	0	ø	0	0	0	ø	
LOM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MOI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MOL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
MOS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
NAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
NES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
0SL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
050	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
POR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
RAH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
SAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
SKI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
STA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
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STA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
STJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TON	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VEN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

### YΧ

Here we can see that only YX is distributing fuel to their gas stations at their demands from their depots within their capacities.

xtYX.txt 🕅
z = 97234400
. = 97234400
= [*,*] (tr)
t ; j (0/ # \$1 = CIALT
\$2 = CIFOR
\$3 = CIHAR
¢ \$4 = CIKRI
\$ \$5 = CIOSL
\$ \$6 = CITRH
\$ \$7 = EQMON
\$ \$8 = ESBER
\$9 = ESFRE
\$10 = ESSLA
\$11 = ESTRH
\$12 = SHBAL
\$13 = SHKIR
\$14 = SHLAR
\$15 = SHLIL
\$16 = SHSJU
\$17 = SH5KJ
\$18 = SHTAN
\$1 \$2 \$3 \$4 \$5 \$6 \$7 \$8 \$9 \$10 \$11 \$12 \$13 \$14 \$15 \$16 \$17 \$18 \$19 :=
VAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
YER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 4.1.3.14. YX stand-alone text file

1.0																				
TextYX.txt %																				
	HAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	HAM	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	HAR	õ	ŏ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ
	HAU	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	HON	õ	ŏ	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	õ	ő	õ	ŏ	ő	ŏ	õ	ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	õ	õ
	HOR	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
	JES	ø	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	0	0	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	0	ø
	KNA	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	õ	ŏ	õ	ŏ	ø	ŏ	ø	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	õ
	KON	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	KOP	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	KOR	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
	KOU	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	KOV	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	KRI	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	KRU	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	LAR	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	LEI	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	LEV	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	LIL	0	ø	0	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	0	0
	LOM	0	ø	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø
	MAN	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	MOI	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	MOL	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	MOS	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
	NAR	0	ø	ø	ø	0	0	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	NES	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ŏ	ø	ŏ	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	õ
	OSL	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	050	ŏ	ŏ	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	õ
	POR	õ	õ	õ	ø	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
	RAH	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	0	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø
	SAN	ő	ŏ	õ	ő	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	õ
	SKI	0	ø	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	ø	0	ø	0	0
	STA	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø
	STE	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ
	STJ	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
	TON	ő	ŏ	ø	ő	ő	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	ő	õ	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	õ
	TRD	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
	TRH	õ	õ	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	õ	ŏ	ő	ŏ	ő	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	ŏ	õ	õ
	TRO	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ	õ
	VEN	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ	ø	ø	ø	õ	õ	ø	ø	ø	ø	ø	õ
				×	×	·		·		·	×	·	×							

Figure 4.1.3.15. YX stand-alone text file

📄 TextYX	txt 🛙		
	YXMOI	YXSTA	:=
AAS	0	2125	
ALE	10413	0	
ALG	0	2216	
ALT	3000	0	
ARE	0	8509	
ASK	2833	0	
ASO	0	4319	
BER	0	50270	
BOD	8158	0	
BRU	2084	0	
BRY	0	2386	
DRA	0	21105	
DRO	0	2619	
EGE	0	2236	
ELV	2956	0	
FOR	0	2022	
FRE	0	22218	
GJO	4026	0	
GRI	0	2601	
HAL	0	5027	
HAM	5465	0	
HAR	4120	0	
HAU	0	8807	
HON	0	3335	
HOR	0	4009	
JES	3914	0	
KNA	0	2249	
KON	0	4345	
КОР	0	2261	
KOR	0	3516	
KOU	0	2017	
KOV	2353	0	
KRI	0	12526	
KRU	3573	0	
LAR	0	4819	
LEI	0	2762	
LEV	2021	0	
LIL	4024	0	
LOM	0	2190	
MAN	0	2133	

#### Figure 4.1.3.16. YX stand-alone text file

#### Cost results

**Circle K** Circle K's stand-alone cost

Figure 4.1.3.17. Circle K stand-alone text file

TextCi.txt ☆ z = 131161000

#### Shell

Shell's stand-alone cost

Figure 4.1.3.18. Shell stand-alone text file

■ TextSh.txt ☆
z = 126062000

Esso

Esso's stand-alone cost

Figure 4.1.3.19. Esso stand-alone text file

```
TextEs.txt ☆
z = 48454000
```

#### YX

YX's stand-alone cost

Figure 4.1.3.20. YX stand-alone text file

```
TextYX.txt ☆
z = 97234400
```

### 4.2 Two companies collaboration analysis

In two companies collaboration I investigate the costs for two and two companies collaborates in a best possible way regarding achieve lowest possible total cost for two companies distributing their fuel from these two companies depots to their gas stations with their corresponding demands. In the previous chapters I have shown what sort of changes I have done in the data files and the run files at the different analyses. I will in the following therefor only show the results regarding cost from the text files from the different analyses I have done, as the changes will be equivalently here as already described above.

Cost results

**Circle K / Shell** Figure 4.2.1. Circle K / Shell coalition text file

```
TextCiSh.txt ☆
z = 217075000
```

#### Circle K / Esso

Figure 4.2.2. Circle K / Esso coalition text file

📄 TextCiEs.txt 🔀 z = 114500000

#### Circle K / YX

Figure 4.2.3. Circle K / YX coalition text file

```
TextCiYX.txt ☆
z = 188942000
```

#### Shell / Esso

Figure 4.2.4. Shell / Esso coalition text file

#### Shell / YX

Figure 4.2.5. Shell / YX coalition text file

#### Esso / YX

Figure 4.2.6. Esso / YX coalition text file

```
TextEsYX.txt 🔀 z = 82818100
```

# 4.3 Three companies collaboration analysis

#### Cost results

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso

Figure 4.3.1. Circle K / Shell / Esso coalition text file


#### Circle K / Shell / YX

Figure 4.3.2. Circle K / Shell / YX coalition text file




#### Circle K / Esso / YX

Figure 4.3.3. Circle K / Esso / YX coalition text file



#### Shell / Esso / YX

Figure 4.3.4. Shell / Esso / YX coalition text file



# 4.4 Four companies(grand coalition) collaboration analysis

Cost results

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX

Figure 4.4.1. Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition text file

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

Figure 4.4.2. Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition plus Equinor depot text file



# 5. AMPL analyses and calculations with results

I will in this chapter run three series of 16 analyses in AMPL, which is 3 different approaches regarding depot capacities, to investigate if there is a pattern in what the results will show. The differences in the three series will be in the depots capacities, due to uncertain data for this parameter. In this way I hope to find a pattern which is similar in all the three approaches and then be able to make more reliable conclusions from the results. A serie of 15 analyses will give costs for each possible coalition including stand alone. These 15 analyses is all needed for allocating the grand coalition's cost to each company in Shapley Values. The 16<sup>th</sup> analysis will give the cost for the grand coalition were Equinor's depot is included.

I will also do the calculations regarding the grand coalition's cost allocation in Shapley Values.

Further I will check the three condition tests for each of the three series to find out if the grand coalition is the most beneficial for all the four companies.

In addition I will run 5 analyses in AMPL regarding  $CO^2$  emission for one serie and calculate the  $CO^2$  emission for all three series.

This will in total include 53 analyses in AMPL plus corresponding calculations.

From these results I will calculate the savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emission in each of the three series from optimized collaboration.

### 5.1 Fuel distribution with equal depot capacities

Here I have given all depots an equal capacity which is the total annual consumption of fuel in Norway divided by the total number of depots multiplied with approximately 1.5 to give overcapacities at a middle extent.

Total annual fuel consumption in Norway in 1000 litre: 4874893

Total number of fuel depots in Norway including Mongstad: 21

4874893 / 21 x 1.5 = 348206.6

Depot capacities in 1000 litre for each depot: 350000

### 5.1.1 Coalition transportation cost results from AMPL listed

The costs showed below is the transportation costs from AMPL for all possible coalitions in this game for the four companies. This do not mean the cost for each company (except for stand alone), but the cost for the entire coalition.

Circle K	131161000
Shell	126062000
Esso	48454000
YX	97234400
Circle K / Shell	217075000
Circle K / Esso	114500000
Circle K / YX	188942000
Shell / Esso	101847000
Shell / YX	207354000
Esso / YX	82818100
Circle K / Shell / Esso	159858000
Circle K / Shell / YX	297113000
Circle K / Esso / YX	139426000
Shell / Esso / YX	154963000
Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX	219031000
Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot	206766000

#### 5.1.2 Savings for each coalition

Here I will find the savings in percentage for each coalition. To find this I compare the cost for the coalition to the companies summed stand-alone costs of the corresponding coalition.

*Circle K / Shell* Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 126062000 = 257223000

Coalition cost = 217075000

Savings = (257223000 - 217075000) / 257223000 = 15.6 %

*Circle K / Esso* Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 82818100 = 213979100

Coalition cost = 114500000

Savings = (213979100 - 114500000) / 213979100 = 46.5 %

*Circle K / YX* Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 97234400 = 228395400

Coalition cost = 188942000

Savings = (228395400 - 188942000) / 228395400 = 17.3 %

Shell / Esso Summed stand-alone costs = 126062000 + 48454000 = 174516000

Coalition cost = 101847000

Savings = (174516000 - 101847000) / 174516000 = 41.6 %

### Shell / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 126062000 + 97234400 = 223296400

Coalition cost = 207354000

Savings = (223296400 - 207354000) / 223296400 = 7.1 %

Esso / YX Summed stand-alone costs = 48454000 + 97234400 = 145688400

Coalition cost = 82818100

Savings = (145688400 - 82818100) / 145688400 = 43.2 %

*Circle K / Shell / Esso* Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 126062000 + 48454000 = 305677000

Coalition cost = 159858000

Savings = (305677000 - 159858000) / 305677000 = 47.7 %

Circle K / Shell / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 126062000 + 97234400 = 354457400

Coalition cost = 297113000

Savings = (354457400 - 297113000) / 354457400 = 16.2 %

#### Circle K / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 48454000 + 97234400 = 276849400

Coalition cost = 139426000

Savings = (276849400 - 139426000) / 276849400 = 49.6 %

Shell / Esso / YX Summed stand-alone costs = 126062000 + 48454000 + 97234400 = 271750400

Coalition cost = 154963000

Savings = (271750400 - 154963000) / 271750400 = 43.0 %

# *Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX* Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 126062000 + 48454000 + 97234400 = 402911400

Coalition cost = 219031000

Savings = 402911400 NOK - 219031000 NOK = <u>183880400 NOK</u>

Savings = (402911400 - 219031000) / 402911400 = <u>45.6 %</u>

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

This case must be seen as a special case as Equinor depot do not have a stand-alone cost, due to they do not own or operate any gas stations. However, I want to include this analysis to get a picture of what savings can be done in NOK and  $CO^2$  emission when the companies can choose also to distribute fuel from this depot to their gas stations.

Summed stand-alone costs = 131161000 + 126062000 + 48454000 + 97234400 = 402911400

```
Coalition cost = 206766000
```

Savings = 402911400 NOK - 206766000 NOK = <u>196145400 NOK</u>

```
Savings = (402911400 - 206766000) / 402911400 = <u>48.7 %</u>
```

## 5.1.3 Game theory

First I will use the cost allocation tool Shapley Values to allocate the coalition cost to each player (company) in this 4-player game. This formula belongs to cooperative game theory, which I described in the Theory chapter, regarding calculation and the mechanism behind the formula.

The reason I choose Shapley Values method for this cost allocation is that it weight each players contribution to the collaboration in a good and accurate way, which is likely to give a fair cost allocation. Shapley Values is also in my opinion a well-known and trusted method for cost allocation.

After I have calculated the cost allocation from Shapley Values I will further check the three conditions, to find out if each player is most beneficial to join the full collaboration (grand coalition) or if any of the players are more beneficial to form smaller coalitions or stand alone, given the cost allocation. This is calculated in the chapters below the chapter "Shapley Values".

This cost allocation belongs to the core if there are no other(smaller) coalitions that can be more beneficial than this 4 player coalition (grand coalition) in this game. This cost allocation is stable if none of the 4 players will have benefit from braking out to form smaller coalitions or stand alone.

To find out if the cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core I will check the three conditions individual rational, coalition rational and efficiency condition.

#### 5.1.4 Shapley Values

To set up the calculations in the Shapley Values formula I here uses all the 15 coalition costs (included the stand alone costs) from the analyses in AMPL with equal depot capacities.

Regarding the grand coalition cost I will here use the result from the analysis where Equinor depot is not included, as Equinor was not included in the other analyses. If I here had used the grand coalition result where Equinor's depot is included, the Shapley values calculation had been fault, as Equinor's depot is not included in the smaller coalition analyses and the stand-alone analyses. Therefore I need to be consistence when calculating Shapley values to get correct values from the formula.

These cost results are calculated according to the cost allocation method Shapley Value, which I already have described in detail in the Theory chapter at page 18-22, both for calculation and logic behind Shapley Values. I will therefore not show calculations for Shapley Values here.

$$arphi_i(v) = \sum_{S \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} rac{|S|! \; (n-|S|-1)!}{n!} (v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S))$$

The results(allocated costs) from the Shapley Values formula in the game with equal depot capacities are listed below.

Circle K:	86569291.67
Shell:	91008458.33
Esso:	-25275025.00
YX:	66728275.00

### 5.1.5 Individual rational

Here I will check if these Shapley values are individual rational, by checking if the calculated Shapley value for each player (company) is lower than their stand-alone value from AMPL. This is the first step to find out if the cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core.

Circle K:	86569291.67 < 131161000 (yes)
Shell:	91008458.33 < 126062000 (yes)
Esso:	-25275025.00 < 48454000 (yes)
YX:	66728275.00 < 97234400 (yes)

#### 5.1.6 Coalition rational

Here I will check if the calculated Shapley values for every coalition summed are lower than their respective coalition cost from AMPL. The coalition for all 4 companies will of course not be calculated here, only the 2 and 3 player coalitions. The 4 companies coalition will be tested in another test in the next section.

Circle K / Shell:	(86569291.67 + 91008458,33) < 217075000 (yes)	
Circle K / Esso:	(86569291.67 + (-25275025,00)) < 114500000 (yes)	
Circle K / YX:	(86569291.67 + 66728275,00) < 188942000 (yes)	
Shell / Esso:	(91008458.33 + (-25275025,00)) < 101847000 (yes)	
Shell / YX:	(91008458.33 + 66728275,00 < 207354000 (yes)	
Esso / YX:	(-25275025.00 + 66728275,00) < 82818100 (yes)	
Circle K / Shell / Ess	so: (86569291.67 + 91008458,33 + (-25275025.00)) < 159858000 (yes)	
Circle K / Shell / YX: (86569291.67 + 91008458,33 + 66728275.00) < 297113000 (yes)		

Circle K / Esso / YX: (86569291.67 + (-25275025,00) + 66728275.00) < 139426000 (yes)

Shell / Esso / YX: (91008458.33 + (-25275025,00) + 66728275.00) < 154963000 (yes)

Since I only have yeses, the rational condition for coalitions are fulfilled.

#### 5.1.7 Efficiency condition

A final test is the efficiency condition test, where I going to check if all 4 Shapley values summed are equal to the full coalition cost from AMPL.

Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX: (86569291.67 + 91008458.33 + (-25275025.00) + 66728275.00) = 219031000 (yes)

## 5.1.8 Conclusion from the individual rational-, coalition rationaland efficiency condition tests

This cost allocation from the Shapley values formula passed all three tests, which means according to game theory, that this cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core. Then we also know that non of the 4 companies have an economical benefit to break out of the 4-player coalition to form a smaller coalition. They all will benefit most when they stay in this grand coalition.

#### 5.1.9 Savings for each company

Here I will calculate each company's savings when comparing their Shapley values to their stand-alone costs. This will tell how much in annually NOK and in percentage each of the four companies saves to join this collaboration where all four companies collaborate together. As these calculations use the cost allocation from Shapley Values this will show results for the grand coalition when Equinor's depot is not included.

Circle K: 131161000.00 – 86569291.67 = 44591708.33

Annually savings = 44591708.33 NOK

44591708.33 / 131161000,00 = 0.34

Percentage savings = 34.0 %

Shell: 126062000 - 91008458.33 = 35053541.67

Annually savings = 35053541.67 NOK

35053541.67 / 126062000 = 0.278

Percentage savings = 27.8 %

Esso: 48454000 - (-25275025.00) = 73729025

Annually savings = 73729025 NOK

73729025 / 48454000 = 1.522

Percentage savings = 152.2 %

YX: 97234400 - 66728275.00 = 30506125

Annually savings = 30506125 NOK

30506125 / 97234400 = 0.314

Percentage savings = 31.4 %

## 5.1.10 Reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> emission at full collaboration

Here I will find the annual reduction in  $CO^2$  emissions from the trucks when the 4 companies collaborates together in the grand coalition compared to if they distribute fuel as stand-alone companies. I will first do some manual calculations.

From own knowledge and statements from people in the driver industry I suggest that a gas trucks tank contains when full tank typical 40000 litre and that a truck driving with full tank of that amount consumes at average approximately 0,4 litre diesel per km driving.

40000 / 1000 = 40

0.4 / 40 = 0.01

This gives that the trucks consumption of diesel is estimated to 0.01 litre diesel per 1000 litre km, given that they drive with full tanks of 40000 litre on the trucks.

The  $CO^2$  emission from a diesel engine is 2660 gram per consumed litre of diesel (Helleborg, 2018).

2660 gram x 0,01 = 26,6 gram

This gives us that the trucks emission of  $CO^2$  is 26.6 gram per 1000 litre km of distributed fuel.

26.6 gram = 0.0000266 ton

To find the annual reduction in  $CO^2$  emission in ton there is a short cut that can be done. It is simply to divide 0.0000266 with the cost parameter c 0.31 in AMPL and then multiply this by the savings from the full collaboration, which here will be the version that includes Equinor's depot at Mongstad. The reason why I do include Equinor here is that this will not give any disturbance in the calculation as it would in Shapley values earlier. In this way I will get the results where the 4 companies also uses Equinor's depot, as I expect them to do, when seeking for the best possible way to collaborate and distribute fuel in Norway. Let's try to calculate. 0.00008581 x 196145400 = 16830.54

Annual reduction in  $CO^2$  emission from full collaboration = <u>16830.54 ton</u>

However, I still going to do this in some new analyses in AMPL to also make a functional program for  $CO^2$  emission for this case.

I will now run 5 new analyses in AMPL to find the potential reduction in  $CO^2$  at full collaboration. First I will run 4 new stand-alone analyses. Then I will run a last analysis with full collaboration including Equinor's depot.

To manage to run these new analyses I will now make 5 new data files, 5 new run files and 5 new text files in AMPL. I will also in this case use the same model file I already have created, which will be unchanged.

The only change I need to do in the data files compared to the previous relevant files are that I change the parameter c cost value 0.31 to 0.0000266 for  $CO^2$  emission. The output will now show total annual  $CO^2$  output from the corresponding company or companies in the analysis.

## 5.1.11 Creating CO<sup>2</sup> emission program in AMPL

## Changes for CO<sup>2</sup> emission stand alone data files

Figure 5.1.11.1. Changes for the  $CO^2$  emission stand-alone data files compared to the stand-alone data files for costs.

```
param c :=
# CO2 emission for transport of fuel per 1000L km in ton
0.0000266
;
<</pre>
```

```
Figure 5.1.11.2. CO<sup>2</sup> emission Circle K stand alone run file
```



#### Figure 5.1.11.3. CO<sup>2</sup> emission Circle K stand alone text file

A DataCOCi.dat	RunCOCi.run	📄 TextCOCi.txt 💥	
z = 11254.5			

The other  $CO^2$  emission stand alone run files will have equivalently changes, I will therefore not show them here. Text files will give each new analysis individual results regarding  $CO^2$ .

Changes for CO<sup>2</sup> emission Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot data file

Figure 5.1.11.4. Changes for  $CO^2$  emission Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition plus Equinor depot data file compared to Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition plus Equinor depot data file for cost.

```
param c :=
# CO2 emission for transport of fuel per 1000L km in ton
0.0000266
:
```

Figure 5.1.11.5.  $CO^2$  emission Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition plus Equinor depot run file





Figure 5.1.11.6.  $CO^2$  emission Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition plus Equinor depot text file

A DataCO.dat A RunCO.run	📄 TextCO.txt 🔀	
z = 17741.8		


#### CO<sup>2</sup> emission results

The results shows annual CO<sup>2</sup> emission from distributing fuel.

Figure 5.1.11.7. CO<sup>2</sup> emission Circle K stand alone text file



```
Figure 5.1.11.8. CO<sup>2</sup> emission Shell stand alone text file
```



A DataCOEs.dat	RunCOEs.run	📄 TextCOEs.txt 💥	
z = 4157.66		<i>.</i>	

Figure 5.1.11.10. CO<sup>2</sup> emission YX stand alone text file

A DataCOYX.dat	RunCOYX.run	TextCOYX.txt 🔀	
z = 8343.34			

Figure 5.1.11.11.  $CO^2$  emission Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX coalition plus Equinor depot text file

1		~ ~ ~	
A DataCO.dat	A RunCO.run	📄 TextCO.txt 🔀	
z = 17741.8			
Circle K:		11254.5 t	on CO <sup>2</sup>
Shell:		10816.9 t	on CO <sup>2</sup>
Esso:		4157.66 t	on CO <sup>2</sup>
YX:		8343.34 t	on CO <sup>2</sup>
Sum:		34572.4 t	on CO <sup>2</sup>

Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Eq	uinor depot:	17741.8 ton CO <sup>2</sup>
	1	

This means that a optimized collaborating in fuel distributing gives an annual reduction in  $CO^2$  emission of <u>16830.6 ton  $CO^2$ </u> compared to if there is no collaboration. This is the same answer as in the short cut method above.

## 5.2 Fuel distribution with limitless depot capacities

Here I have set all depot capacities to 5000000 which is more than the total annual fuel consumption in Norway. This can then be seen as limitless depot capacities as every depot could in theory supply whole Norway with fuel on its own.

Total annual fuel consumption in Norway in 1000 litre: 4874893

Depots capacities: 5000000

The changes in AMPL files will be in the data files regarding depot capacities. Other than that the procedure for coding the AMPL program is all the same as I described for the serie with "equal depot capacities". Therefore I will here display the results I got from AMPL directly without screenshots.

Circle K	43511300
Shell	42164400
Esso	48063600
YX	73247100
Circle K / Shell	48416500
Circle K / Esso	48798900
Circle K / YX	44937700
Shell / Esso	31220400

#### 5.2.1 Coalition transportation cost results from AMPL listed

Shell / YX	57276400
Esso / YX	51858900
Circle K / Shell / Esso	31895200
Circle K / Shell / YX	56136300
Circle K / Esso / YX	38757700
Shell / Esso / YX	36930300
Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX	34398700
Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot	34398700

## 5.2.2 Savings for each coalition

*Circle K / Shell* Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 42164400 = 85675700

Coalition cost = 48416500

Savings = (85675700 - 48416500) / 85675700 = 43.5 %

*Circle K / Esso* Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 48063600 = 91574900

Coalition cost = 48798900

Savings = (91574900 - 48798900) / 91574900 = 46.7 %

### Circle K / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 73247100 = 116758400

Coalition cost = 44937700

Savings = (116758400 - 44937700) / 116758400 = 61.5 %

Shell / Esso Summed stand-alone costs = 42164400 + 48063600 = 90228000 Coalition cost = 31220400

Savings = (90228000 - 31220400) / 90228000 = 65.4 %

Shell / YX Summed stand-alone costs = 42164400 + 73247100 = 115411500

Coalition cost = 57276400

Savings = (115411500 - 57276400) / 115411500 = 50.4 %

Esso / YX Summed stand-alone costs = 48063600 + 73247100 = 121310700

Coalition cost = 51858900

Savings = (121310700 - 51858900) / 121310700 = 57.3 %

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso

Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 42164400 + 48063600 = 133739300

Coalition cost = 31895200

Savings = (133739300 - 31895200) / 133739300 = 76.2 %

#### Circle K / Shell / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 42164400 + 73247100 = 158922800

Coalition cost = 56136300

Savings = (158922800 - 56136300) / 158922800 = 64.7 %

## Circle K / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 48063600 + 73247100 = 164822000

Coalition cost = 36930300

Savings = (164822000 - 36930300) / 164822000 = 77.6 %

#### Shell / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 42164400 + 48063600 + 73247100 = 163475100

Coalition cost = 36930300

Savings = (163475100 - 36930300) / 163475100 = 77.4 %

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 42164400 + 48063600 + 73247100 = 206986400

Coalition cost = 34398700

Savings = 206986400 NOK - 34398700 NOK = <u>172587700 NOK</u>

Savings = (206986400 - 34398700) / 206986400 = <u>83.4 %</u>

*Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot* Summed stand-alone costs = 43511300 + 42164400 + 48063600 + 73247100 = 206986400 Coalition cost = 34398700 Savings = 206986400 NOK - 34398700 NOK = <u>172587700 NOK</u> Savings = (206986400 - 34398700) / 206986400 = <u>83.4 %</u>

We see that the result here is exactly the same as when Equinor Mongstad depot is not included. This make sense as there is always another depot that are closer to any gas station than Mongstad and now all depots have limitless capacity. So Mongstad will now never deliver fuel to any gas station and we got therefore equal results as in the previous collaboration.

#### 5.2.3 Shapley values

Circle K:	7337550
Shell:	5406150
Esso:	740500
YX:	20914500

## 5.2.4 Individual rational

Circle K:	7337550 < 43511300 (yes)
Shell:	5406150 < 42164400 (yes)
Esso:	740500 < 48063600 (yes)
YX:	20914500 < 73247100 (yes)

## 5.2.5 Coalition rational

Circle K / Shell:	(7337550 + 5406150) < 48416500 (yes)	
Circle K / Esso:	(7337550 + 740500) < 48798900 (yes)	
Circle K / YX:	(7337550 + 20914500) < 44937700 (yes)	
Shell / Esso:	(5406150 + 740500) < 31220400 (yes)	
Shell / YX:	(5406150 + 20914500) < 57276400 (yes)	
Esso / YX:	(740500 + 20914500) < 51858900 (yes)	
Circle K / Shell / Esso: (7337550 + 5406150 + 740500) < 31895200 (yes)		
Circle K / Shell / YX: (7337550 + 5406150 + 20914500) < 56136300 (yes)		
Circle K / Esso / YX:	: (7337550 + 740500 + 20914500) < 38757700 (yes)	
Shell / Esso / YX:	(5406150 + 740500 + 20914500) < 36930300 (yes)	

Since I only have yeses, the rational condition for this cost allocation are fulfilled.

#### 5.2.6 Efficiency condition

Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX: (7337550 + 5406150 + 740500 + 20914500) = 34398700 (yes)

### 5.2.7 Conclusion from the individual rational-, coalition rationaland efficiency condition tests

This cost allocation from the Shapley values formula passed all three tests, which means according to game theory, that this cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core.

### 5.2.8 Savings for each company

Circle K:

43511300 - 7337550 = 36173750

Annually savings =  $\underline{36173750 \text{ NOK}}$ 

36173750 / 43511300 = 0.831

Percentage savings =  $\underline{83.1 \%}$ 

Shell:

42164400 - 5406150 = 36758250

Annually savings = <u>36758250 NOK</u>

36758250 / 42164400 = 0.872

Percentage savings =  $\underline{87.2 \%}$ 

#### Esso:

48063600 - 740500 = 47323100
Annually savings = $\frac{47323100 \text{ NOK}}{100 \text{ NOK}}$
47323100 / 48063600 = 0.985
Percentage savings = $98.5 \%$

#### YX:

73247100 - 20914500 = 52332600

Annually savings = 52332600 NOK

52332600 / 73247100 = 0.714

Percentage savings =  $\underline{71.4 \%}$ 

## 5.2.9 Reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> emission at full collaboration

2660 gram x 0.01 = 26.6 gram

From this gives us that the trucks emission of  $CO^2$  is 26.6 gram per 1000 litre km of distributed fuel.

26.6 gram = 0.0000266 ton

0.0000266 / 0.31 = 0.00008581

0.00008581 x 172587700 = 14809.8

Annual reduction in  $CO^2$  emission from full collaboration with limitless depots = <u>14809.8</u> <u>ton</u>

## 5.3 Fuel distribution with adjusted depot capacities

Here I have run a new series of 16 analyses with total depot capacities adjusted to relate to each company's share of annual fuel sale at all their gas stations in Norway. All values are then multiplied with 20% to make some overcapacity. The total overcapacity will in addition to this also include the depot at Mongstad. For Equinor which do not own or operate any gas stations I have calculated an average capacity from the 4 companies for their depot capacity at Mongstad.

Annual capacities in 1000 litre:

Circle K:	4874893 x 1.2 x 0,325/ 6 = 316868.0
Shell:	4874893 x 1.2 x 0,325 / 8 = 237651.0
Esso:	4874893 x 1.2 x 0,225 / 4 = 329055.3
YX:	4874893 x 1.2 x 0,125 / 2 = 365617.0
Equinor:	(316868.0 + 237651.0 + 329055.3 + 365617.0) / 4 = 312297.8

### 5.3.1 Coalition transportation cost results from AMPL listed

Circle K	177207000
Shell	285499000
Esso	50214100
YX	94770200
Circle K / Shell	431180000
Circle K / Esso	129120000
Circle K / YX	226464000
Shell / Esso	196868000

Shell / YX	341711000
Esso / YX	87572400
Circle K / Shell / Esso	332446000
Circle K / Shell / YX	485696000
Circle K / Esso / YX	173934000
Shell / Esso / YX	256191000
Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX	387685000
Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot	299921000

## 5.3.2 Savings for each coalition

*Circle K / Shell* Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 285499000 = 462706000

Coalition cost = 431180000

Savings = (462706000 - 431180000) / 462706000 = 6.8 %

*Circle K / Esso* Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 50214100 = 227421100

Coalition cost = 129120000

Savings = (227421100 - 129120000) / 227421100 = 43.2 %

### Circle K / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 94770200 = 271977200

Coalition cost = 226464000

Savings = (271977200 - 226464000) / 271977200 = 16.7 %

Shell / Esso

Summed stand-alone costs = 285499000 + 50214100 = 335713100

Coalition cost = 196868000

Savings = (335713100 - 196868000) / 335713100 = 42.4 %

Shell / YX Summed stand-alone costs = 285499000 + 94770200 = 380269200

Coalition cost = 341711000

Savings = (380269200 - 341711000) / 380269200 = 10.1 %

Esso / YX Summed stand-alone costs = 50214100 + 94770200 = 144984300

Coalition cost = 87572400

Savings = (144984300 - 87572400) / 144984300 = 39.6 %

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso

Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 285499000 + 50214100 = 512920100

Coalition cost = 332446000

Savings = (512920100 - 332446000) / 512920100 = 35.2 %

#### Circle K / Shell / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 285499000 + 94770200 = 557476200

Coalition cost = 485696000

Savings = (557476200 - 485696000) / 557476200 = 12.9 %

## Circle K / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 50214100 + 94770200 = 322191300

Coalition cost = 173934000

Savings = (322191300 - 173934000) / 322191300 = 46.0 %

## Shell / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 285499000 + 50214100 + 94770200 = 430483300

Coalition cost = 256191000

Savings = (430483300 - 256191000) / 430483300 = 40.5 %

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX

Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 285499000 + 50214100 + 94770200 = 607690300

Coalition cost = 387685000

Savings = 607690300 NOK - 387685000 NOK = <u>220005300 NOK</u>

Savings = (607690300 - 387685000) / 607690300 = <u>36.2 %</u>

#### Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

Summed stand-alone costs = 177207000 + 285499000 + 50214100 + 94770200 = 607690300

Coalition cost = 299921000

Savings = 607690300 NOK - 299921000 NOK = <u>307769300 NOK</u>

Savings = (607690300 - 299921000) / 607690300 = <u>50.6 %</u>

We see that the result for Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot collaboration now is different than when Equinor Mongstad depot was not included. In the case where we had unlimited supply, Equinor's depot had no effect on optimal solution. Now Equinor's depot has an effect on optimal solution due to the fact that maximum supply from the fuel depots has changed, in this case where we have "adjusted depot capacities.

# 5.3.3 Shapley values

Circle K: 137359025.0

Shell: 231374525.0

Esso: -43674208.3

YX: 62625658.3

## 5.3.4 Individual rational

Circle K:	137359025.0 < 177207000 (yes)
Shell:	231374525.0 < 285499000 (yes)
Esso:	-43674208.3 < 50214100 (yes)
YX:	62625658.3 < 94770200 (yes)

## 5.3.5 Coalition rational

Circle K / Shell:	(137359025 + 231374525) < 431180000 (yes)	
Circle K / Esso:	(137359025 +(-43674208.3)) < 129120000 (yes)	
Circle K / YX:	(137359025 + 62625658.3) < 226464000 (yes)	
Shell / Esso:	(231374525 +(-43674208.3)) < 196868000 (yes)	
Shell / YX:	(231374525 + 62625658.3) < 341711000 (yes)	
Esso / YX:	((-43674208,3) + 62625658.3) < 87572400 (yes)	
Circle K / Shell / Esso: (137359025 + 231374525 + (-43674208.3)) < 332446000 (yes)		
Circle K / Shell / YX	: (137359025 + 231374525 + 62625658.3) < 485696000 (yes)	

Circle K / Esso / YX: (137359025 + (-43674208.3) + 62625658.3) < 173934000 (yes)

Shell / Esso / YX: (231374525 + (-43674208.3) + 62625658.3) < 256191000 (yes)

Since I only have yeses, the rational condition for this cost allocation is fulfilled.

#### 5.3.6 Efficiency condition

Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX: (137359025 + 231374525 + (-43674208.3)) + 62625658.3 = 387685000 (yes)

The sum for all allocated costs are equal to the full collaboration coalition cost from AMPL, I then conclude that the efficient condition is fulfilled.

# 5.3.7 Conclusion from the individual rational-, coalition rational-, and efficiency condition tests

This cost allocation from the Shapley values formula passed all three tests, which means according to game theory, that this cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core.

#### 5.3.8 Savings for each company

Circle K:

177207000 - 137359025 = 40047975

Annually savings = 40047975 NOK

40047975 / 177207000 = 0.226

Percentage savings =  $\underline{22.6 \%}$ 

### Shell:

285499000 - 231374525 = 54124475	
Annually savings = <u>54124475 NOK</u>	
54124475 / 285499000 = 0.190	
Percentage savings = $\underline{19.0\%}$	

## Esso:

50214100.0 - (-43674208.3) = 93888308.3 Annually savings = <u>93888308.3 NOK</u> 93888308.3 / 50214100 = 1.870

Percentage savings =  $\underline{187.0 \%}$ 

## YX:

94770200 - 62625658.3 = 32144541.7 Annually savings = <u>32144541.7 NOK</u> 32144541.7 / 94770200 = 0.339 Percentage savings = <u>33.9 %</u>

# 5.3.9 Reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> emission at full collaboration

2660 gram x 0.01 = 26.6 gram

From this gives us that the trucks emission of  $CO^2$  is 26.6 gram per 1000 litre km of distributed fuel.

26.6 gram = 0.0000266 ton

0,0000266 / 0.31 = 0.00008581

0.00008581 x 307769300 = 26409.7

Annual reduction in  $CO^2$  emission from full collaboration with adjusted depot capacities = <u>26409.7 ton</u>

# 6. Discussion

I have run 3 series of 15 analyses and from the results used Shapley Values to allocate the grand coalition cost to the 4 companies Circle K, Shell, Esso and YX/UNO-X. I then checked each company's allocated cost from Shapley Values regarding the 2 conditions individual- and rational condition, to find out if the cost allocation is stable and belongs to the core. I also checked the sum regarding efficiency condition. All this is done 3 times(3 series) due to 3 different games.

The allocated costs passed all these test in every 3 series. So we then know that the cost allocations in every 3 cases are stable and belongs to the core. This means that all the 4 companies Circle K, Shell, Esso and YX/UNO-X have most benefit from stay in the grand coalition, given the input data and restrictions in these 3 series of AMPL analyses. As all three series of analyses and calculations show that the grand coalition is best for all the four companies, I suggest that this probably is the case in reality as well. The reason I believe that this likely can be true is that I believe the true depot capacities probably lay within the area of these 3 series of capacities I have used in the analyses, I know capacity may differ within each depot in reality, but at least I still think this indicates that these results can be true, in a way that all 4 companies will have most benefit regarding cost from collaborating in the 4 company coalition where they are open to share depots in a optimized fuel distribution, and that this also of course gives the greatest reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> emission as this will have the same percentage reduction as the percentage savings.

The results show in all three series that every of the 4 companies have considerable savings from the optimized collaborated fuel distributing in this grand coalition of all 4 companies collaborating. The results regarding decreased  $CO^2$  emission also shows considerable amounts decreased  $CO^2$  emissions in all 3 series.

However, I believe that the results for percentage- savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emission are more likely to be closer to the reality then the savings and decreased  $CO^2$  emission in NOK. This is due to some uncertainty regarding cost from driving and salary, as changes in this cost will affect the savings in NOK, but not in percentage. As I explained earlier the return routes are not included in the program, so the savings will in practice probably be higher than the results here, not in percent, but in NOK. The amount of decreased  $CO^2$  emission will of course also probably be higher in practice, due to this.

The results for total savings from full collaborated (included Equinor's depot) fuel distributing in Norway compared to non-collaborative distribution, from the 3 series analyses, given the input data show:

Annual total savings in NOK (serie 1) = 196145400 NOK

Annual total savings in percent (serie 1) = 48.7 %

Annual total decreased  $CO^2$  emission in ton (serie 1) = 16830.54 ton

Annual total savings in NOK (serie 2) = 172587700 NOK

Annual total savings in percent (serie 2) = 83.4 %

Annual total decreased  $CO^2$  emission in ton (serie 2) = 14809.8 ton

Annual total savings in NOK (serie 3) = 307769300 NOK

Annual total savings in percent (serie 3) = 50.6 %

Annual total decreased  $CO^2$  emission in ton (serie 3) = 26409.7 ton

From the main results we can see that the greatest savings in percent is for the analyses with "limitless depot capacities"(serie 2), but still have less savings in NOK then the results for "equal depot capacities"(serie 1). This make sense as the companies now can distribute all the fuel from the nearest depot no matter how much fuel they want, this makes low costs. At the same time they will have high savings when they can pic up as much fuel as they want from all any of the 21 depots in Norway.

If we takes a look at the results in the results chapter there also seems to be a pattern that Esso have the greatest contribution to the savings among the companies and that this contribution is very high compared to the contribution from the other companies. We can see that the coalitions where Esso is included tend to have high percentage savings. Though all companies still contributes significantly to the savings. The reason for Essos high contribution to the savings can be that Esso have depots which are more suitable spread in the country regarding locations and demands, compared to the other companies.

We see that Esso do have negative allocated cost value from Shapley Values. This means that when Circle K, Shell and YX have paid their allocated costs into the money pot for the grand coalition cost Esso do not pay anything to the money pot but rather gain a sum from that money pot. This is due to Esso's very high contribution to the savings in the collaboration. Esso's contribution is as high that the cost for the grand coalition is way lower than the cost would be for a 3 companies coalition where Esso would not be included. The average marginal cost of Esso is negative. The grand coalition cost is actual lower than the sum for what Circle K, Shell and YX pays into the grand coalition pot, due to that Esso get some of this money. This cost allocation is still stable and belongs to the core, all companies are most beneficial to stay in the grand coalition, they has no reason to break out to form smaller coalitions. However, the companies do not necessarily need to split the grand coalition cost exactly this way, they can agree to split it different, but the cost allocation from Shapley Values here is probably a good suggestion to how the companies should split the grand coalition cost in a fair way, even though Esso get paid from the money pot.

The results for the savings from 2- and 3 company coalitions are actual not very important here as we already know that the grand coalition gives most benefits for all the companies. But these percentage saving results can sure shred more light on the results and show some patterns which gives a better understanding of the results, I will therefore discuss some of these findings.

We can see that there tend to be more savings as larger the coalitions are, that make sense as collaboration here is most beneficial in the grand coalition, where all four companies collaborates.

Shell seems to have the lowest contribution to the savings, but do not differ very much from Circle K and YX. One reason for this can be that they have

We see that a 3 company coalition with Circle K, Esso and YX have the highest percentage saving in 2 series, but all these 3 companies are still more beneficial when they including Shell, because Shells allocated cost in the grand coalition will be high enough to lower the other companies cost, which gives the other companies higher benefits in the grand coalition then in a 3 company coalition, and Shell still contributes enough to the savings to get an allocated cost which is lower than its own stand alone cost. Every company will still be most beneficial to stay in the grand coalition where all 4 companies collaborating, but that did we already know according to the 3 condition tests. Each company contributes to savings in the grand coalition, but with different amounts and at different grades. The companies will get allocated their costs based on how much they contributes to the savings.

The analyses and calculations for decreased  $CO^2$  emissions show that the amount of annual decreased  $CO^2$  emission from a full collaboration is considerable.

Although the results in this thesis of course is not perfectly accurate to reality, due particularly to uncertain depot capacities, and changes in depot capacities can sure lead to changed numbers in the results, but I still believe that the results gives true pointers of each companies savings of being in the collaboration and how they want to collaborate. And maybe more important, I think that the model gives true pointers of the magnitude of the amount of decreased  $CO^2$  emission collaboration potential can give in distributing fuel in Norway.

A aspect to think of when creating a program in AMPL for collaboration regarding the results for which depot one should pic up fuel from and how much, is when two depots are located very close to each other. The program then chooses only the nearest depot as long as it has capacity to deliver, no matter how minimal the difference in distances is. The coalition cost will almost not be changed if one pic up fuel also from the depot laying minimal far away from the gas station, but this changes which depot (company) should deliver the fuel to a specific city/place (gas station). So this should be pay attention to when creating the program in AMPL. Though this aspect is not important in the AMPL analyses here when the purpose is to find savings for the entire coalitions.

# 7. Conclusion

The results show that all the four companies are most beneficial to collaborate together in a 4 company coalition (grand coalition), given the input data and restrictions in the analyses. The results also show that the savings from a optimized fuel distribution in the grand coalition compared to a none collaborative fuel distribution are not even among the companies, but still are considerable for all the four companies.

From this I recommend all the four companies Circle K, Shell (ST1), Esso and YX/UNO-X to collaborate together in the 4 companies coalition (grand coalition), being open to share depots, in distributing fuel in Norway, to get the lowest possible transportation costs for their own company. They than need to arrange the routes and amounts as the text file in AMPL displays. Further I recommend the companies to share the costs according to the results from Shapley Values. This is given that there will be done new analyses with accurate input data to get as accurate results as possible and to verify my conclusions.

The results also show that the amount of potential decreased  $CO^2$  emission from the trucks used to distribute the fuel in Norway is considerable when all four companies collaborate together in a 4 company coalition compared to a none collaborative fuel distribution.

From this I also recommend all the four companies Circle K, Shell (ST1), Esso and YX/UNO-X to collaborate together in the 4 companies coalition (grand coalition), being open to share depots, in distributing fuel in Norway, to reduce the  $CO^2$  emissions to the world as much as possible. In this aspect also the government can play an important role in facilitating and encourage to collaboration in distributing fuel in Norway. They than need to arrange the routes and amounts as the text file in AMPL says. This is given that there will be done new analyses with accurate input data to get as accurate results as possible and to verify my conclusions.

Further I experiences that the AMPL program I have created in this thesis is working smooth and is easy to change and expand regarding changed or added data. The program could therefore be used as a tool or a help in decision makings in collaborative fuel distribution in Norway.

## 8. References

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# Appendix: AMPL file names

# Equal depot capacities

# Model file

Model.mod:	The model file used for all analyses
Data files	
DataCi.dat:	Circle K
DataSh.dat:	Shell
DataEs.dat:	Esso
DataYX.dat:	YX
DataCiSh.dat:	Circle K / Shell
DataCiEs.dat:	Circle K / Esso
DataCiYX.dat:	Circle K / YX
DataShEs.dat:	Shell / Esso
DataShYX.dat:	Shell / YX
DataEsYX.dat:	Esso / YX
DataCiShEs.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
DataCiShYX.dat:	Circle K / Shell / YX
DataCiEsYX.dat:	Circle K / Esso / YX
DataShEsYX.dat:	Shell / Esso / YX
DataCiShEsYX.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
Data.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

RunCi.run:	Circle K
RunSh.run:	Shell
RunEs.run:	Esso
RunYX.run:	YX
RunCiSh.run:	Circle K / Shell
RunCiEs.run:	Circle K / Esso
RunCiYX.run:	Circle K / YX
RunShEs.run:	Shell / Esso
RunShYX.run:	Shell / YX
RunEsYX.run:	Esso / YX
RunCiShEs.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
RunCiShYX.run:	Circle K / Shell / YX
RunCiEsYX.run:	Circle K / Esso / YX
RunShEsYX.run:	Shell / Esso / YX
RunCiShEsYX.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
Run.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# **Text files**

TextCi.txt:	Circle K
TextSh.txt:	Shell
TextEs.txt:	Esso
TextYX.txt:	YX
TextCiSh.txt:	Circle K / Shell
TextCiEs.txt:	Circle K / Esso
TextCiYX.txt:	Circle K / YX
TextShEs.txt:	Shell / Esso
TextShYX.txt :	Shell / YX
TextEsYX.txt:	Esso / YX
TextCiShEs.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
TextCiShYX.txt:	Circle K / Shell / YX
TextCiEsYX.txt:	Circle K / Esso / YX
TextShEsYX.txt:	Shell / Esso / YX
TextCiShEsYX.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
Text.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# Limitless depot capacities

# Model file

# Data files

DataLICi.dat:	Circle K
DataLISh.dat:	Shell
DataLIEs.dat:	Esso
DataLIYX.dat:	YX
DataLICiSh.dat:	Circle K / Shell
DataLICiEs.dat:	Circle K / Esso
DataLICiYX.dat:	Circle K / YX
DataLIShEs.dat:	Shell / Esso
DataLIShYX.dat:	Shell / YX
DataLIEsYX.dat:	Esso / YX
DataLICiShEs.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
DataLICiShYX.dat:	Circle K / Shell / YX
DataLICiEsYX.dat:	Circle K / Esso / YX
DataLIShEsYX.dat:	Shell / Esso / YX
DataLICiShEsYX.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
DataLI.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# Run files

RunLICi.run:	Circle K
RunLISh.run:	Shell
RunLIEs.run:	Esso
RunLIYX.run:	YX
RunLICiSh.run:	Circle K / Shell
RunLICiEs.run:	Circle K / Esso
RunLICiYX.run:	Circle K / YX
RunLIShEs.run:	Shell / Esso
RunLIShYX.run:	Shell / YX
RunLIEsYX.run:	Esso / YX
RunLICiShEs.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
RunLICiShYX.run:	Circle K / Shell / YX
RunLICiEsYX.run:	Circle K / Esso / YX
RunLIShEsYX.run:	Shell / Esso / YX
RunLICiShEsYX.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
RunLI.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# **Text files**

TextLICi.txt:	Circle K
TextLISh.txt:	Shell
TextLIEs.txt:	Esso
TextLIYX.txt:	YX
TextLICiSh.txt:	Circle K / Shell
TextLICiEs.txt:	Circle K / Esso
TextLICiYX.txt:	Circle K / YX
TextLIShEs.txt:	Shell / Esso
TextLIShYX.txt:	Shell / YX
TextLIEsYX.txt:	Esso / YX
TextLICiShEs.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
TextLICiShYX.txt:	Circle K / Shell / YX
TextLICiEsYX.txt:	Circle K / Esso / YX
TextLIShEsYX.txt:	Shell / Esso / YX
TextLICiShEsYX.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
TextLI.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# Adjusted depot Capacities

# Model file

# Data files

DataADCi.dat:	Circle K
DataADSh.dat:	Shell
DataADEs.dat:	Esso
DataADYX.dat:	YX
DataADCiSh.dat:	Circle K / Shell
DataADCiEs.dat:	Circle K / Esso
DataADCiYX.dat:	Circle K / YX
DataADShEs.dat:	Shell / Esso
DataASDShYX.dat:	Shell / YX
DataADEsYX.dat:	Esso / YX
DataADCiShEs.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
DataADCiShYX.dat:	Circle K / Shell / YX
DataADCiEsYX.dat:	Circle K / Esso / YX
DataADShEsYX.dat:	Shell / Esso / YX
DataADCiShEsYX.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
DataAD.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

RunADCi.run:	Circle K
RunADSh.run:	Shell
RunADEs.run:	Esso
RunADYX.run:	YX
RunADCiSh.run:	Circle K / Shell
RunADCiEs.run:	Circle K / Esso
RunADCiYX.run:	Circle K / YX
RunADShEs.run:	Shell / Esso
RunADShYX.run:	Shell / YX
RunADEsYX.run:	Esso / YX
RunADCiShEs.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
RunADCiShYX.run:	Circle K / Shell / YX
RunADCiEsYX.run:	Circle K / Esso / YX
RunADShEsYX.run:	Shell / Esso / YX
RunADCiShEsYX.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
RunAD.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# **Text files**

TextADCi.txt:	Circle K
TextADSh.txt:	Shell
TextADEs.txt:	Esso
TextADYX.txt:	YX
TextADCiSh.txt:	Circle K / Shell
TextADCiEs.txt:	Circle K / Esso
TextADCiYX.txt:	Circle K / YX
TextADShEs.txt:	Shell / Esso
TextADShYX.txt:	Shell / YX
TextADEsYX.txt:	Esso / YX
TextADCiShEs.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso
TextADCiShYX.txt:	Circle K / Shell / YX
TextADCiEsYX.txt:	Circle K / Esso / YX
TextADShEsYX.txt:	Shell / Esso / YX
TextADCiShEsYX.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX
TextAD.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

# Equal depot capacities CO<sup>2</sup> emission

# Model file

Model.mod:	The model file used for all analyses
Data files	
DataCOCi.dat:	Circle K
DataCOSh.dat:	Shell
DataCOEs.dat:	Esso
DataCOYX.dat:	YX
DataCO.dat:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot
Run files	
RunCOCi.run:	Circle K
RunCOSh.run:	Shell

RunCOSh.run:	Shell
RunCOEs.run:	Esso
RunCOYX.run:	YX
RunCO.run:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot

## **Text files**

TextCOCi.txt:	Circle K
TextCOSh.txt:	Shell
TextCOEs.txt:	Esso
TextCOYX.txt:	YX
TextCO.txt:	Circle K / Shell / Esso / YX / Equinor depot