• Access regulation and cross-border mergers : is international coordination beneficial? 

      Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Olsen, Trond E.; Straume, Odd Rune (Working paper, Working paper, 2005-06)
      The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic ...
    • Access regulation and cross-border mergers : is international coordination beneficial? 

      Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Olsen, Trond E.; Straume, Odd Rune (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-04)
      The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic ...
    • Balanced scorecards: a relational contract approach 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;3/20, Working paper, 2020-05-08)
      Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. However, there is no formal incentive model that actually describe this kind of index ...
    • Bonus og motivasjon i frisørbransjen : hvordan brukes prestasjonsbasert lønn som styringsverktøy i frisørbransjen, og er det en sammenheng mellom bonuser og frisørenes motivasjon? 

      Lunde, Endre; Stokkvik, Morten Tøgersen (Master thesis, 2019)
      I dette studiet undersøkte vi hvordan prestasjonsbasert lønn brukes som styringsverktøy i frisørbransjen, og om det er en sammenheng mellom prestasjonsbasert lønn og motivasjon. Vi brukte kvantitativ metode, i form av ...
    • Career concerns, monetary incentives and job design 

      Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-12)
      We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the principal might want ...
    • Career concerns, multiple tasks, and short-term contracts 

      Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-12)
      We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the optimal compensation ...
    • Common agency with outside options : the case of international taxation of an MNE 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1999)
    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Working paper, Working paper, 2008-05)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...
    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...
    • Crime and punishment : when tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;4/2013, Working paper, 2013-02)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper offers ...
    • Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;05/13, Working paper, 2013-05)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper ...
    • Distorted performance measures and dynamic incentives 

      Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-12)
      Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match agents' true contribution to principals' objectives. Such misalignment may impose difficulties for effective incentive design. ...
    • Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Journal article, 2009)
      Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that ...
    • Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-11)
      We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ...
    • Finansiering av helseforetak basert på relative prestasjoner 

      Kjerstad, Egil; Olsen, Trond E. (Rapport, Research report, 2002-11)
      Hovedspørsmålet i denne rapporten er om regionale helseforetak kan forbedre ressursbruken ved å utnytte informasjon om relative prestasjoner mellom egne helseforetak, dvs. om målestokkonkurranse kan brukes som utgangspunkt ...
    • Implementering av robot- og sensorteknologi i renholdstjenester : en casestudie av Bergen Renhold 

      Ulvang, Kristine Dalland; Amundsen, Rikke Sofie (Master thesis, 2020)
      Denne utredningen ser på hvilken effekt implementering av robot- og sensorteknologi kan ha på Bergen Renholds lønnsomhet, arbeidsforhold, miljøpåvirkning og kvalitet på tjenester. Hensikten med studien er å avdekke ...
    • Implikasjoner av ny postlov og dens innvirkning på innovasjonsinsentivene i Posten Norge AS: en teoretisk studie av det norske postmarkedet 

      Høyem, Maria Holmen; Grydeland, Ragni (Master thesis, 2015)
      Innovasjon er en viktig faktor for bedrifter når det gjelder å skape konkurransefortrinn i bedriftene sine respektive markeder. Det synes derfor interessant å se på hvilke faktorer som kan være medvirkende for en bedrifts ...
    • Incentive provision when contracting is costly 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)
      We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ...
    • International competition for R&D investments 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-02)
      Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm contributes to local welfare ...
    • Kundelojalitetsprogrammer i det norske dagligvaremarkedet : konkurransevirkninger 

      Aashagen, Synne Stedje; Teigen, Synne Gravalid (Master thesis, 2017)
      Denne utredningen tar for seg det norske dagligvaremarkedet sin bruk av kundelojalitetsprogrammer, samt gjør rede for hvordan dette i sin tur kan påvirke konkurransebildet. Med utgangspunkt i mikroøkonomisk teori analyseres ...