Now showing items 21-39 of 39

    • Multinationals, regulatory competition and outside options 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-12)
      Lower barriers to entry and developments in world capital markets have increased the actual and potential mobility of multinational enterprises. This poses challenges for host countries’ tax and regulation policies. The ...
    • Multinationals, tax competition and outside options 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-09)
      We analyse tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an outside option, e.g., towards a third country. An interesting finding is that more attractive outside options for firms may ...
    • Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement 

      Miller, David; Olsen, Trond E.; Watson, Joel (Discussion paper;8/18, Working paper, 2018-05-18)
      We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play ...
    • Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement 

      Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;6/18, Working paper, 2018-04-30)
      This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...
    • Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. 

      Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E. (DP SAM;7/2018, Working paper, 2018-04)
      This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...
    • Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE ...
    • The rise of individual performance pay 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-07)
      Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...
    • Sharing of endogenous risk in construction 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Report, Research report, 2000-10)
      Large and complex construction projects are often very risky; the total completion costs may be influenced by a range of unforeseen factors. The risk can be reduced, however, by careful planning ad specification of the ...
    • Sharing of endogenous risk in construction 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-07)
      In risk management of complex procurement projects in construction, the buyer has two principal instruments at his disposal: 1) the choice of time and resources put into engineering and design (project specification), thus ...
    • Spillovers and international competition for investments 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-05)
      Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm has private information about its efficiency ...
    • Strategic regulation of a multi-national banking industry 

      Dalen, Dag Morten; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-12)
      This paper focuses on the consequences of cross-border banking and entry of multi-national bank (MNB) subsidiaries for banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB ...
    • Strategic tax competition : implications of national ownership 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1999-11)
      Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, ...
    • Team incentives in relational employment contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-08)
      The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and independent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is ...
    • Team incentives in relational employment contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Working paper, Working paper, 2005-08)
      The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and indendent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is ...
    • Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;13/13, Working paper, 2013-12)
      This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts be- tween a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate out- put can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the ...
    • Teams in Relational Contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;23/16, Working paper, 2016-12-16)
      We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal ...
    • The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;2012:8, Working paper, 2012-06)
      When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement ...
    • Tournaments with prize-setting agents 

      Eriksen, Kristoffer W.; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-10)
      In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage distribution, and many firms allow self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource ...