Lower barriers to entry and developments in world capital markets have increased the actual and potential mobility of multinational enterprises. This poses challenges for host countries’ tax and regulation policies. The ...

This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...

We analyze optimal relational contracts for a group (team) of multitasking agents with hidden actions. Contracts are based on noisy signals that may be correlated across agents and between tasks. The optimal contract defines ...

Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...

In risk management of complex procurement projects in construction, the buyer has two principal instruments at his disposal: 1) the choice of time and resources put into engineering and design (project specification), thus ...

This paper focuses on the consequences of cross-border banking and entry of multi-national bank (MNB) subsidiaries for banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB ...

The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and independent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is ...

This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts be- tween a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate out- put can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the ...

When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement ...