• Immobilizing Corporate Income Shifting: Should It Be Safe to Strip in the Harbor? 

      Gresik, Thomas A.; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;31/15, Working paper, 2015-11-18)
      Many subsidiaries can deduct interest payments on internal debt from their taxable income. By issuing internal debt from a tax haven, multinationals can shift income out of host countries through the interest rates they ...
    • Playing Easy or Playing Hard to Get: When and How to Attract FDI 

      Gresik, Thomas A.; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;7/20, Working paper, 2020-06-30)
      We study the link between a country’s institutional quality in tax collection and its optimal corporate tax policies in a model of heterogeneous multinationals that can shift income using both debt and transfer prices. ...
    • Tax induced transfer pricing under universal adoption of the destination-based cash-flow tax 

      Gresik, Thomas A.; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;8/22, Working paper, 2022-02-22)
      The view that the transfer pricing problem vanishes under universal destination-based cash flow taxation (DBCFT) is based on how firms behave in perfectly competitive markets. We show that the neutralizing effect DBCFT has ...
    • The Effect of Tax Havens on Host Country Welfare 

      Gresik, Thomas A.; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;19/15, Working paper, 2015-04-24)
      Multinational corporations can shift income into low-tax countries through transfer pricing and debt financing. While most developed countries use thin capitalization rules to limit the extent to which a subsidiary can ...