• Breaking the glass ceiling? : the effect of board quotas on female labor market outcomes in Norway 

      Bertrand, Marianne; Black, Sandra E.; Jensen, Sissel; Lleras-Muney, Adriana (Discussion paper;28/2014, Working paper, 2014-08)
      In late 2003, Norway passed a law mandating 40 percent representation of each gender on the board of publicly limited liability companies. The primary objective of this reform was to increase the representation of women ...
    • The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under two-part tariffs 

      Schjelderup, Guttorm; Jensen, Sissel (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-06)
      In this paper, we compare ad valorem and specific taxation under heterogeneous demand when a monopolist offers a menu of two-part tariffs. An increase in either tax rate leads to a higher usage fee for all consumers, whereas ...
    • Crime and punishment : when tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;4/2013, Working paper, 2013-02)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper offers ...
    • Made in China, sold in Norway : local labor market effects of an import shock 

      Balsvik, Ragnhild; Jensen, Sissel; Salvanes, Kjell Gunnar (Discussion paper;25/2014, Working paper, 2014-06)
      We analyze whether regional labor markets are affected by exposure to import competition from China. We find negative employment effects for low-skilled workers, and observe that low-skilled workers tend to be pushed ...
    • Price discrimination and three part tariffs in a duopoly 

      Jensen, Sissel (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-03)
      The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differentiated products. Two firms serve consumers having heterogeneous willingness to pay for the good, willingness to pay ...
    • The Role of Parenthood on the Gender Gap among Top Earners 

      Bütikofer, Aline; Jensen, Sissel; Salvanes, Kjell G. (DP SAM;9/2018, Working paper, 2018-04)
      Is the wage penalty due to motherhood larger among highly qualified women? In this paper, we study the effect of parenthood on the careers of high-achieving women relative to high-achieving men in a set of high-earning ...
    • Two part tariffs with partial product bundling 

      Jensen, Sissel (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001)
      When a firm operates in an industry with very large differences in consumers' willingness to pay for the service it offers, it faces a challenge in the pricing decision. It wants to engage in price discrimination, but ...
    • Two-part pricing, consumer heterogeneity and Cournot competition 

      Jensen, Sissel; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001)
      We analyze two-part tariffs in an oligopoly, where each firm commits to a quantity and a fixed fee prior to the determination of unit prices. In the case of homogeneous consumers, Harrison and Kline (2001) showed that the ...
    • Two-part tariffs with partial unbundling 

      Jensen, Sissel (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-10)
      The paper explores second degree price discrimination in a multidimensional good context. There are two types of consumers with demand described by a two-dimensional vector, a quantity dimension and a service attribute ...
    • Two-part tariffs with quality degradation 

      Jensen, Sissel (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-03)
      There is a gap between the recommendations of the theory of second degree price discrimination and the practices of firms that target consumer segments with varying willingness to pay with two or more distinct tar- iffs. ...
    • Two-part tariffs, consumer heterogeneity and Cournot competition 

      Jensen, Sissel; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-10)
      We analyze two-part tariffs in oligopoly, where each firm commits to a certain quantity. The model is an extension of the one introduced in Har (2001). We show that their main results are reversed when the model is extended ...