• Crime and punishment : when tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;4/2013, Working paper, 2013-02)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper offers ...
    • Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. 

      Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E. (DP SAM;7/2018, Working paper, 2018-04)
      This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...