• Beyond trade costs : firms' endogenous access to international markets 

      Pires, Armando José Garcia (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-10)
      In this paper we argue that the level of access to international markets by firms is related not only to exogenous factors such as trade costs, but also to endogenous factors such as strategic competition on R&D. In ...
    • Capital taxation and imperfect competition : ACE vs. CBIT 

      Brekke, Kurt R.; Pires, Armando José Garcia; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper;32/14, Working paper, 2014-11)
      This paper studies the market and welfare effects of two main tax reforms – the Corporate Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity tax (ACE). Using an imperfect-competition model for a small open ...
    • FDI, R&D and endogenous competitiveness 

      Pires, Armando José Garcia (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-01)
      We analyze the influence of endogenous competitiveness on multinational activity. Competitiveness is endogenized by assuming that firms differ on R&D commitment power, i.e.: some firms are leaders in R&D. We show that ...
    • International trade with competitiveness : effects in R&D 

      Pires, Armando José Garcia (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-02)
    • Losers, winners and prisoner's dilemma in international subsidy wars 

      Pires, Armando José Garcia (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-10)
      Two central results in the strategic trade literature are that governments shall support winners and that there is a policy prisoner dilemma in international subsidy wars (i.e.: countries have incentives to support local ...
    • R&D and strategic industrial location in international oligopolies 

      Pires, Armando José Garcia (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-03)
    • Should governments help winners or losers? 

      Pires, Armando José Garcia (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-10)
      One central result in the strategic trade literature is that governments should not support domestic ”losers” but domestic ”winners”. We show that when first-mover advantages are taken into account, the reverse holds, ...