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dc.contributor.authorNielsen, Søren Bo
dc.contributor.authorRaimondos-Møller, Pascalis
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-10T11:45:46Z
dc.date.available2006-07-10T11:45:46Z
dc.date.issued2005-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162692
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.en
dc.format.extent190647 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2005:11en
dc.subjectcentralized vs. de-centralized decisionsen
dc.subjecttaxesen
dc.subjectMNEsen
dc.titleCentralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxesen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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