| dc.contributor.author | Schindler, Dirk | |
| dc.contributor.author | Schjelderup, Guttorm | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-07-11T09:01:06Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2006-07-11T09:01:06Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006-05 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162712 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability
of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces
collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize
or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization
to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 259413 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2006:19 | en |
| dc.subject | corporate tax systems | en |
| dc.subject | tacit collusion | en |
| dc.title | Company tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavior | en |
| dc.type | Working paper | en |
