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dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-11T09:01:06Z
dc.date.available2006-07-11T09:01:06Z
dc.date.issued2006-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162712
dc.description.abstractWe study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.en
dc.format.extent259413 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006:19en
dc.subjectcorporate tax systemsen
dc.subjecttacit collusionen
dc.titleCompany tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavioren
dc.typeWorking paperen


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