dc.contributor.author | Schindler, Dirk | |
dc.contributor.author | Eggert, Wolfgang | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-03T07:20:47Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-03T07:20:47Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-11 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162752 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines competition between bank regulators in open economies.
We use a model where credit demand of firms is endogenous and show any tendency
for downward competition in regulation policy is limited by the effect of regulation
on profits of nonfinancial firms. Moreover, perfect mobility on loans and deposit
markets fully eliminates the incentives of regulators to set bank regulation at ine±cient low levels. | en |
dc.format.extent | 230177 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2004:29 | en |
dc.title | Competition between bank regulators | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |