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dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgang
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-03T07:20:47Z
dc.date.available2006-08-03T07:20:47Z
dc.date.issued2004-11
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162752
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines competition between bank regulators in open economies. We use a model where credit demand of firms is endogenous and show any tendency for downward competition in regulation policy is limited by the effect of regulation on profits of nonfinancial firms. Moreover, perfect mobility on loans and deposit markets fully eliminates the incentives of regulators to set bank regulation at ine±cient low levels.en
dc.format.extent230177 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:29en
dc.titleCompetition between bank regulatorsen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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