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dc.contributor.authorBarros, Pedro P.
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorNilssen, Tore
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-03T07:22:08Z
dc.date.available2006-08-03T07:22:08Z
dc.date.issued2004-08
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162754
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a model of competition between two advertisingfinanced media firms, and we apply the model to analyze competition between portals on the Internet. First, we show that equilibrium prices of advertising are actually higher the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be. Second, we show that aggregate profit for the portals increases if they form each their vertical alliance with advertisers. This is true even if there is perfect competition between the advertisers for advertising space. However, we also demonstrate that it may be individually profitable for one of the portals not to form a vertical alliance if the portals are close substitutes. In that case we end up with an asymmetric equilibrium with only one vertical alliance. This happens despite the fact that aggregate profit would be higher with two vertical alliances.en
dc.format.extent234286 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:21en
dc.titleMedia competition on the Interneten
dc.typeWorking paperen


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