dc.contributor.author | Eggert, Wolfgang | |
dc.contributor.author | Schjelderup, Guttorm | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-08T07:32:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-08T07:32:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162778 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence-based capital tax with a property tax (source tax on capital) the tax equilibrium is efficient. In contrast, the use of a 2-factor FA scheme based on sales and capital combined with a residence-based capital tax leads to an inefficient outcome. | en |
dc.format.extent | 73576 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2003:1 | en |
dc.title | Symmetric tax competition under formula apportionment | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |