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dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgang
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-08T07:32:48Z
dc.date.available2006-08-08T07:32:48Z
dc.date.issued2003-01
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162778
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence-based capital tax with a property tax (source tax on capital) the tax equilibrium is efficient. In contrast, the use of a 2-factor FA scheme based on sales and capital combined with a residence-based capital tax leads to an inefficient outcome.en
dc.format.extent73576 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:1en
dc.titleSymmetric tax competition under formula apportionmenten
dc.typeWorking paperen


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