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dc.contributor.authorBjorvatn, Kjetil
dc.contributor.authorSøreide, Tina
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-04T08:27:55Z
dc.date.available2006-08-04T08:27:55Z
dc.date.issued2003-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162866
dc.description.abstractMarket reforms in developing and transition economies have sometimes failed to deliver the desired welfare effects. Corruption may be an important reason for the inefficiency of market reforms, such as privatization campaigns. The present paper demonstrates how corruption can affect the choice of buyer of a public asset. Our main result is that market reform in highly corrupt societies is likely to result in less competition and less economic efficiency than reform in less corrupt societies. We also demonstrate that the level of bribes in the sale of public assets does not necessarily increase in the government’s emphasis on bribes.en
dc.format.extent259136 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:6en
dc.subjectcorruptionen
dc.subjectmarket reformen
dc.subjectprivatizationen
dc.titleCorruption and market reformen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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