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dc.contributor.authorSandmo, Agnar
dc.contributor.authorPersson, Mats
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-10T10:45:27Z
dc.date.available2006-08-10T10:45:27Z
dc.date.issued2002-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162898
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labour supply and income distribution in the context of the rank-order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non-zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society’s welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.en
dc.format.extent66170 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2002:10en
dc.titleTaxation and tournamentsen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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