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dc.contributor.authorLommerud, Kjell Erik
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-10T10:48:42Z
dc.date.available2006-08-10T10:48:42Z
dc.date.issued2002-07
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162902
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in the telecommunication industry, and how public policy may promote a more competitive outcome. We apply a model that captures the fact that the incumbent has an installed base of loyal consumers, some consumers are price sensitive, and the entrant is charged an access fee for entering the network. We distinguish between classical (de novo) entry and reciprocal entry (incumbent entering the neighbouring market), and analyse how such public policy measures as (i) publication of prices by the authorities and (ii) lower access fees affect the competitive outcome. In the reciprocal entry model we find that lower access fees tend to discourage entry into a neighbouring market, while the publishing of prices has an ambiguous effect on entry.en
dc.format.extent107687 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2002:15en
dc.subjectcollusionen
dc.subjectentryen
dc.subjectaccess feeen
dc.subjecttelecommunicationen
dc.titleEntry in telecommunication : customer loyalty, price sensitivity and access pricesen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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