dc.contributor.author | Kolstad, Ivar | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-10T10:52:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-10T10:52:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002-03 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162908 | |
dc.description.abstract | A two-population evolutionary model of learning is proposed where
there is a conflict of interests between populations, and where
interaction ranges from complete viscosity to complete dispersion. The
long run stochastically stable states under complete viscosity match
those of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). With complete dispersion,
the long run stochastically stable states match those of Hehenkamp
(2001). With fluid interaction, there is a possibility of convention
coexistence. Welfare properties of the long run stochastically stable
states are examined using utilitarian and Rawlsian measures of welfare. | en |
dc.format.extent | 126907 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2002:7 | en |
dc.subject | evolutionary game theory | en |
dc.subject | viscosity | en |
dc.subject | learning | en |
dc.subject | stochastic stability | en |
dc.subject | equilibrium selection | en |
dc.subject | convention coexistence | en |
dc.title | Viscosity and dispersion in an evolutionary model of learning | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |