Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorJensen, Sissel
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-15T12:07:20Z
dc.date.available2006-08-15T12:07:20Z
dc.date.issued2000-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162958
dc.descriptionRevised October 2001en
dc.description.abstractThe paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differentiated products. Two firms serve consumers having heterogeneous willingness to pay for the good, willingness to pay being private knowledge. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are subsequently billed according to the chosen tariff. Although product differentiation enables the firms to implement price discrimination, it is shown that competition has important effects on the tariff structure. A fully separating equilibrium can only be reached if the firm is allowed to use three part tariffs, i.e., quantity discounts conditional on a certain minimum usage level, in addition to two part tariffs, i.e., quantity discounts on the condition that a fixed fee is paid in advance.en
dc.format.extent227594 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2000:3en
dc.subjectprice discriminationen
dc.subjectnonlinear pricingen
dc.subjectimplementationen
dc.subjectmulti-part tariffsen
dc.titlePrice discrimination and three part tariffs in a duopolyen
dc.typeWorking paperen


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel