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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorHansen, Bjørn
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-15T12:09:11Z
dc.date.available2006-08-15T12:09:11Z
dc.date.issued2001-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162960
dc.description.abstractWe consider a two-stage game between two competing Internet service providers(ISPs). The firms offer access to the Internet. Access is assumed to be vertically and horizontally differentiated. Our model exhibits network externalities. In the first stage the two ISPs choose the level of compatibility (i.e. quality of a direct interconnect link between the two networks). In the second stage the two ISPs compete á-la Hotelling. We find that the ISPs can reduce the stage 2 competitive pressure by increasing compatibility due to the network externality. The firms will thus agree upon a high compatibility at stage 1. When it is costly to invest in compatibility, we find that the firms overinvest, as compared to the welfare maximising investment level.en
dc.format.extent172186 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2001:4en
dc.subjectcompatibilityen
dc.subjectinterneten
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectduopolyen
dc.titleCompetition and compatibility among Internet service providersen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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