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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorHansen, Bjørn
dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngve
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-11T07:05:10Z
dc.date.available2006-08-11T07:05:10Z
dc.date.issued2001-12
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162998
dc.description.abstractWe analyze roaming policy in the market for mobile telecommunications. Firms undertake investments in network infrastructure to increase geographical coverage, capacity in a given area, or functionality. Prior to investments, roaming policy is determined. We show that under collusion at the investment stage, firms' and a benevolent welfare maximizing regulator's interests coincide, and no regulatory intervention is needed. When investments are undertaken non-cooperatively, firms' and the regulator's interests do not coincide. Contrary to what seems to be the regulator’s concern, firms would decide on a higher roaming quality than the regulator. The effects of allowing a virtual operator to enter are also examined. Furthermore, we discuss some implications for competition policy with regard to network infrastructure investment.en
dc.format.extent360789 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2001:32en
dc.subjectmobile communicationsen
dc.subjectroamingen
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectvirtual operatorsen
dc.titleDemand-side spillovers and semi-collusion in the mobile communications marketen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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