Making sense of market delineation with the aggregate diversion ratio

dc.contributor.author	Daljord, Øystein Børnes
dc.contributor.author	Sørgard, Lars
dc.contributor.author	Thomassen, Øyvind
dc.date.accessioned	2007-09-21T11:15:09Z
dc.date.available	2007-09-21T11:15:09Z
dc.date.issued	2007-08
dc.identifier.issn	0804-6824
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163028
dc.description.abstract	The US Merger Guidelines leave it an open question if the SSNIP test requires an increase in one, some or all prices in the candidate market. We argue that the characteristics of the candidate market in question should be decisive for how to perform the SSNIP test. If there are asymmetries between products, increasing one price might be a better procedure in order to identify competitive constraints. Katz & Shapiro (2003) derived a one-price criterion in terms of the aggregate diversion ratio which is applicable for asymmetric candidate markets. Unfortunately, the derivation is incorrect. We derive a corrected criterion.	en
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2007:18	en
dc.title	Making sense of market delineation with the aggregate diversion ratio	en
dc.type	Working paper	en
dc.subject.nsi	VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212	en