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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt Richard
dc.contributor.authorSiciliani, Luigi
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-03T12:41:40Z
dc.date.available2007-07-03T12:41:40Z
dc.date.issued2007-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163038
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times. We use a Salop-type model, with hospitals that differ in (geographical) location and, potentially, waiting time, and two types of patients; high-benefit patients who choose between neighbouring hospitals (competitive segment), and low-benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital (monopoly segment). Compared with a benchmark case of regulated monopolies, we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large. Given a policy regime of hospital competition, the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement: Lower travelling costs increase waiting times, higher hospital density reduces waiting times, while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous. We also show that, if the competitive segment is large, hospital competition is socially preferrable to regulated monopolies only if the (regulated) treatment price is sufficiently high.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:13en
dc.subjecthospitalsen
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectwaiting timesen
dc.titleCompetition and waiting times in hospital marketsen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


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