dc.contributor.author | Clark, Derek J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Foros, Øystein | |
dc.contributor.author | Sand, Jan Yngve | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-05-15T07:45:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-05-15T07:45:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-10 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163100 | |
dc.description.abstract | We consider an industry where one firm with a superior technology competes
for market shares with several rivals. The owner of the superior technology
(the dominant firm) can license or transfer the source of its dominance
to a subset of rivals. Allowing the non-license takers to remain active in the
market is a drain on the profit of the insiders, and we demonstrate that the
dominant firm will only make a transfer of the superior technology if it can be
used to foreclose some rival firms. Foreclosure of a subset of firms may thus
be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. Moreover,
we show that when licensing is profitable, the dominant firm will prefer a
complete transfer even if a partial transfer can be made. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007:29 | en |
dc.subject | licensing | en |
dc.subject | foreclosure | en |
dc.subject | contest | en |
dc.title | Licensing technology and foreclosure | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | en |