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dc.contributor.authorThøgersen, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorMatsen, Egil
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-28T08:09:59Z
dc.date.available2008-08-28T08:09:59Z
dc.date.issued2007-12
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163136
dc.description.abstractWe suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of re-election. Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain re-election, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:37en
dc.subjectbudget deficitsen
dc.subjectvotingen
dc.subjectextremismen
dc.subjecthabit formationen
dc.titleHabit formation, strategic extremism and debt policyen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


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