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dc.contributor.authorMathiesen, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-06T08:55:35Z
dc.date.available2008-11-06T08:55:35Z
dc.date.issued2008-06
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163146
dc.description.abstractIn the traditional Cournot model producers influence each other’s decisions through revenue earned in the product market. Rosen (1965) introduced the notion of a coupled constraints equilibrium which allowed players to affect their rivals’ strategy space as well. Krawczyk (2005) applied this idea to the regulation of environmental pollution where a cap on aggregate emissions implies a constraint across firms’ activity levels. He solved the model with a diagonalization algorithm obtaining linear convergence. We formulate this problem as a complementarity problem and apply a Newton algorithm obtaining a quadratic convergence. We show that the conditions under which this model has a unique solution and the algorithm computes the solution are analogous to those for the traditional Cournot model.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:12en
dc.titleRegulation of pollution in a Cournot equilibriumen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


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