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dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorShaffer, Greg
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-22T11:21:38Z
dc.date.available2010-03-22T11:21:38Z
dc.date.issued2010-01
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163184
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement and find that partial ownership arrangements can be more profitable for the acquiring and acquired firm because they can result in a greater dampening of competition. We also derive comparative statics on the prices of the acquiring firm, the acquired firm, and the outside firms. In a dual context, we show that a cross-majority owner may have incentives to sell a fraction of the shares in one of the firms he controls to a silent investor who is outside the industry. Aggregate ex post operating profit in the two firms controlled by the cross-majority shareholder then increases, such that both the cross-majority shareholder and the silent investor will be better off with than without the partial divestiture.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010:1en
dc.subjectmedia economicsen
dc.subjectmergersen
dc.subjectcorporate controlen
dc.subjectfinancial controlen
dc.titleMergers and partial ownershipen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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