dc.contributor.author | Jacquet, Laurence | |
dc.contributor.author | Lehmann, Etienne | |
dc.contributor.author | Van der Linden, Bruno | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-22T14:53:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-22T14:53:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-02 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163206 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper characterizes the optimal income taxation when individuals respond along
both the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions:
their skills and their disutility of participation. Preferences over consumption and work effort
can differ with the skill level, only the Spence-Mirrlees condition being imposed. We derive
an optimal tax formula thanks to a tax perturbation approach. This formula generalizes
previous results by allowing for income effects and extensive margin responses. We provide
a sufficient condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be nonnegative everywhere. The
relevance of this condition is discussed with analytical examples and numerical simulations
on U.S. data. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2010:7 | en |
dc.subject | optimal tax formula | en |
dc.subject | tax perturbation | en |
dc.subject | random participation | en |
dc.title | Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | en |