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dc.contributor.authorStrandenes, Siri Pettersen
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmar
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-03T07:40:16Z
dc.date.available2006-08-03T07:40:16Z
dc.date.issued2003-10
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163280
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers one-sided scheduling problems, where a schedule of service is arranged at one location, without regard to other schedules. Typically, such scheduling problems are handled on a first-come-firstserve basis, which is grossly inefficient. The present paper proposes a scheduling mechanism that is a non-standard auction, in which the allocation is ruled by evaluating combinations of bids. The proposed mechanism implements the efficient allocation in dominant strategies and is deficit-free. Since that mechanism is suitable for the scheduling problems at sea-ports, loading or unloading at sea-ports is used as an illustration.en
dc.format.extent80101 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:13en
dc.subjectauctionsen
dc.subjectrationingen
dc.titleEfficient (re-)scheduling : an auction approachen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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