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dc.contributor.authorEllingsen, Tore
dc.contributor.authorKristiansen, Eirik Gaard
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-14T13:04:04Z
dc.date.available2013-03-14T13:04:04Z
dc.date.issued2012-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163346
dc.description.abstractTalented managers may leave the firm in order to work elsewhere. Focusing on the portability of managers' resources, we develop a model in which managerial compensation is designed to prevent inefficient departure. The model rationalizes the widespread use of fl at salaries in combination with performance-vesting stock options and is consistent with observed differences in compensation contracts across individuals, firms, industries, and countries.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics, Department of Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;8/2012
dc.titlePaying for staying : managerial contracts and the retention motiveno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO


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