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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt Richard
dc.contributor.authorSiciliani, Luigi
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-30T08:27:23Z
dc.date.available2013-07-30T08:27:23Z
dc.date.issued2013-04
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163406
dc.description.abstractUsing a spatial competition framework with three ex ante identical hospitals, we study the effects of a hospital merger on quality, price and welfare. The merging hospitals always reduce quality, but the non-merging hospital responds by reducing quality if prices are fixed and increasing quality if not. The merging hospitals increase prices if demand responsiveness to quality is sufficiently low, whereas the non-merging hospital always increases its price. If prices are endogenous, a merger leads to higher average prices and quality in the market. A merger is harmful for total patient utility but can improve social welfare under price competition.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;8/2013
dc.subjecthospital mergersno_NO
dc.subjectspatial competitionno_NO
dc.subjectantitrustno_NO
dc.titleHospital mergers : a spatial competition approachno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO
dc.subject.jelI11
dc.subject.jelI18
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL44


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