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dc.contributor.authorBjorvatn, Kjetil
dc.contributor.authorSøreide, Tina
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-13T09:59:19Z
dc.date.available2013-03-13T09:59:19Z
dc.date.issued2012-09
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163442
dc.description.abstractAn increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that differ from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a developing country context. We show how differences in the investors level of technology and differences in the host country government's trade-off between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. We find that the entry of a corrupt investor may induce the honest investor to offer bribes instead of taxes. Surprisingly, however, our analysis also demonstrates that under some conditions, the entry of a corrupt investor may in fact induce the honest investor to increase its tax payments.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics, Department of Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;18/2012
dc.subjectcorruptionno_NO
dc.subjectFDIno_NO
dc.subjectauctionno_NO
dc.subjectnatural resourcesno_NO
dc.titleCorruption and competition for resourcesno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO


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