Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorNilsen, Øivind Anti
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.contributor.authorUlsaker, Simen A.
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-05T13:21:14Z
dc.date.available2014-02-05T13:21:14Z
dc.date.issued2013-12
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163456
dc.description.abstractThis study develops and uses a successive oligopoly model, with an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, to analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger. We find that an upstream merger may lead to higher average prices paid by downstream firms, but that there is no change in the prices paid by consumers. The model is tested empirically on data for an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector (specifically, the market for eggs). Consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, we find that the merger had no effect on consumer prices, but led to higher average prices from the downstream to the upstream firm.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers;17/2013
dc.subjectupstream mergerno_NO
dc.subjectnon-linear pricesno_NO
dc.subjectvertical contractsno_NO
dc.titleUpstream merger in a successive oligopoly : who pays the price?no_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO
dc.subject.jelK21
dc.subject.jelL41


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record