Blar i Discussion papers (FOR) på forfatter "Olsen, Trond E."

Viser treff 21-27 av 27

    • Strategic regulation of a multi-national banking industry 

      Dalen, Dag Morten; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-12)
      This paper focuses on the consequences of cross-border banking and entry of multi-national bank (MNB) subsidiaries for banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB ...

    • Strategic tax competition : implications of national ownership 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1999-11)
      Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, ...

    • Team incentives in relational employment contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-08)
      The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and independent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is ...

    • Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;13/13, Working paper, 2013-12)
      This paper analyses and compares optimal relational contracts be- tween a principal/firm and a set of agents when (a) only aggregate out- put can be observed, and (b) individual outputs can be observed. We show that the ...

    • Teams in Relational Contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;23/16, Working paper, 2016-12-16)
      We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal ...

    • The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;2012:8, Working paper, 2012-06)
      When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement ...

    • Tournaments with prize-setting agents 

      Eriksen, Kristoffer W.; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-10)
      In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage distribution, and many firms allow self-managed teams to freely determine internal resource ...