• Public information and IPO underpricing 

      Bakke, Einar; Leite, Tore; Thorburn, Karin S. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)
      We analyze the effect of public information on rational investors' incentives to reveal private information during the bookbuilding process and their demand for allocations in the IPO. Our model generates several new ...
    • Public Stackelberg leadership in a mixed oligopoly with foreign firms 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Heywood, John S. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001)
      This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximizing leader is shown to always produce less than under ...
    • Publication bias in the returns to R&D literature 

      Møen, Jarle; Thorsen, Helge Sandvig (Discussion paper;12/13, Working paper, 2013-11)
      The returns to R&D literature is large and has been surveyed on several occasions. We complement previous surveys by using formal meta analytic techniques to analyse publication bias. We find evidence consistent with a ...
    • The pursuit of global opportunities : the role of central managers 

      Bragelien, Iver (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002)
      I study a local manager's incentives to invest in the research of new opportunities, when the implementation of some projects requires the participation of more than one unit. A central manager can select projects or ...
    • R & D investment responses to R & D subsidies : a theoretical analysis and a microeconometric study 

      Klette, Tor Jakob; Møen, Jarle (Discussion paper;2011:15, Working paper, 2011-09)
      Subsidies to the Norwegian high-tech industries have traditionally been given as matching grants , i.e. the subsidies are targeted, and the firms have to contribute a 50 % own risk capital to the subsidized projects. ...
    • R&D investments with competitive interactions 

      Miltersen, Kristian R.; Schwartz, Eduardo S. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002)
      In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur ...
    • Rational investor sentiment 

      Gerber, Anke; Hens, Thorsten; Vogt, Bodo (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-11)
      We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes' beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset ...
    • A re-examination of credit rationing in the Stiglitz and Weiss model 

      Su, Xunhua (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-11)
      To explain the widely observed phenomenon of credit rationing, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) propose a theory of random rationing under imperfect information. With a simple model plausibly expanding the Stiglitz and Weiss ...
    • Real-time versus day-ahead market power in a hydro-based electricity market 

      Tangerås, Thomas P.; Mauritzen, Johannes (Discussion paper;06/14, Working paper, 2014-02)
      We analyse in a theoretical framework the link between real-time and day-ahead market performance in a hydro-based and imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity market. Theoretical predictions of the model are tested ...
    • Recursive utility and disappearing puzzles for continuous-time models 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion papers;2013/02, Working paper, 2013-05)
      Motivated by the problems of the conventional model in rational- izing market data, we derive the equilibrium interest rate and risk premiums using recursive utility in a continuous time model. Two ordinally equivalent ...
    • Recursive utility and jump-diffusions 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper;09/14, Working paper, 2014-03)
      We derive the equilibrium interest rate and risk premiums using recursive utility for jump-di usions. Compared to to the continuous version, including jumps allows for a separate risk aversion related to jump size risk ...
    • Recursive utility and jump-diffusions 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper;06/15, Working paper, 2015-01-30)
      We derive the equilibrium interest rate and risk premiums using recursive utility for jump-diffusions. Compared to to the continuous version, including jumps allows for a separate risk aversion related to jump size risk ...
    • Recursive utility and the equity premium puzzle: A discrete-time approach 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion papers;2013/03, Working paper, 2013-05)
      We study the Epstein-Zin model with recursive utility. Recognizing that recursive preferences implies that the underlying model is not Markovian, we use methods not depending upon the Markov property to solve the model. ...
    • Recursive utility using the stochastic maximum principle 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper;03/14, Working paper, 2014-02)
      Motivated by the problems of the conventional model in rationalizing market data, we derive the equilibrium interest rate and risk premiums using recursive utility in a continuous time model. We consider ...
    • Redistributive taxation, multinational enterprises, and economic integration 

      Haufler, Andreas; Klemm, Alexander; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-03)
      Increased activity of multinational firms exposes national corporate tax bases to cross-country profit shifting, but also leads to rising profitability of the corporate sector. We incorporate these two effects of economic ...
    • Reflections about pseudo-dual prices in combinatorial auctions 

      Drexl, Andreas; Jörnsten, Kurt (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-04)
      Combinatorial auctions permitting bids on bundles of items have been developed to remedy the exposure problem associated with single-item auctions. Given winning bundle prices a set of item prices is called market clearing ...
    • A regression surprise resolved 

      Lillestøl, Jostein; Andersson, Jonas (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-09)
      In this note we explore the following surprising fact: In regression with trend and seasonality, the prediction risk is constant for all seasons of a new cycle, despite the fact that it increases with time when the seasons ...
    • Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement 

      Miller, David; Olsen, Trond E.; Watson, Joel (Discussion paper;8/18, Working paper, 2018-05-18)
      We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play ...
    • Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement 

      Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;6/18, Working paper, 2018-04-30)
      This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...
    • Relational incentive contracts for teams of multitasking agents 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;10/23, Working paper, 2023-06-30)
      We analyze optimal relational contracts for a group (team) of multitasking agents with hidden actions. Contracts are based on noisy signals that may be correlated across agents and between tasks. The optimal contract defines ...