• Asset ownership and implicit contracts 

      Bragelien, Iver (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1998-12)
      In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific investments, I suggest a model where a linear implicit contract can strengthen the incentives to invest, if the parties are sufficiently ...
    • Asset ownership and relational contracts 

      Bragelien, Iver (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002)
      In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relational contract specifies the same payments that renegotiations would have led to in a spot mode, plus a fixed transfer and ...
    • Asset ownership and risk aversion 

      Bragelien, Iver (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1998-12)
      I suggest a model for two managers/owners and two assets, where the optimal allocation of ownership rights is jointly determined by the parties’ risk aversion and the specificity of their investments. The managers are ...
    • The pursuit of global opportunities : the role of central managers 

      Bragelien, Iver (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002)
      I study a local manager's incentives to invest in the research of new opportunities, when the implementation of some projects requires the participation of more than one unit. A central manager can select projects or ...
    • Relationship-specificity, bargaining power, growth, and firm performance 

      Bragelien, Iver; Impink, Joost (Discussion paper;04/14, Working paper, 2014-02)
      We investigate the relevance of relationship-specificity in explaining firm performance and firm value. First, we use an incomplete contracts model to derive hypotheses on how relationship-specificity interacts with ...