Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.contributor.authorOsmundsen, Petter
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-13T18:34:54Z
dc.date.available2006-07-13T18:34:54Z
dc.date.issued2001-05
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163627
dc.description.abstractTwo jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm has private information about its efficiency and about spillovers. It is shown that the firm may gain from governmental tax coordination. Relative to a cooperative tax agreement, tax competition may induce excessive investments in the country where the positive spillover effects are lowest. Also, with sufficiently asymmetric spillovers, investments under competition will be excessively spread out, not properly concentrated to the country where spillovers would be largest. Equilibrium outcomes in the taxation game depend on the firm’s ownership structure, and the firm as well as the governments may wish to influence this structure to affect the equilibrium.en
dc.format.extent388884 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2001:23en
dc.titleSpillovers and international competition for investmentsen
dc.typeWorking paperen


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel