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dc.contributor.authorBragelien, Iver
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-13T12:24:24Z
dc.date.available2006-07-13T12:24:24Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163641
dc.description.abstractIn a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relational contract specifies the same payments that renegotiations would have led to in a spot mode, plus a fixed transfer and a one-step bonus scheme. The choice of ownership is shown to depend critically on the punishment strategies and the nature of the uncertainty.en
dc.format.extent232446 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2002:27en
dc.subjectrelational contractsen
dc.subjectproperty rightsen
dc.subjecttheory of the firmen
dc.titleAsset ownership and relational contractsen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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