Optimal risk sharing

dc.contributor.author	Aase, Knut K.
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-13T08:08:53Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-13T08:08:53Z
dc.date.issued	2003-01
dc.identifier.issn	1500-4066
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163741
dc.description.abstract	Optimal risk sharing is considered from the perspective of the risk sharing model introduced by Karl Borch in the late 50ies. First we introduce, in a modern setting, the main concepts from this theory. These we apply on the risk sharing problem between an insurer and an insurance customer. We motivate the development through a simple example, illustrating some fine points of this theory. In order to explain deductibles, we separately introduce (i) costs, and (ii) moral hazard in the neoclassical model , the latter case also illustrated by an example.	en
dc.format.extent	308856 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2003:2	en
dc.subject	reinsurance exchange	en
dc.subject	equilibrium	en
dc.subject	pareto optimality	en
dc.subject	representative agent	en
dc.subject	core solution	en
dc.subject	individual rationality	en
dc.subject	deductibles	en
dc.subject	costs	en
dc.subject	moral hazard	en
dc.title	Optimal risk sharing	en
dc.type	Working paper	en