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dc.contributor.authorBjørndal, Mette
dc.contributor.authorJörnsten, Kurt
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-14T08:05:58Z
dc.date.available2006-07-14T08:05:58Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163781
dc.description.abstractGrid investments are normally done in electrical networks in order to achieve a well functioning integrated electricity market and/or making the network more secure, i.e. less sensitive to link failures. In general, there are two aspects to be considered when making a new grid investment, the first is that of detecting beneficial investments, and the second is how to induce them under the chosen market regime. We will show that network "improvements", i.e. strengthening a line or building a new line, may in fact be detrimental to social surplus, and that some agents will have incentives to advocate these changes.en
dc.format.extent170931 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2000:10en
dc.titleParadoxes in networks supporting competitive electricity marketsen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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